第9章

In the first place, it is clear that by self-existence we especially meanan existence independent of any other -- not produced by any other: the assertionof self-existence is an indirect denial of creation. In thus excluding theidea of any antecedent cause, we necessarily exclude the idea of a beginning. for to admit that there was a time when the existence had not commenced,is to admit that its commencement was determined by something, or was caused,which is a contradiction. Self-existence, therefore, necessarily means existencewithout a beginning; and to form a conception of self-existence is to forma conception of existence without a beginning. Now by no mental effort canwe do this. To conceive existence through infinite past-time, implies theconception of infinite past-time, which is an impossibility. To this letus add that even were self-existence conceivable, it would not be an explanationof the Universe. No one will say that the existence of an object at the presentmoment is made easier to understand by the discovery that it existed an hourago, or a day ago, or a year ago; and if its existence now is not made morecomprehensible by knowledge of its existence during some previous finiteperiod, then no knowledge of it during many such finite periods, even couldwe extend them to an infinite period, would make it more comprehensible.

Thus the Atheistic theory is not only absolutely unthinkable, but, even wereit thinkable, would not be a solution. The assertion that the Universe isself-existent does not really carry us a step beyond the cognition of itspresent existence; and so leaves us with a mere re-statement of the mystery.

The hypothesis of self-creation, which practically amounts to what iscalled Pantheism, is similarly incapable of being represented in thought.

Certain phenomena, such as the precipitation of invisible vapour into cloud,aid us in forming a symbolic conception of a self-evolved Universe; and thereare not wanting indications in the Heavens, and on the Earth, which helpus in giving to this conception some distinctness. But while the successionof phases through which the visible Universe has passed in reaching its presentform, may perhaps be comprehended as in a sense self-determined; yet theimpossibility of expanding our symbolic conception of self-creation intoa real conception, remains as complete as ever. Really to conceive self-creation,is to conceive potential existence passing into actual existence by someinherent necessity, which we cannot. We cannot form any idea of a potentialexistence of the Universe, as distinguished from its actual existence. Ifrepresented in thought at all, potential existence must be represented assomething, that is, as an actual existence: to suppose that it can be representedas nothing involves two absurdities -- that nothing is more than a negation,and can be positively represented in thought, and that one nothing is distinguishedfrom all other nothings by its power to develop into something. Nor is thisall. We have no state of consciousness answering to the words an inherentnecessity by which potential existence became actual existence. To renderthem into thought, existence, having for an indefinite period remained inone form, must be conceived as passing without any external impulse intoanother form; and this involves the idea of a change without a cause -- athing of which no idea is possible. Thus the terms of this hypothesis donot stand for real thoughts, but merely suggest the vaguest symbols not admittingof any interpretation. Moreover, even were potential existence conceivableas a different thing from actual existence, and could the transition fromthe one to the other be mentally realized as self-determined, we should stillbe no forwarder: the problem would simply be removed a step back. For whencethe potential existence? This would just as much require accounting for asactual existence, and just the same difficulties would meet us. The self-existenceof a potential Universe is no more conceivable than the self-existence ofthe actual Universe. The self-creation of a potential Universe would involveover again the difficulties just stated -- would imply behind this potentialuniverse a more remote potentiality, and so on in an infinite series, leavingus at last no forwarder than at first. While to assign an externa1 agencyas its origin, would be to introduce the notion of a potential Universe forno purpose whatever.

There remains the commonly -- received or theistic hypothesis -- creationby external agency. Alike in the rudest creeds and in the cosmogony longcurrent among ourselves, it is assumed that the Heavens and the Earth weremade somewhat after the manner in which a workman makes a piece of furniture.

And this is the assumption not only of theologians but of most philosophers.