CHAPTER 2 The New Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) and Its Potential Impacts on Defense Program Managers

By David F. Matthews

The June 2003 release of the radically revised CJCSI 3170.01C and CJCSM 3170.01 promulgating the new Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) literally turned the legacy Requirements Generation System (RGS) upside-down. The decades-old threat-driven, bottom-up development process of warfare materiel requirements was summarily replaced by a revolutionary, capabilities-driven, top-down process.

Historically, the service-unique requirements development processes and organizations and their entrenched institutional memories had been forcibly altered, with the imposition of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Unified Commanders in Chief (CINC) participation, by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (hereafter cited as Goldwater-Nichols). Then, seventeen years later, this act was suddenly superseded by a new and rapidly evolving process and organization driven by DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Drastic changes typically have very complex origins—and indeed, this one did. This chapter will thoroughly explore this highly political metamorphosis and will provide an executive summary of JCIDS (including the March 2004 Change 1) and highlight significant changes from the legacy system. It also will emphasize the nearly concurrent changes made to the DoD 5000 series governing acquisition management that were either forced by, or made in correlation with, the JCIDS “revolution.”

Such change has caused many to be concerned that JCIDS may be trying to resolve legacy RGS problems and disconnections in a manner that may be injecting new, equally disruptive deficiencies. This chapter will provide an analysis, from a program manager’s perspective, of the potential impacts of these changes on the acquisition community. Finally, this chapter will present conclusions and offer recommendations for possible adjustments to JCIDS.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Modern American military history is replete with examples of weapon systems that proved to be either inadequate or inferior when confronted with serious hostilities. The reasons for the flaws are varied and complex, ranging from failures to recognize the militarily significant applications of emerging technologies, to faulty intelligence and threat identification, to inadequate developmental and operational testing. The early WWII Mark XIV submarine torpedo fiasco is a very painful example of the latter.

That war also saw the rise of joint and combined operations and the formation of the JCS. Yet, equipment developed parochially by one of the two branches of the armed services frequently failed to operate adequately with the other’s in-joint systems. Early WWII problems with performing amphibious operations and obtaining effective naval gunfire support for the Marines and Army provide vivid examples. Various attempts were made at two-service and, after 1947, three-service cooperation in requirements generation. These efforts were judged by many to have been largely unproductive.

Behind this lack of successful cooperation existed a long history of service parochialism, arrogance, and competitive infighting. The contention between the fledgling Air Force’s B-36 and the Navy’s supercarriers in 1948–49 is a vicious case in point. The interservice conflicts and myriad Congressional interferences literally drove the first Secretary of Defense (and former Secretary of the Navy), James Forrestal, to commit suicide.

Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, and their Secretaries of Defense, vainly struggled with the services and many members of Congress to empower the DoD and to inculcate jointness and improved interservice cooperation. Despite the Key West Agreement of 1947, the still-autonomous services continued to try to poach other services’ roles and missions. What was good for the service far transcended what was good for the DoD. President Eisenhower tried to deal with this service intransigence in his national security initiatives that resulted in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. He tried to strengthen the power of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Unified Commanders in Chief. He felt strengthening these positions would increase the integration of the military services in support of JCS strategic plans and the Unified CINCs. Congress, however, was not ready for a major transformation and passed a diluted bill that initiated few substantial changes.

Later, President Kennedy empowered Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to reform the Pentagon’s requirements generation and resource allocation/management processes by introducing the “whiz kids” with their systems-effectiveness analysis and by imposing a formal planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) for the DoD. Although some limited further joint rationalization occurred, Kennedy’s assassination and President Johnson’s subsequent focus on the Great Society, and increasingly on Viet Nam, basically acquiesced the administration to the DoD status quo.

President Nixon was likewise enmeshed in Viet Nam and, subsequently, his very survival in office. President Ford served only two years, and President Carter, although a former regular Navy officer, had other priorities. Then came the Iranian hostage-taking and the joint service Desert One failure; these led to the beginning of a transfer in the impetus for DoD/JCS reform from the executive branch of the government to the dissatisfied and increasingly concerned legislative branch. As the Reagan administration began its sweeping defense buildup, the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing tragedy occurred; likewise, the disjointed Grenada invasion again revealed serious shortcomings in the armed services’ ability to act effectively and unselfishly in the conduct of joint operations.

