Socrates’ Avowals of Knowledge and the Epistemic Asymmetry of Values

WEI Yixin^[1]

Abstract：Socrates，taken as the figure in Plato’s so-called early dialogues，famously professes to be ignorant，but the nature and the scope of his ignorance have long been intensely debated and still remain obscure. In this paper，I try to contribute to the relevant discussions by pointing out and interpreting a generally overlooked，yet essential feature of Socrates’ avowals of knowledge：in most cases，what Socrates claims to know falls under the category of （what I call） negative，as opposed to positive，ethical knowledge.The distinction between positive ethical knowledge and negative ethical knowledge is as follows：the former involves either definitions of what the good and virtues are，or knowledge that certain particular facts are good and virtuous；the latter refers to the knowledge of what the good and virtues are not，or the knowledge that certain particular facts are bad and evil. It will be argued that Socrates only avows negative ethical knowledge because he recognizes an asymmetry between the knowledge of the good and that of the bad：one may know a fact about the bad without knowing the corresponding fact about the good，but not vice versa. This epistemic asymmetry shows that knowledge of the good is more epistemically demanding than that of the bad，and thus it sheds further light on the scope of Socrates’ ignorance and his view of the good and virtue.

Key words：Socrates；ignorance；Plato’s early dialogues；epistemic asymmetry；ethical knowledge

Introduction

Socrates’^[2] view of knowledge is mysterious. He famously professes to be ignorant；in the mean time，however，he also paradoxically claims to know something quite substantial on various occasions. How should we reconcile this apparent inconsistency？ What is the exact scope of the knowledge he pursues but lacks？

Commentators on Socrates have had various attempts to distinguish a strong kind of knowledge and a weak one to resolve the paradox：Vlastos contends that Socrates disavows knowledge，an infallible kind of knowledge，but avows knowledge，which is fallible and acquired through Socrates’ method of inquiry，the elenchus^[3]；Brickhouse and Smith remark that Socrates possesses knowledge-that but does not possess knowledge-how^[4]；Woodruff and Reeve maintain that Socrates lacks expert knowledge analogous to craft （），but has some non-expert knowledge.^[5] Other scholars believe that there is no way in which we can reconcile the inconsistency across the dialogues by any single standard，and argue that Socrates’ view on knowledge varies in different dialogues. Kraut suggests that Socrates’ position is developed from the Apology to the Gorgias^[6]；and Wolfsdorf advocates the more radical interpretation that Plato employs the character ‘Socrates’ differently in each dialogue to try out different views and methodologies^[7].

Though a consensus has yet been reached，this paper is not intended to settle the issue. However，I wish to point out and explain another puzzling feature of Socrates’ avowals of knowledge which is in general overlooked by scholars：in most cases where Socrates sincerely avows ethical knowledge，what he knows can be classified as negative，as opposed to positive，ethical knowledge. The distinctionbetween negative and positive ethical knowledge will be explained later on.

To make such a distinction is not my ultimate aim. I will argue that Socrates’ avowals of only negative ethical knowledge reveal his recognition of an asymmetry between the knowledge of the good and that of the bad：one may know a fact about the bad without knowing the corresponding fact about the good，but notvice versa. This epistemic asymmetry is interesting because it shows that the standard of knowledge of the good is more demanding than that of the bad，and thus it sheds further light on the scope of his ignorance and on Socrates’ view of the good and virtue.

This paper proceeds in the following order. Section I shows that Socrates’ ignorance lies in the field of ethics （broadly construed），and Socrates’ genuine avowals of ethical knowledge are far rarer than many people believe；in section II I offer a close textual analysis showing that those genuine avowals of ethical knowledge are mainly concerned with only negative ethical knowledge；section III considers a rhetorical reading of Socrates’ possession of negative ethical knowledge，and rejects it；my interpretation is developed in section IV，where I argue that the epistemic asymmetry of values best solves the puzzle on both textual and philosophical grounds；section V deals with two objections to the asymmetry thesis，and elucidates the asymmetry further in my response to it；a brief summary is provided in section VI.

Section I：Range of Socrates’ Avowals of Ethical Knowledge

Before we set out，a quick note on the methodology of interpretation is necessary. There are cases where Socrates explicitly claims to know something，by using Greek words that are indisputably associated with knowledge，such as ，，and ，etc. In these cases we should，I think，take Socrates as sincerely acknowledging some kind of knowledge.^[8] There are also cases where Socrates，though not using Greek words in that group，employs similar syntactical structures or displays high-level confidence about the truth of certain propositions. I hold that some of these utterances could be considered avowals of knowledge，but only after close analysis of the relevant contexts on a passage-to-passage basis.^[9] For sometimes the context suggests that Socrates himself is extremely confident about the truth of certain propositions despite the absence of the word ‘to know’ （e.g. T7 and T8 below），whereas at other times he merely entertains certain claims for dialectical purposes，without being actually committed to it （e.g. T3 below）. No general treatment can be given to this group of passages.

