第26章 NAVAL OR MARITIME BELLIGERENCY(3)

'The United States consider powerful navies and large standing armiesas permanent establishments to be detrimental to national prosperity anddangerous to civil libertyThe expense of keeping them up is burdensometo the peoplethey are in some degree a menace to peace among nationsAlarge force ever ready to be devoted to the purposes of war is a temptationto rush into itThe policy of the United States has ever beenand nevermore than nowadverse to such establishmentsand they can never be broughtto acquiesce in any change in International Law which may render it necessaryfor them to maintain a powerful navy or large standing army in time of peace.

If forced to vindicate their rights by armsthey are contentin the presentaspect of international relationsto rely in military operations on landmainly upon volunteer troopsand for the protection of their commerce inno inconsiderable degree upon their mercantile marineIf this country weredeprived of these resources it would be obliged to change its policy andassume a military attitude before the worldIn resisting an attempt to changethe existing maritime law that may produce such a resultit looks beyondits own interestand embraces in its view the interest of such nations asare not likely to be dominant naval PowersTheir situation in this respectis similar to that of the United Statesand to them the protection of commerceand the maintenance of international relations of peace appeal as stronglyas to this country to withstand the proposed change in the settled Law ofNationsTo such nations the surrender of the right to resort to privateerswould be attended with consequences most adverse to their commercial prosperitywithout any compensating advantages.

'It certainly ought not to excite the least surprise that strong navalPowers should be willing to forego the practicecomparatively useless tothemof employing privateersupon condition that weaker Powers agree topart with their most effective means of defending their maritime rights.

It is in the opinion of this Government to be seriously apprehended thatif the use of privateers be abandonedthe dominion over the seas will besurrendered to those Powers which adopt the policy and have the means ofkeeping up large naviesThe one which has a decided naval superiority wouldbe potentially the mistress of the oceanand by the abolition of privateeringthat domination would be more firmly securedSuch a Power engaged in a warwith a nation inferior in naval strength would have nothing to do for thesecurity and protection of its commerce but to look after the ships of theregular navy of its enemyThese might be held in check by one-half or lessof its naval forceand the other might sweep the commerce of its enemy fromthe oceanNor would the injurious erect of a vast naval superiority to weakerstates be much diminished if that superiority were shared canons three orfour great PowersIt is unquestionably the interest of such weaker statesto discountenance and resist a measure which fosters the growth of regularnaval establishments.'

It is at the same time to be remarked that this opinionthough intelligible,had not always prevailedand that early in their history the United Stateshad negotiatedthrough Benjamin Franklina treaty with Prussia in 1785by which it was stipulated that in the event of war neither Power shouldcommission privateersOn the other handan early president of the AmericanUnionMonroehad laid down that it was unworthy of civilised states toprey upon private property when in transit at seaThe result of the refusalof the United States to assent to the Declaration of 185was that this Declarationhas not become part of the general law of other civilisationsfor the assentof a state which is perhaps destined to be the most powerful in the world,and certainly the most powerful neutral state in the worldhas been withheldfrom itBut the United States Government expressed its willingness to joinin a modified form of the Declarationif all private property at sea shouldbe exempted from captureas President Monroe had argued that it ought tobeand there is good reason to believe that if the signatories of the Declarationwould agree to this exemption of private propertythe United States wouldwithdraw their objection to the abolition of privateering.

The first article of the Declaration was invoked in a dispute which arosebetween the French and Prussian Governmentsthen at warduring the contestof 1870The Prussian Governmentsoon to be merged in that of Germanyproposedto raise a volunteer navyAll German seafaring men were to over themselvesfor service in a Federal navy for the whole period of the then proceedingwarThe French Government objected to this as a breach of the first articleof the DeclarationThey declared that it was a species of revival of privateering.

Some writersincluding MonsCalvoand to a certain extent MrHallhavesupported these viewsbut some conditions of the service proposed to beestablishedas for example the necessity for the volunteers wearing a uniform,the incorporation of the new force with the existing navyand an oath toarticles of warseem to me to take these naval volunteers out of the classof privateersAs a matter of factthe Decree was never practically actedupon.

It will be seen from the text of the Declaration of Pariswhich is setforth abovethat its rules do not apply in two casesfirstwhere contrabandof war is carried in a shipand nextin the case of a ship endeavouringto obtain entrance to a blockaded townTherefore the law of contraband ofwar and the law of blockade are not touched by the reform under the Declarationof Parisexcept so far as a principle long contended for is applied to blockades.