Many in Congress, already concerned about the effects of service parochialism, saw these incidents as evidence that the DoD required major reforms in its capability to equip, organize, and execute joint operations in the defense of the country. Therefore, they called for a major reorganization. Several critics asserted that service autonomy would have to be sacrificed in the interests of improved effectiveness in the joint arena.

Late 1983 saw the commencement of a series of hearings in both houses of Congress that would culminate three years later in the landmark Goldwater-Nichols legislation. During the latter part of this period, in July 1985, President Reagan chartered the Packard Commission to investigate the DoD’s procedures and activities for procuring military equipment and materiel. The commission staff, as well as some members of Congress, directly coordinated their investigations with the inquiries of the relevant House and Senate committees and their staffs.

The work of both bodies significantly parallels and overlaps in the portions of the legislation and commission report that pertain to requirements generation and acquisition management. The Congressional emphasis on jointness in requirements generation dovetailed tightly into the Packard Commission’s recommendations on acquisition management reform.

Over vehement service protests, particularly those of the Navy and its diehard coterie of Congressional supporters, Goldwater-Nichols established the permanent position of vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). Among the new position’s specified duties was the responsibility to preside as the chairman of the newly created JROC, which consisted of all the service vice chiefs of staff and the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, and which was facilitated by a small, permanent staff. The JROC’s charter was, with input from the Unified CINCs, to oversee the materiel requirements documentation validation process for all major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) (classified by DoD as Acquisition Category I [ACAT I]). It was also to authenticate that the proposed capability was required and not duplicative of another service’s program, and that the submitted documentation adequately addressed all DoD/JCS-level joint-warfare and interoperability concerns.

The second new major VCJCS acquisition-related duty was to serve concurrently as vice chairman of the newly created Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), which was chaired by the also newly created defense acquisition executive (DAE). The DAB, an outgrowth from the former Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), had been created to advise the DAE—as the DoD Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)—concerning the readiness of developmental programs to advance into the next acquisition management phase. These two principal duties assigned to the office of the VCJCS promised significantly increased DoD/JCS influence over the service-initiated requirements generation and service-managed acquisition management processes.

Goldwater-Nichols also promulgated a major change in the services’ acquisition management systems. Although the 1976 OMB Circular A-109 (which established acquisition management policy for the executive branch) had required all agencies to establish short, clear lines of acquisition responsibility, authority, and accountability, as of 1986 the DoD still had not institutionalized this policy. Therefore, embracing a Packard Commission recommendation in order to assist the DoD’s acquisition management policy, the legislation required the adoption of what has become known as the PEO system. In this system, lines of acquisition management authority and oversight flowed from a service-chartered program manager (PM) to a commodity-oriented program executive officer (PEO) overseeing a group of related PMs, to a service acquisition executive (SAE), and finally to the DAE. The existing service hardware systems commands (HSCs) were to provide support to the PMs on a matrix basis and be reimbursed by program funds which, in another major change, would now flow through the PEO chain.

The PEO system, once fully implemented, constituted a significant improvement in acquisition management and accountability; it was and still is considered a success. However, the inauguration of the JROC Requirements Oversight system proved to be more difficult and controversial. Admiral William A. “Bill” Owens was appointed as the third VCJCS and, therefore, as chairman of the JROC. Press reports from the period relate that the JROC meetings were characterized by rancor and parochial infighting. These reports likewise suggest Admiral Owens became increasingly frustrated by service intransigence and his inability to orchestrate a joint consensus on many issues that, to achieve improved commonality and interoperability, required serious service concessions and compromises. Sandra Irwin, in National Defense, states that Admiral Owens:

created what he called the JWCA, or joint warfighting capabilities assessment, that was designed to more closely match the needs of joint commanders with the services’ procurement priorities. The JWCA didn’t achieve the expected results, officials claim, because it was a “bottom-up” review process that began at service level and ended at the JROC.