So much for the interpretive methodology，and now I turn to the range of Socratic knowledge or ignorance. It is commonly held that the knowledge Socrates pursues is ethical knowledge，where this is broadly construed as knowledge of how to live one’s life well. This popular interpretation is correct and supported by textual evidence. Not only does Socrates deny being concerned with natural philosophy （Apology18b-d），he also asserts that despite the lack of knowledge of things that are fine and good （καλòνκáγαθòν，ibid.21d2），he does know many trivial things （σμικρá，Euthydemus，293b7-8）. Because Socrates’ philosophical activities always come down to the pursuit of understanding the nature of virtue and good life，it is safe to say that the distinction between fine and good things and trivialities roughly corresponds to that between ethical and non-ethical matters.

Having said that，it should be noted that Socrates’ genuine avowals of ethical knowledge are far rarer than many scholars have argued. There are a multitude ofpassages where Socrates seems to claim positive ethical knowledge，but actually does not. In those places his professions of knowing something are best interpreted not as sincere avowals of ethical knowledge，but as either an attribution of knowledge to someone else，or recognition of personal or common facts，or understandings of a conclusion which is dependent on assumptions that Socrates does not claim to know. The following are some examples.

Attribution of Knowledge to Someone Else. T1.“[...to Euthyphro] but now I know well （） that you believe you have clear knowledge of piety and impiety.” （Euthyphro，15d8-e1）^[10]

In this passage，Socrates seems to claim to know something ethically related，i.e.，that Euthyphro has clear knowledge of piety and impiety. However，a careful reading suggests that what Socrates knows here is just one belief Euthyphro has，namely，that he possesses knowledge of piety and impiety. Nothing is revealed about Socrates’sown epistemic state about piety and impiety. Therefore，this is not a sincere avowal of ethical knowledge on Socrates’ part.

Personal or common facts. T2.“for I know very well （） that wherever I go the young men will listen to my talk as they do here.” （Apology，37d6-7）

Here Socrates also claims to know something，but it is apparently not related to ethics. Rather，Socrates here is making a reasonable prediction that he would never lack young followers attracted by his philosophical dialectic even if he were exiled and living in other cities. At best，Socrates’ knowledge here is about the psychology of young Greeks and how appealing his methodology is among them.

On assumptions. T3.“[To Thrasymachus] But now，if justice is indeed wisdom and virtue，it will easily be shown to be stronger than injustice，since injustice is ignorance （no one could now be ignorant （） of that）.” （Republic I，351a，my emphasis）

This passage is more controversial. Vlastos takes it as evidence that Socrates claims to know ‘injustice is ignorance’，for Socrates says that no one，which naturally includes himself，can be ignorant of that proposition.^[11] This is，however，a misreading. Notice that in the quoted passage the claim that ‘injustice is ignorance’ depends on a conditional，the antecedent of which is：‘if justice is indeed wisdom and virtue.’ As far as I can tell，Socrates never maintains that he knows this ethical truth，neither in the Republic I nor in the Protagoras，though he does provide some arguments in favor of that position. Therefore，Socrates does not profess to know ‘injustice is ignorance’ unconditionally，for the truth of this proposition hinges on a premise that Socrates has not yet proven.

Many more passages should not be taken as evidence of Socrates’ genuine avowals of ethical knowledge though they might suggest on at first glance，which include：Protagoras，357d7-e1；Hippias Major，304e6-9；Lysis，214d8-e1；Laches，190b7-c5；Crito，49d2，etc..It is impossible to examine each such passage here，^[12] but a careful reading would show that Socrates in those passages is either attributing knowledge to someone else，or recognizing personal or common facts，or entertaining certain conclusions which are dependent on assumptions that Socrates does not claim to know.

Section II：Socrates’ Avowals of Negative Ethical Knowledge

Having ruled out those passages where Socrates does not actually avow ethical knowledge，we are ready to show that Socrates basically always claims only negative，as opposed to positive，ethical knowledge. The distinction between positive ethical knowledge and negative ethical knowledge is as follows：the former involves either definitions of what the good and virtues are，or knowledge that certain particular acts are good and virtuous；the latter refers to the knowledge of what the good and virtues are not，or that certain particular acts are bad and vicious. Hence，to define the good and virtue，or to say that ‘X is good or just or pious or moderate’ where X stands for concrete actions or people or any particular things falls under the category of positive ethical knowledge，whereas a claim about what the good is not，or how wrongdoing occurs，or to say ‘X （a particular act） is not good，or unjust or impious or cowardly’ are classified as negative ethical knowledge.^[13]

The passage at Apology 29a-b has been often cited as conclusive evidence that Socrates does claim certain ethical knowledge. Asserting that one who fears death is only pretending to be wise，he says：

T4. “But I，men，differ from most people perhaps in just this way，and if I am to some degree wiser than others，it would be in this：while I do not adequately know about things in Hades，I do not think I know. But I do know （） that to do injustice and to disobey someone better than myself，whether god or man，is bad and foul.”

In this passage，Socrates confidently asserts that he knows that doing injustice by disobeying one’s superior is bad. Though most commentators have rightly reached the consensus that this piece of knowledge does not meet the high standard of knowledge for Socrates （expert knowledge，knowledge-how，knowledge，etc），they usually neglect one essential feature of this claim：what Socrates claims to know here is not any fact about the good and justice，but a fact about the unjust and the bad. What he says is not that he knows that obeying one’s superior is just and noble，but that disobeying one’s superior is bad and foul. That is to say，under the distinction between positive a negative knowledge，he does not claim to have any positive knowledge of the good，but only some negative knowledge associated with the bad.

