Soc. Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there, have been poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many others who were inspired. And they say-mark, now, and see whether their words are true-they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. "For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages." The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, rand having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection -all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue.
Men. Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you teach me how this is?
Soc. I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a contradiction.
Men. Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. Ionly asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say is true, I wish that you would.
Soc. It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants, that I may demonstrate on him.
Men. Certainly. Come hither, boy.
Soc. He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?
Men. Yes, indeed; he was born in the house.
Soc. Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether he learns of me or only remembers.
Men. I will.
Soc. Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?
Boy. I do.
Soc. And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. A square may be of any size?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet?
Boy. There are.
Soc. Then the square is of twice two feet?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.
Boy. Four, Socrates.
Soc. And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And of how many feet will that be?
Boy. Of eight feet.
Soc. And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is two feet-what will that be?
Boy. Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.
Soc. Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does he not?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And does he really know?
Men. Certainly not.
Soc. He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is double.
Men. True.
Soc. Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To the Boy.) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure equal every way, and twice the size of this-that is to say of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from double line?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?
Boy. True.
Soc. And is not that four times four?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. And four times is not double?
Boy. No, indeed.
Soc. But how much?
Boy. Four times as much.
Soc. Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, but four times as much.
Boy. True.
Soc. Four times four are sixteen-are they not?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. What line would give you a space of right feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet;-do you see?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. And the space of four feet is made from this half line?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other?
Boy. Certainly.
Soc. Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one?
Boy. Yes; I think so.
Soc. Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four?
Boy. Yes.
Soc. Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?
Boy. It ought.
Soc. Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.
Boy. Three feet.