Press reports asserted that both these prolonged frustrations and severe service criticism of his efforts were the principal reasons that he declined nomination for a second two-year term as VCJCS.

Yet, Owens wasn’t the reason the JWCA didn’t survive:

But the real reason why JWCA was only a passing fad—and why JCIDS may encounter a similar fate—is that ultimately the services have ownership of their programs and the responsibility to justify them before Congress. The Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS) program is a particularly relevant illustration of the challenge that the services face in getting major programs off the ground. While LCS critics on Capitol Hill charge that the Navy has done a poor job validating and articulating the need for the ship, the program passed the JCIDS review with flying colors and then some.

At the very least … JCIDS will serve as a valuable forum to debate the relevance of major programs in a joint context, which certainly has merit. But some still wonder about a process that apparently ignores the long-standing relationship the services have with the movers and shakers on Capitol Hill.

Subsequent administrations shared the same frustrations with the RGS. These frustrations culminated with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s initiative to radically transform the legacy system. The initiative grew out of studies conducted early in the Bush administration aimed at improving the responsiveness of the acquisition management system. These studies concluded that the RGS was part of the low responsiveness problem. The service-initiated bottom-up system was not conducive to commonality, interoperability, and jointness. Therefore, Secretary Rumsfeld decided to direct the JCS to take responsibility for initiating materiel requirements from the top down to ensure that requirements were “born joint.”

JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM (JCIDS)

The newly released National Military Strategy (NMS), “A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow,” clearly articulates the strategy and vision from which JCIDS was derived.

The foreword highlights protecting the United States, preventing conflict, and prevailing against adversaries. The Chairman, USAF General Richard B. Myers, sets forth three priorities. The first is winning the war on terrorism, which will require “the full integration of all instruments of national power.” The second is enhancing our ability to fight as a joint force. He asserts, “Joint teamwork is an integral part of our culture and focus as we develop leaders, organizations, systems, and doctrine” (italics added). The third is transforming the armed forces by ensuring that “U.S. forces emerge from the struggle against terrorism with our joint force fully prepared to meet future global challenges.”

In Chapter V, “Joint Vision for Future Warfighting,” the NMS introduces the goal of full spectrum dominance (FSD). It states:

FSD recognizes the need to integrate military activities with those of other government agencies, the importance of interoperability with allies and other partners, and the criticality of transforming in-stride. FSD will serve to strengthen the trust and confidence that exists among service components by acknowledging their interdependence and developing concepts that reduce gaps and seams among organizations. It requires a capabilities-based approach that balances near-term capabilities with longer-term requirements and incorporates a global perspective on military and strategic risk…. Along with technological solutions to improve joint warfighting, we must also examine our doctrine, organizations, training systems, materiel procurement … to ensure military superiority…. Reducing lead times associated with research, development, and fielding of new capabilities must be a priority. Such actions are essential to an in-stride approach to transforming the Joint Force and executing concepts for future joint warfighting. Research and development programs are equally important to FSD, providing a hedge against the more uncertain aspects of the security environment.

Perhaps the best recent summary of the intent and basic architecture of JCIDS can be found in an excerpt from an October 8, 2004, article from Inside the Pentagon that is quoted below. The unnamed author explains the system as follows:

The Joint Training FCB (Functional Capabilities Board) is the eighth such panel created by the Pentagon. The others cover command and control, battlespace awareness, force application, force protection, force management, focused logistics and network-centric operations. These activities are prevalent in the full range of missions the Defense Department carries out.

Each board plays a central role in crafting an array of capabilities for future warfighters under the Pentagon’s year-old Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, or JCIDS for short.

JCIDS, as spelled out in a revised Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170, was implemented to replace a defense-wide requirements generation system that was widely viewed as flawed because it did not adequately support efforts to field a more effective joint force (Inside the Pentagon, July 24, 2003, p. 3). This was a concern because military planners believe the services—and the equipment they use—must be able to work together seamlessly to defeat 21st-century threats.