This negative ethical knowledge is reiterated by Socrates himself three times in the Apology.

T5. “I shall never fear or avoid things of which I do not know （），whether they may not be good rather than things that I know to be bad.” （ibid.，29b6-7）

T6. “Am I then to choose in preference to this something that I know very well （） to be an evil and assess the penalty at that？” （ibid.，37b5-6）

Furthermore，Socrates’ assessment of his own moral character also serves as evidence that he only knows some negative ethical truth.

T7. “Since I am convinced （） that I wrong no one ...” （Apology，37b2）

Here Socrates does not explicitly say that heknows （i.e.，not using ，，，etc..） that he wrongs no one. However，given that Socrates in his defense is very confident in this judgment，and this position is quite consistent throughout Socratic dialogues，we have good reason to believe that Socrates has knowledge about this. But evidently it is nothing more than negative ethical knowledge，for Socrates only knows that he has committed no wrongdoings and that he never treats others unjustly. This assertion is not identical with the assertion that he knows that throughout his life all he has done are virtuous and just，nor does he ever makes that assertion.^[14]

This same point applies to other passages which are critical to Socrates’ avowal of ethical knowledge as well. In the Gorgias，Socrates famously tells Callicles：

T8. “As for what my own reasoning is，that’s been told many times by now，but there’s nothing to stop its being told once again [...] to sum up，to commit anyunjust acts at all against me and my possessions is both worse and more shameful for the one who does these unjust acts than it is for me，the one who suffers them.These conclusions，at which we arrived earlier in our previous discussions are，I’d say，held down and bound by arguments of iron and adamant ...”（Gogias，508d4-e6；cf.，479e8，my emphasis）

Again，Socrates does not use the knowledge-words here. Nevertheless，based on the remark at the end of the passage that the conclusion is ‘held down and bound by arguments of iron and adamant’，it is reasonable to attribute this piece of knowledge to Socrates. Commentators on the Gorgias usually state that Socrates in the dialogue proves this ethical proposition：it is better to suffer injustice than commit it.^[15] It is critical to notice，however，that Socrates himself never formulates his conclusion in this way. What he says，as T8 shows，is that it is worse and more shameful to commit injustice than suffer it. Socrates is very consistent with this phrasing throughout the dialogue，as shown in the following passage：

T9. “Of these two things，then，of doing what’s unjust and suffering it，we say that doing it is worse and suffering it is less bad.” （ibid.，509c7-8）

The ethical knowledge Socrates avows in T8 and T9 is negative at two levels. First，the core of the arguments concerns only injustice，as opposed to justice. No matter what his conclusion might amount to，Socrates never suggests that it reveals anything essential with regard to either justice itself or any concrete particular things that are just. Even if we are convinced by Socrates that committing injustice is more shameful and worse than suffering it，it does not directly inform us that anything is a clear instances of justice.

Second，as noted with the italics，Socrates phrases the conclusion using negative ethical terms：he says ‘it is worse and more shameful to commit injustice than to suffer it’，as opposed to ‘it is better and more noble to suffer injustice than to commit it’. Therefore，given that it is plausible to think Socrates takes himself to know this ethical truth，this avowal of knowledge is conformity with that in the Apology （T4-T7）：he does not proclaim to know what the good or justice is or which acts are noble and fine；what he does assert is that he knows committing injustice is ethically worse and more shameful.

More on Socrates avowals of negative ethical knowledge：

T10. “[...] how shall I say I know that good men are unjust？ Come tell me，do I know this，or not？” “Oh yes，you know （） it”，he said，“Know what？” said I，“That the good are not unjust”. “Yes，I’ve always known that”，I said. （Euthydemus，296e3-297a1）

Here Socrates does not hesitate to tell Euthydemus that he has knowledge of the ethical proposition that the good are not unjust. In this piece of knowledge，nothing about good people is revealed，for Socrates does not maintain that he knows “the good are just”. It only makes it clear what the good are not in one respect，namely，not unjust. The positive nature of the good still remains undiscovered.

T11. “Do you think Polus and I were or were not correct in being compelled to agree in our previous discussion when we agreed that no one does what’s unjust because he wants to，but that all who do so do it unwillingly？” （Gorgias，509e4-7）

T11 comprises only negative ethical knowledge in that Socrates claims to be compelled to agree to the ethical truth that no one errs willingly. This is tantamount to the proposition that all wrongdoings are committed unwillingly. It is not positive ethical knowledge for it only concerns wrongdoings and how wrongdoings occur. Good and virtuous actions are not what is being discussed here.

