第25章

We can have no consciousness of Being in general which is not some Beingin particular: a thing, in consciousness, is one thing out of many. In assumingthe possibility of an infinite object of consciousness, I assume, therefore,that it is at the same time limited and unlimited; -- actually something,without which it could not be an object of consciousness, and actually nothing,without which it could not be infinite. * * *"A second characteristic of Consciousness is, that it is only possiblein the form of a relation. There must be a Subject, or person conscious,and an Object, or thing of which he is conscious. There can be no consciousnesswithout the union of these two factors; and, in that union, each exists onlyas it is related to the other. The subject is a subject, only in so far asit is conscious of an object; the object is an object, only in so far asit is apprehended by a subject: and the destruction of either is the destructionof consciousness itself. It is thus manifest that a consciousness of theAbsolute is equally self-contradictory with that of the Infinite. To be consciousof the Absolute as such, we must know that an object, which is given in relationto our consciousness, is identical with one which exists in its own nature,out of all relation to consciousness. But to know this identity, we mustbe able to compare the two together; and such a comparison is itself a contradiction.

We are in fact required to compare that of which we are conscious with thatof which we are not conscious; the comparison itself being an act of consciousness,and only possible through the consciousness of both its objects. It is thusmanifest that, even if we could be conscious of the absolute we could notpossibly know that it is the absolute: and, as we can be conscious of anobject as such, only by knowing it to be what it is, this is equivalent toan admission that we cannot be conscious of the absolute at all. As an objectof COnsciousness, every thing is necessarily relative; and what a thing maybe out of consciousness no mode of consciousness can tell us. * * *"This contradiction, again, admits of the same explanation as theformer, * * * Existence, as we conceive it, is but a name for the severalways in which objects are presented to our consciousness, -- a general term,embracing a variety of relations. The Absolute, on the other hand, is a termexpressing no object of thought, but only a denial of the relation by whichthought is constituted."

Here let me point out how the same general inference may be evolved fromanother fundamental condition to thought, omitted by Sir W. Hamilton andnot supplied by Mr. Mansel; -- a condition which, under its obverse aspect,we have already contemplated in the last section. Every complete act of consciousness,besides distinction and relation, also implies likeness. Before it can constitutea piece of knowledge, or even become an idea, a mental state must be knownnot only as separate in kind or quality from certain foregoing states towhich it is known as related by succession, but it must further be knownas of the same kind or quality with certain other foregoing states. Thatorganization of changes which constitutes thinking, involves continuous integrationas well as continuous differentiation. Were each new affection of the mindperceived simply as an affection in some way contested with preceding ones-- were there but a chain of impressions, each of which as it arose was merelydistinguished from its predecessors; consciousness would be a chaos. To producethat orderly consciousness which we call intelligence, there requires theassimilation of each impression to others that occurred earlier in the series.

Both the successive mental states, and the successive relations which theybear to one another, must be classified; and classification involves notonly a parting of the unlike, but also a binding together of the like. Inbrief, a true cognition is possible only through an accompanying recognition.