To that end, the JCIDS process encourages interoperability at the earliest stages of program development—a proposal from one of the services to build a new weapon system, for instance, would be judged in large part on how it could contribute to joint warfighting, as opposed to just the needs of that service. Officials also will guard against unnecessary duplication of effort by the services, thereby promoting efficiency in the expenditure of DOD resources.

Much of the heavy work of vetting proposals to field new capabilities is the province of FCBs, which can include representatives from the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services and combatant commands. The boards support Pentagon decision makers—including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Capabilities Board—in analyzing and prioritizing proposed warfighting requirements. Further, they will help identify shortfalls and gaps in existing or projected joint capabilities.

Here’s how it works: Much of the activity that flows to the FCBs will be assigned by an official known as the JCIDS “gatekeeper.” This person examines each capabilities proposal—perhaps in the form of an initial capabilities document, which replaced the mission need statements used under the old requirements generation system—to assess what the chairman’s instruction calls “joint potential.”

The gatekeeper then tags each proposal “JROC interest,” “joint impact,” or “independent.” The designation determines who will be responsible for validating and approving the document—the JROC, an FCB or a DOD component. Certification requirements for interoperability and staffing distribution also are considered.

The JROC interest label applies to all acquisition category-1/1A (sic) programs, which already are subject to JROC oversight. Joint impact is applied to all ACAT-II and below programs “where the concepts and/or systems associated with the document affect the joint force such that an expanded review is appropriate in order to ensure” the best solution for the joint warfighter, the instruction states. The independent designation is intended for ACAT-II and below programs that do not affect the joint force and do not require certifications, according to the instruction.

The gatekeeper also picks the lead FCB to handle analysis of a particular proposal.

FCBs also develop and update functional concepts that, along with strategic policy direction from OSD, guide decisions about capabilities proposals.

In addition to the concise explanation quoted above, CJCSI 3170.01D, 12 March 2004, provides the details concerning JCIDS and will not be repeated here. However, Figure 2-1 does graphically outline the process discussed above.

JCIDS was developed concurrently with a major overhaul of the acquisition management system. Beginning in the closing years of the Clinton administration, the acquisition model started to significantly evolve. This evolution culminated in the May 2003 publication of a significantly revised DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2. Publication of the initial version of the new CJCSI 3170.01 establishing JCIDS followed a month later. The details and implications of this JCIDS-inspired management model are thoroughly discussed in John T. Dillard’s 2003 report, “Toward Centralized Control of Defense Acquisition Programs: A Comparative Review of the Decision Framework from 1987 to 2003.”

Figure 2-1. JCIDS Review and Validation Process (NPS Course MN3331).

ANALYSIS FROM THE PROGRAM MANAGER’S PERSPECTIVE

Note: The author was PM of an MDAP in the mid-1990s and has been teaching materiel acquisition and program management at the Naval Postgraduate School for more than ten years. The following analysis is reflective of experience in the surface-to-surface rocket and guided missile commodity. It also is influenced by the experiences of former PM colleagues and by feedback from former students currently serving in mainstream acquisition positions in the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and DoD.

The first concern of this analysis is how the Pentagon-based JCIDS process will capture the institutional memory and lessons learned (some more than once) resident in the old RGS bureaucracy. How will the legacy knowledge and expertise (“We tried that ‘good idea,’ but it did not work because….”) be preserved and accessed? The old shibboleth that the “devil’s in the details” is certainly applicable here, as is the axiom that “the project failed because we built the wrong thing.” Then, the inevitable question follows: Why did we build the wrong thing? The answer follows too: “Because they did not get the requirements right.”