Section III：Refuting the Rhetorical Reading

So far I have made the textual case that Socrates’ avowals of ethical knowledge are，at least in most cases，of negative，as opposed to positive，ethical knowledge. This feature of Socratic epistemology has not received much attention from commentators，but it certainly deserves more. How should we interpret this？ What is it that prevents him from claiming positive ethical knowledge，if he has any？

One may want to dismiss the distinction between positive knowledge and negative knowledge as superficial，arguing that such as distinction lacks philosophical significance. Indeed，one tempting reading is that Socrates just has this personal inclination to phrase his conclusions with negative terms. That is to say，Socrates’ consistent negative formulation of ethical propositions should reveal nothing more than his idiosyncratic way of expression or rhetorical framing for certain practical purposes，whatever they might be.^[16]

On this reading，Socrates actually has knowledge of the positive counterparts of those propositions. For instance，when Socrates in T4 professes to know that disobeying one’s superior is both bad and foul，he also thereby knows that obeying one’s superior is good and virtuous，though he does not explicitly say so. The reason for him to adopt the negative framing could be that the negative version sounds more powerful as a literary device，or he is trying to behave modestly，etc..There are no philosophical，logical，or ethical reasons for him to avoid the positive claim. Similarly，in T7，Socrates could tell the jury not that he has done no wrong，but that he has been acting virtuously and justly throughout his life；in T8，he could claim that he has proven that it is better and nobler to suffer injustice than commit it，instead of that it is worse and more shameful to commit injustice than suffer it；in T10，to know that the good are not unjust also commits him to knowing that the good are just. In a nutshell，Socrates has knowledge of all the positive counterparts of those claims. Let us call this the rhetorical reading.

I shall argue that the rhetorical reading is untenable for two reasons. First，it fails to explain Socrates’ assessment of his own virtue. As mentioned in the last paragraph，the reading in question maintains that Socrates’ confidence in his doing no wrong implies his assurance of him being virtuous and good in his life so far. Contrary to it，I contend that Socrates not only never says that he is virtuous，but also is driven by philosophical considerations for not believing so. To see that he never claims to be virtuous，let us examine the following passages （T7 is quoted again here to make the list complete）：

T7. “I am convinced that I never willingly wrong anyone [...] Since I am convinced that I wrong no one ...” （Apology，37a4-b3）

T12. “But I know this well （）：that if I do come into court involved in one of those perils which you mentioned，the man who brings me in will be a wicked man—for no good （） man would bring in a man who is not a wrongdoer ...” （Gorgias，521c7-d3）

T13. “Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say I am，you will not harm me more than yourselves. Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way；he could not harm me，for I do not think it is permitted that a better man be harmed by a worse.” （Apology，30c8-d5）

As far as I know，these are all the passages that are directly relevant to Socrates’ moral evaluation of himself. First thing that should catch our attention is that Socrates never asserts he has been virtuous and good in the quotes.^[17] What he does claim，however，is that he has wronged no one （T7），or he is not a wrongdoer （T12）. In T13 he seems to judge himself to be a good man，but what he actually says is merely that he is a better man than his accusers，but of course one can be better than wicked people （i.e.，less wicked） without being virtuous. Hence，in the texts Socrates never attributes virtue to himself.

In fact，we should not be surprised to see Socrates’ reluctance to claim virtue，for it is in accordance with his ignorance. Socrates is famous for his belief that knowledge about the good life is at least necessary，if not sufficient，for the acquisition of virtue，as we see in the Protagoras. Since he professes to be ignorant，he lacks at least one essential component of virtue，which rules out the possibility that Socrates meets the standard of a virtuous man set by himself. Indeed，given his view of the intimate relation between wisdom and virtue，it should strike us as bold and，to some extent，contradictory，if Socrates did consider himself a virtuous man. Since not only does Socrates never claim to be good and virtuous in the texts，but also he has philosophical reasons of not doing so，the rhetorical reading is fallacious in holding that Socrates actually has knowledge that all that he has done in his life are just and virtuous.

My second criticism of the rhetorical reading is that it neglects a crucial point Socrates makes in the Gorgias. According to this reading，given that Socrates is confident in his knowledge of the proposition that ‘it is worse and more shameful to commit injustice than suffer injustice’ （henceforth ‘PN’），he necessarily possesses knowledge of the positive version of PN，i.e.，‘it is better and more noble to suffer injustice than commit injustice’ （henceforth ‘PW’）. Again，on this view，his preference of PN over PW is a result of nothing more than a personal inclination of rhetorical framing. Philosophically speaking，Socrates in effect confirms the truth of PW.

This interpretation misses an important philosophical message Socrates wants to deliver with the way in which he phrases the conclusion. Socrates’ reluctance of claiming PW reveals that he does not think，ethically speaking，that PN entails PW. Consider Socrates’ following remark on the asymmetry between being happy and being miserable. Polus invites Socrates to compare two persons，one plotting to unjustly set himself up as a tyrant but having failed，the other succeeding doing it，and asks which one lives a happier life. Socrates replies：

T14. “In that case neither of them will ever be the happier one，neither the one who gains tyrannical power unjustly，nor the one who pays what is due，for of two miserable people one could not be happier than the other. But the one who avoids getting caught and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable one.” （Gorgias，473d5-e2）

In the quoted passage，Socrates obviously holds an asymmetry between happiness and miserableness：being less miserable is not tantamount to being happier，for no miserable person is happier than another miserable person，insofar as they are both miserable，though not to the same extent.

To live virtuously requires one to actively bring about good outcomes and perform just actions. If someone merely suffers injustice but does nothing just whatsoever，he is far from living a virtuous and happy life. Such a person is not made happier，not even a bit，merely by being treated unjustly，though the one committing injustice is more shameful and miserable than he is. Therefore，Socrates only knows that committing injustice is more shameful than receiving it，but not that the latter is better and nobler. The rhetorical reading fails to accommodate this point.

Section IV：The Asymmetry between Knowledge of Values

I suggest another interpretation. The fact that Socrates nearly always avows only negative ethical knowledge reveals that Socrates recognizes anasymmetry between the knowledge of the good and that of the bad：the standard for positive ethical knowledge is more stringent than that for negative ethical knowledge. The upshot of this asymmetry is that the possession of positive ethical knowledge necessarily entails the knowledge of its negative counterpart，but not vice versa. Hence，it is easier to know a fact about what the bad or what the good are not than a fact about the good and virtue.

Let me spell out what the asymmetry means by employing it as an interpretive tool to make sense of some of the key passages quoted earlier. Performing an action in accordance with virtue is，not surprisingly，very demanding. However，one action may fall short of meeting the high standard of virtue given the circumstances without necessarily being bad. This point can be illustrated with Socrates’ claim in T4，i.e.，that it is bad and foul to disobey those who are better than the agent himself. It is perfectly conceivable that someone might obey his superior but still fail to act virtuously. Suppose that in a battle when the commander orders ‘Charge！’，a soldier follows the order by advancing towards the enemy，but at a slower speed and with more hesitance due to his fear. In this case the soldier is indeed following his superior，i.e.，his commander，but obviously he fails to act as a fully courageous soldier should，who，in this case，is supposed to fearlessly attack the enemies. He thereby avoids disobeying one’s superior，which is bad，but fails to display virtue，too.

The same asymmetry between happiness and miserableness Socrates proposes in the Gorigias can be applied to virtue and vice. In cases where one fails to act virtuously but also avoids the bad deed，he should not be said to act more virtuously than the person who commits the wrongdoing，though the latter does act more viciously than the former. Therefore，one who disobeys her superior definitely instantiates the relevant vice，but the person who obeys the superior，without further information provided，does not necessarily act in accordance with virtue，though less viciously. This is the reason why Socrates does not claim to know that to obey one’s superior is good and just，for that is not necessarily true. In this way，a middle ground between good and bad emerges，for it is possible for someone to perform no bad actions whereas fall short of virtue in the mean time.

In light of this middle ground and the asymmetry，we are also in a better position to understand the seemingly confusing fact that Socrates never claims to be a virtuous and good man，despite his confidence in having done nothing wrong （T7，T12，T13）. In virtue of his knowledge of facts about the bad，Socrates is assured that in his life he has committed none of these. All that he has successfully avoids are the vicious acts. That does not entail，however，that Socrates has been acting virtuously all the time，for we have shown that one may shun the bad without acting exactly as the virtuous person should. In order to be sure that all his past actions are virtuous and good，Socrates needs to possess the positive knowledge of what good or virtue is，which he says is a kind of divine wisdom he lacks. Hence，there is a firm philosophical ground on which Socrates can consider himself not a wrongdoer and consistently refuse to claim virtue. This theoretical ground，as I have argued，is the asymmetry between knowledge of the good and that of the bad，and his possession of the latter with the absence of the former.^[18]

The asymmetry also does an excellent interpretative job on T10 above. In that passage，Socrates shows no hesitance admitting that he knows ‘the good are not unjust’. Does he thereby know the positive version of it，i.e.，‘the good are just’？ Equipped with the asymmetry between positive and negative ethical values，we can now contend that he does not know it，and explain why this is so. For since there is a gap between virtuous acts and vicious acts （‘not vicious’ is not tantamount to ‘virtuous’），that which is not unjust may turn out to be short of full-fledged justice. Hence，even though Socrates knows that the good are not unjust，he does not，in virtue of this piece of negative knowledge，know the positive proposition that the good are just.

So far in this section I have shown that the asymmetry between the knowledge of the good and that of the bad perfectly accounts for Socrates’ almost ubiquitous avowals of negative，as opposed to positive，ethical knowledge. Now I’m going to draw further supports for my interpretation from two other important elements in Socratic philosophy：Socrates’ typical method of inquiry，i.e.，the elenchus，and Socrates’ ‘divine voice’，the daimonion.

Elenchus，lends support to the asymmetry I am arguing for in the following way. Recall that part of negative ethical knowledge，as defined at the outset of this paper，is about what virtue and the good are not. This sort of negative knowledge are very common in Socratic inquiries，as elenchus often ends in aporia，where no positive conclusions are made，or where no positive conclusions offered by the interlocutor are capable of withstanding Socrates’ scrutiny. What do we get after aporiais reached？ It cannot be nothing，for then the examination of the subject would be worthless. In fact，we do gain some insight every time aporia occurs：what virtue or the good are not. That is to say，some negative knowledge or justified beliefs are obtained after Socrates’ conversation with his partners. For instance，in the Euthyphro，though Socrates and Euthyphro are unable to find a satisfactory definition of piety，a number of fallacious definitions of it，along with explanations of why they are fallacious，are indeed revealed. Socrates at least proves that the definition of piety is not that what is loved by （all） the gods，nor is it equivalent to the care of the gods.^[19]

Next I discuss how Socrates’ daimonion is also friendly to the asymmetry of values. One essential feature of the daimonion is that it only issues negative command. Socrates says the daimonion only stops him from doing something wrong，without ever actively encouraging him to do anything （Apology，31d1-4）. The idea is that the daimonion，only says，as it were，‘Stop！’，but never says to Socrates ‘Do X！’. That is to say，through the orders from the daimonion，Socrates is merely aware of that what he might be considering to do is not good，and thus he can avoid that course of action. What the daimonion does not reveal，however，is what the right thing to do is in this particular situation. This apotropaic feature of the daimonion has evident similarities with the epistemic asymmetry developed in this paper.