Getting the requirements right is the core of this concern. Measures in the new acquisition management model emphasize achieving and demonstrating technological maturity before final commitment to a developmental program; lack of technological maturity has certainly been a major problem in many past programs. However, another major requirements problem that adversely affected the PM’s ability to meet his or her mandated acquisition program baseline (APB)—the problem of requirements creep—appears to have been institutionalized in JCIDS. The evolution of the specific requirement from the initial capabilities document (ICD) to its codification in the capabilities development document (CDD) to the “final” (for the first increment) capabilities production document (CPD) represents new ground for PMs. Under the legacy requirements and management systems, what is now the CDD (roughly the old operational requirements document (ORD), but now occurring somewhat later in the developmental cycle) froze the qualification to enable the PM to execute the program definition and risk reduction (PDRR) and engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phases with a stable requirement. Now, with the new CPD, the requirement freezes later on, somewhere between the critical design review (CDR) and Milestone C. Here commitment is made to low-rate initial production (LRIP). In addition, the CDR, where the design is frozen, now comes somewhat later in the developmental cycle, affording the PM less time to complete and extensively integrate and test the system. This decreased leeway for testing and integration potentially increases program risk.

These changes are well-intended and have the laudable objective of deploying the latest technology to the warfighter. However, for every pro there is a con. Particularly, given the increasing software intensity of major defense systems and the extensive integration testing inherently required for those technological systems, there is potentially more risk here than the framers of the new system may have realized because of the decreased timeframe. Software integration testing is predominately serial and therefore schedule-intensive; one cannot accurately forecast a final completion date until it actually arrives. Therefore, adequate schedule management reserve must be provided to avoid a baseline breach.

A second concern is that the key performance parameters (KPP) under JCIDS will probably focus significantly more on interoperability and jointness than they have in the past. The PM for an MDAP may have to rely increasingly on other PMs outside of his PEO, or even service, to provide key components or other critical subsystems to his higher-level system precisely on his schedule to meet his KPP thresholds. The March 12, 2004, version of CJCSI 3170.01D specifically highlights the mandated interdependencies of materiel developers. It states:

Potential solutions may include a family of systems (FoS) that take different approaches to filling the capability gap, each addressing operational considerations in a different way. Alternatively, the solution may require a system of systems (SoS) approach to fill a capability gap. The FoS and SoS materiel solutions may also require systems delivered by multiple sponsors/materiel developers.

In other words, the desired jointness of the service inherently catalyzes materiel interdependency among the branches.

Another paragraph of the March 12, 2004, version stipulates that requirements documents “will comply with the formal instructions in CJCSI 3170.01B and incorporate the Interoperability/Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter (KPP) as required by reference g. The transition from the Interoperability KPP to the Net-Ready KPP is directed by the instructions in JROCM 236-03, 19 December 2003.”

The imposition of this Net-Ready KPP will further exacerbate the PM interdependency situation by requiring PMs to develop unprogrammed, newly required interface capabilities with other PMs’ systems.

With virtually no formal control over these supporting PMs, how will the system’s PM be held responsible or accountable? Will the milestone decision authority (MDA) approve exit from or entrance into a phase in the event that these supporting PMs fail to meet their schedules, and thereby prevent the system PM from meeting some KPP? Will the JROC endorse a diminished-capability requirement for the initial increment, and will the MDA approve a rebaselined evolutionary acquisition strategy that increases the use of increments? Will the director of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E) declare the less-capable initial increment fully operationally effective and suitable?

The above concerns eventually may turn out to be somewhat overstated, but with both JCIDS and the complementing 5000 series being relatively immature in terms of application to real-world materiel development programs, considerable skepticism persists in the PM community. Only applying the new paradigms to actual programs and thoroughly evaluating their impacts will illustrate the extent and validity of these concerns.

A third concern with this new paradigm is that under the new evolutionary acquisition strategy and the DoD-preferred spiral development method, the potential exists for a plethora of low densities of somewhat different configurations of major systems being serially deployed to the fleet. This would require a separately tailored logistical support package for each discrete model. Rear Admiral (Ret.) Don Eaton, holder of the Admiral Stanley Arthur NPS Logistics Chair, often recounts to his classes his experiences as the senior logistician at the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), with aircraft carriers deployed with several different blocks of FA-18 aircraft. A portion of the logistics footprint for each block consisted of block-unique test equipment, spares, and sometimes even seaman ratings. Acquiring enough storage space for the aggregated footprints of all the FA-18s on board presented a considerable challenge. He described one instance in which NAVAIR procured only twelve of one particular FA-18 block; then, when one aircraft was lost operationally, a single squadron had to support two different configurations to remain at full strength on deployments. Rear Admiral (Ret.) Eaton remains concerned that the new paradigm will inadvertently result in increased operation and maintenance (O&M) costs and possibly even require carrier design modifications to accommodate the multiplicity of unique models. Acquiring and maintaining a large range of relatively expensive but low-density support equipment and repair parts will preclude taking advantage of potential economies of scale and probably result in a significant increase in total ownership costs (TOC).