In what way the daimonion supports my thesis depends on how we interpret the relation between the daimonion and Socrates’ rational thinking，for knowledge must be on a rational basis. The view I am sympathetic to is that daimonion is an uncanny moral feeling Socrates has as a result of his long-time examination of his own soul.^[20] On this reading，it is Socrates’ consistent philosophical inquiry that produces this uncanny feeling which prevents him from going astray，and thus the daimonion would not even have existed without some kind of （non-expert） knowledge Socrates gained via his rational reflections. The asymmetry between positive and negative knowledge gains strong supports from this view of the daimonion，for it best explains why the commands from the daimonion display such an apotropaic characteristic in the first place.

My argument，however，does not necessarily rely on the rationalist interpretation of the daimonion.^[21] One could understand the daimonion as a divine intuition which is totally independent of rationality，and it is still friendly to my view. What matters for the asymmetry is that at least Socrates’ interpretation of the daimonion’s prohibitions must be on a rational basis. Remember that what the daimonion says to Socrates is pretty vague：it does not say ‘Do not φ！’，but simply ‘Do not！’ or ‘Stop！’. It is still up to Socrates to figure out what the prohibition is about or amounts to. This point is evident in two respects. First，he provides reasons for why the prohibitions are correct whenever the daimonion is cited as the source of his confidence in staying away from a certain course of action. In the Apology，Socrates asserts that the daimonion keeps him away from politics because he would have died long ago if he participated actively in public affairs （31d4-9）；and in the Phaedrus，^[22] the daimonion stops him from crossing the river because the speech Phaedrus makes Socrates give calls for revision （242c-d）；second，the command of the daimonion always points to the same direction as the his rational thoughts do，and there is not one single case in the texts where the two sources of moral instructions contradict each other.^[23]

Hence，even the non-rational reading of the daimonion lends support to the asymmetry I am arguing for，since the fact that the daimonion merely issues prohibitions and that Socrates interprets them with rational reflection already show that Socrates has some rational grasp of certain ethical facts about the bad without also knowing the corresponding positive ethical truths. At any rate，since Socratic inquires frequently only yield negative ethical knowledge，though Socrates’ examination of his own moral character does not help him acquire the superhuman wisdom of being clear on the nature and form the good and virtue，such a consistent practice of the caring for his own soul does have revealed to him many actions to be wrong and ought to be shunned. It is on the basis of this cognitive grasp of negative ethical facts that Socrates is able to interpret the apotropaic commands from the daimonion.

Section V：Dealing With Objections

My positive account has been given，and now I deal with possible objections.Some may have the suspicion that my interpretation cannot apply comprehensively to all of Socrates’ avowals of knowledge in Plato’s early dialogues. It might be argued that the asymmetry thesis is established on the basis of a limited and carefully selected group of passages （T4-T11），and there are presumably many other passages that tell against my claim. This worry arises naturally，because many people are under the impression that Socrates must endorse，explicitly and implicitly，many more ethical propositions in his philosophical conversations with interlocutors than T4-T11 could include.

Two points can be made in reply to this worry. First，I believe T4 through T11 are highly representative of and cover most of，even if arguably do not exhaust，Socrates’s avowals of ethical knowledge. It is critical here to remind us of what was established in SectionI. There are numerous places where though Socrates seems to claim to possess some ethical knowledge，he actually does not，and many examples are given there. In those passages Socrates is either attributing knowledge to someone else，or recognizing person or common facts，or entertaining certain conclusions which are dependent on assumptions that Socrates does not claim to know. When we are under the impression that Socrates genuinely claims to know an ethical truth，a careful reading may correct our opinion. As far as my knowledge goes，I have not found a passage that guarantees an attribution of positive ethical knowledge to Socrates.

Second，even if there were a small number of passages that might be taken to indicate that Socrates admits to possess positive knowledge，little harm would be done to what is established in this paper. For it was shown，through my analysis of the quoted passages，that Socrates at least exhibits a general inclination or pattern of thought of avowing only negative ethical knowledge. The existence of a general pattern of thought of course is perfectly compatible with a few exceptions. If this neglected characteristic on Socrates’ part naturally intrigues us，it requires more interpretative and explanatory work，which is what this paper is devoted to.