One option to address this problem is to retrofit legacy models to the current configuration, which would reduce O&S costs and enhance combat effectiveness, reliability, and operational availability. However, at least in the case of NAVAIR, this has not been the historic norm; monetary resources required from the procurement appropriations would have to be diverted from the acquisition of brand-new aircraft.

A final concern revolves around funding. Under Title 10 U.S. Code, Congress still appropriates directly to the services, not to DoD. For decades, Congress has received the president’s budget and then decremented, pulsed up, or even added programs in congruence with its parochial special interests. Therefore, the carefully crafted R&D, procurement, and military construction (MILCON) decisions made in the JCS and the DoD that are reflected in the president’s budget are occasionally not realized in the annual Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts. The services have, in the past, publicly supported the president’s budget while concurrently working covertly behind the scenes with their respective major system contractor lobbyists to reverse on the Hill the very decisions that they lost through unfavorable DoD program budget decisions (PBDs).

The programs that become “bill payers” to fund these priority service programs more fully are in some cases those that provide support to other services. Rep. Les Aspen cited as examples reluctant Navy and Air Force support for Strategic Sea and Air Lift to deploy the Army.

PMs, dependent on other-service-funded components or subsystems to meet their KPPs, may therefore find these programs decremented during congressional enactment and suffer a baseline breach. In other words, jointness and across-the-board service interoperability may prove to be more difficult to achieve than the visionary JCIDS framers anticipated.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

First, the revolution in the requirements generation process must avoid throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Legacy knowledge and experience must be carefully considered when formulating requirements in the JCIDS process. The JCS and service staffs should act quickly to take the necessary policy and bureaucratic steps to ensure JCIDS entities have institutionalized access to the legacy corporate memories and records of both the former service RGS staffs and records on a real-time, or at least nearly a real-time, basis. This would ensure that all of the potential impacts and previously learned lessons would be reviewed and considered in formulating all new JCIDS requirements documents.

Second, there is the issue of developmental PM dependence on other PMs, over whom they have little or no control, for on-time delivery of crucial subsystems and components to meet their KPPs. A mandatory entry should be established in the quarterly Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) report. This entry would identify and provide the status of a system for the systems managed by other PMs that the reporting PM was depending on to achieve his or her KPPs. It also would include the status of any subsystems or components the reporting PM was managing that were critical to some other PM’s ability to meet his or her KPP requirements. Since the DAES report is reviewed and commented on by the reporting PM’s PEO, service acquisition executive (SAE), and subsequently, the defense acquisition executive (DAE), this mandatory communicative entry would ensure that immediate visibility was given to any projected schedule or cost shortfalls in time to have them addressed to effect their timely resolution.

Third, since it is clear that the new evolutionary materiel requirements and development system has enormous potential for increasing the operation and support cost components of TOC, reduction must be addressed during the early stages of the new system’s engineering process. It is therefore recommended that the services be directed to formulate both a comprehensive logistics support strategy and a master configuration management plan, as well as a cost as an independent variable (CAIV) analysis for each JCIDS requirements document. These plans could then be crafted to produce the lowest practical TOC for the full life cycle of the developmental system.

Finally, it is apparent that significant potential exists for Congress to disconnect carefully balanced DoD JCIDS materiel program research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and production budget requests during the enactment process. Therefore, it is recommended that DoD clearly highlights, in its portion of the president’s budget, those RDT&E and procurement programs that have critical interdependencies and that should be funded as a package to ensure that those programs can stay on their approved acquisition program baselines.

Author’s Notes

The research presented in this chapter was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. Copies of the Acquisition Sponsored Research Reports may be accessed from the web site www.acquisitionresearch.org.