There is a more substantial objection. One may argue that the asymmetry thesis contradicts a kind of symmetry Socrates seems to endorse. In various dialogues，Socrates explicitly claims that the ultimate knowledge of the good and that of the bad stand in a relation of mutual entailment，or even of equivalence. In the Hippias Minor，Socrates argues that the liar is the same as the person who has knowledge of the truths in the specific field in which he is capable of lying （364e-369a）；the majority of Athenians would know the greatest good if they knew the greatest evil （Crito，44d4-7）；and the just person may turn out to be a clever thief （Republic I，333e-334b）. If these passages show that knowledge of ethical falsehoods necessarily implies that of ethical truths and vice versa，then the asymmetry expounded in this paper would be rebutted.

This objection correctly calls attention to the symmetry of that sort in Socratic ethical epistemology，but it does not undermine the argument in this paper. The key of my response is that the symmetry in question occurs at a different level from the asymmetry that has been suggested：the former is at the general level of expert knowledge，whereas the latter is at the level of particular facts. For instance，in the Hippias Minor，what is discussed is whether someone who has the power （） of lying，namely，the person who can tell falsehoods consistently whenever he wishes （366c1），turns out to be the same person as the expert in the subject.^[24] The point Socrates attempts to make there does not directly concern the person who only occasionally lies about some concrete facts or the person who merely knows certain concrete true facts in that field of study. This is obvious in Socrates’ examples，for those who are considered in the dialogue are all experts，such as the arithmetician，the geometer，the astronomer，etc.（367a-369a），as opposed to some laymen who have a only mediocre grasp of the relevant knowledge. A closer examination of the passage in the Crito also supports this reading. Socrates remarks：

T15 ‘Would that the majority could inict the greatest evils，for they would then be capable of the greatest good，and that would be fine，but now they cannot do either. They cannot make a man either wise or foolish，but they inict things haphazardly.’ （44d4-7，my emphasis）

It is critical to notice here that what the majority are incapable of are the greatest good and the greatest evil，which turns out to be wisdom and foolishness respectively. In Socratic philosophy，wisdom usually denotes the expert knowledge of goodness and virtue that enables one to live a worthwhile life，so the symmetry here should also be construed as a relation that holds only at the level of expert knowledge rather than particular knowledge，given that nothing is said about the relation between the knowledge of particular goods and that of particular evils. The relevant passage in the Republic I should be interpreted in the same vein.^[25]

Furthermore，it has been shown in the previous section that knowledge of particular evils in fact does not necessarily entail the corresponding positive knowledge. Going back to Socrates’ judgment that disobeying one’s superior is bad and foul，we have seen why this negative ethical truth does not imply ‘obeying one’s superior is good and virtuous’ in the example of the soldier. And we can have more examples to prove the same conclusion. Suppose the following propositions are known to be true：‘Eating lunch in your office is rude and wrong’，‘Bullying your skinny classmates is bad’，‘Drinking alcohol for a surgeon doing a surgery is dangerous and unethical’. Apparently the awareness of these ethical rules does not guarantee the knowledge of what the right thing to do is in each case. One might know that he should not bully his skinny classmates who lack physical strength but is still unclear on how to get along with them in the virtuous manner. On the other hand，if he does know in what manner he should interact with his peers，then surely he also knows that bullying them is wrong. Therefore，the asymmetry at the level of particular ethical facts remains to be a meaningful and reasonable philosophical position.^[26]

Section VI：Conclusion

In summary，the argument in this paper proceeded in the following way. I first showed that Socrates’ genuine avowals of ethical knowledge are rarer than many people believe，and a close textual analysis was provided to prove that in those genuine avowals，what is known are mostly negative ethical knowledge. This presents an interpretative challenge to us. Then a rhetorical solution was outlined，according to which Socrates knows，epistemically speaking，the positive versions of the negative ethical propositions equally well. This reading is ultimately rejected because it misses two philosophical messages Socrates conveys both in the Gorgias and in his moral assessment of himself. Next I argued for the asymmetry thesis，which contends that Socrates is aware of an epistemic asymmetry of values，i.e.，one can know a fact about the bad without knowing the alleged corresponding fact about the good. It was shown that this interpretation not only makes perfect sense of the key passages but also has further supports from two other indispensable elements in Socratic philosophy，i.e.，the elenchus and，especially，the daimonion. In the end，in response to two possible objections，it was argued that the asymmetry thesis holds comprehensively to Socrates’ genuine avowals of ethical knowledge，and that though Socrates actually advocates a kind of symmetry between knowledge of the good and that of the bad，it is at the level of expert and definitional knowledge whereas the asymmetry is at the level of particular facts.^[27]

References

Benson，Hugh H.，2000，Socratic Wisdom，Oxford University Press.

Brickhouse，Thomas C.and Smith，Nicholas D.，1994，Plato’s Socrates，Oxford University Press.

Cooper，J. M. （eds.），1997，Plato Complete Works，Hackett Publishing Company.

Gulley，N.，1968，Philosophy of Socrates，Macmillan.

Kraut，Richard，1984，Socrates and the State，Princeton University Press.

Reeve，C. D. C.，1989，Socrates in the Apology，Hackett Publishing Company.

Smith，N. and Woodruff，P. （eds.），2000，Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy，New York：Oxford University Press.

Vlastos，G.，1985，“Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge”，Philosophical Quarterly，35，1-31.

Weiss，R.，1981：“ as in the Hippias minor”，Classical Quarterly，287-304.

Wolfsdorf，D.，2004，“Socrates’ avowals of knowledge”，Phronesis，49.2 （2004），75-142.

Woodruff，P.，1990，“Plato’s Early Theory of Knowledge”，Ancient Greek Epistemology，ed. by S. Everson，Cambridge：Cambridge University Press，60-84.

——，2000，“Socrates and the Irrational”，Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy，eds. by N. D. Smith and P. B. Woodruff，New York：Oxford University Press.

——，forthcoming，“Self-Ridicule：Socratic Wisdom”，Laughter and Comedy in Ancient Philosophy，ed. by Franco V. Trivigno and Pierre Destrée，New York：OUP.

詹文杰，2015，《论苏格拉底的无知与有知》，《哲学研究》第8期。

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[1] WEI Yixin（魏奕昕），PhD Candidate，Philosophy Department，University of Texas at Austin.Areas of Research：Ancient Philosophy （especially Ancient Greek Ethics，Moral Psychology，Epistemology，and Scepticism），Ethics. Email：weiyixin@utexas.edu.

[2] Throughout this paper，I use ‘Socrates’ to refer to the character who appears in Plato’s early dialogues recognized in common scholarship.

[3] Vlastos （1985/1994）.

[4] Brickhouse and Smith （1994：30-45）.

[5] Reeve （1989：14-62）；Woodruff （1990）.

[6] Kraut （1984：274-9）.

[7] Wolfsdorf （2004）.

[8] Some interpreters disagree. They argue that Socrates is always being ironical when he uses words paradigmatically associated with knowledge，so he does not genuinely believe that he has the relevant knowledge even in those cases. See Gulley，1968. But there are many passages where Socrates is clearly serious about his possession of certain knowledge （e.g.，Apology 29a-b）.

[9] Wolfsdorf （2004） ignores all those passages in the discussion of Socratic knowledge，because he introduced the knowledge/true opinion distinction （made in the Meno，which is usually considered among Plato’s middle dialogues） into early dialogues，and contends that when Socrates seems to be strongly convinced by some proposition but does not use the knowledge-words，what he believes he possesses is merely well-justified opinions，as opposed to knowledge. I am suspicious of that move，for I do not see persuasive reason to attribute this later distinction to Socrates in the early dialogues.

[10] All translations are from Cooper （1997）.

[11] Vlastos（1994：47）.

[12] In this regard，one good place to look at is Wolfsdorf （2004）. He does a good job of showing that of almost 50 passages where Socrates could be taken to claim ethical knowledge，only a few should be read that way. It does not mean，however，that I necessarily agree with his reading of all passages. For example，I disagree with his reading of the Laches 190b7-c5，where I do not think Socrates claims to know what virtue is，which is Wolfsdorf’s reading.

[13] One may notice two distinguishable kinds of negative knowledge in my definition：1. what virtue and the good are not；2. a certain fact is bad，unjust，or vicious. The differences between the two kinds，however，do not directly bear on my arguments in this paper，so I do not make it explicit. However，the two kinds of negative knowledge are clearly not unrelated.

[14] More on Socrates’ moral history later in section III and IV.

[15] E.g.，Wofsdorf （2004：102）.

[16] I thank James Gillard for pointing out this possible reading to me.

[17] On this point I agree with Benson （2000：242-243）.

[18] Note that here I’m not claiming that Socrates in fact has not been virtuous. The possibility of him being a virtuous man is still open. The point here is that he does not have enough positively knowledge for him to confirm that.

[19] One might worry that Socrates could run elenchus on vices，then what they get is something like what injustice is not. But that is still friendly to my thesis，since statements about injustice and vices are negative knowledge under my definition.

[20] This is Woodruff’s view，in Woodruff，in production，pp.20-22.

[21] For more on this debate，see Smith （2000）.

[22] To be sure，the Phaedrus is usually considered one of Plato’s middle dialogues，as opposed to early ones. The only reason I cite the Phaedrus is that the daimonion appears rarely in the corpus. Focusing only on the daimonion in the Apology is already sufficient for my claim here.

[23] See Woodruff （2000：142）.

[24] See Weiss （1981）.

[25] One may also worry about T11. In that passage，Socrates claims to know that the good men are not unjust，which might be taken to be non-particular but general expert knowledge. On the contrary，however，I would argue that this is not expert knowledge but knowledge of particulars. It is not expert knowledge because an expert in morality would know what the good itself is，or is capable of giving the right definition of the good. But knowing what good men are not equivalent to the grasp of the nature of the good itself. It also concerns particular facts in the sense that it concerns a particular group of subjects，namely，the good men.

[26] Cf. Aristotle’s NE.1106b35. There are many ways to go wrong，but only one way to get things right. Knowing one of the false ways does not in itself guarantee the recognition of the only true way that leads to virtue.

[27] I thank Matt Evans，Paul Woodruff，James Gillard，Matt Matherne，Josh Renfro，Wu Hongzhao，Theofilos Kyriakidis and all participants of the seminar ‘Socrates’ at UT Austin in 2019 Spring for extremely useful discussions and comments. I am grateful to Matt Evans，James Gillard，and an anonymous referee for Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy for written comments on earlier versions of this paper. This paper is funded by CSC （Chinese Scholarship Council） Scholarship.