C.Acquisition by Capture

Pierson v.Post

Supreme Court of Judicature of New York

3 Cai.R.175； 1805 N.Y.

[Prior History：THIS was an action of trespass on the case commenced in a justice’s court，by the present defendant against the now plaintiff.

The declaration stated that Post，being in possession of certain dogs and hounds under his command，did，“upon a certain wild and uninhabited，unpossessed and waste land，called the beach， find and start one of those noxious beasts called a fox，”and whilst there hunting，chasing and pursuing the same with his dogs and hounds，and when in view thereof，Pierson，well knowing the fox was so hunted and pursued，did，in the sight of Post，to prevent his catching the same，kill and carry it off.A verdict having been rendered for the plaintiff below，the defendant there sued out a certiorari，and now assigned for error，that the declaration and the matters therein contained were not sufficient in law to maintain an action.

Disposition：Judgment of reversal.]

TOMPKINS，J.，delivered the opinion of the court：

This cause comes before us on a return to a certiorari directed to one of the justices of Queens County.

The question submitted by the counsel in this cause for our determination is，whether Lodowick Post，by the pursuit with his hounds in the manner alleged in his declaration，acquired such a right to，or property in，the fox as will sustain an action against Pierson for killing and taking him away？

The cause was argued with much ability by the counsel on both sides，and presents for our decision a novel and nice question.It is admitted that a fox is an animal feroe naturoe，and that property in such animals is acquired by occupancy only.These admissions narrow the discussion to the simple question of what acts amount to occupancy，applied to acquiring right to wild animals.

If we have recourse to the ancient writers upon general principles of law，the judgment below is obviously erroneous.Justinian’s Institutes (lib.2，tit.1，sec.13），and Fleta (lib.3，ch.2，p.175），adopt the principle，that pursuit alone vests no property or right in the huntsman； and that even pursuit，accompanied with wounding，is equally ineffectual for that purpose，unless the animal be actually taken.The same principle is recognized by Breton (lib.2，ch.1，p.8）.

Puffendorf (lib.4，ch.6，sec.2 and 10） defines occupancy of beasts feroe naturoe，to be the actual corporeal possession of them，and Bynkershock is cited as coinciding in this definition.It is indeed with hesitation that Puffendorf affirms that a wild beast mortally wounded or greatly maimed，cannot be fairly intercepted by another，whilst the pursuit of the person inflicting the wound continues.The foregoing authorities are decisive to show that mere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox，but that he became the property of Pierson，who intercepted and killed him.

It，therefore，only remains to inquire whether there are any contrary principles or authorities，to be found in other books，which ought to induce a different decision.Most of the cases which have occurred in England，relating to property in wild animals，have either been discussed and decided upon the principles of their positive statute regulations，or have arisen between the huntsman and the owner of the land upon which beasts feroe naturoe have been apprehended； the former claiming them by title of occupancy，and the latter ratione soli.Little satisfactory aid can，therefore，be derived from the English reporters.

Barbeyrac，in his notes on Puffendorf，does not accede to the definition of occupancy by the latter，but，on the contrary，affirms that actual bodily seizure is not，in all cases，necessary to constitute possession of wild animals.He does not，however，describe the acts which，according to his ideas，will amount to an appropriation of such animals to private use，so as to exclude the claims of all other persons，by title of occupancy，to the same animals； and he is far from averring that pursuit alone is sufficient for that purpose.To a certain extent，and as far as Barbeyrac appears to me to go，his objections to Puffendorf’s definition of occupancy are reasonable and correct.That is to say，that actual bodily seizure is not indispensable to acquire right to，or possession of，wild beasts； but that，on the contrary，the mortal wounding of such beasts，by one not abandoning his pursuit，may，with the utmost propriety，be deemed possession of him； since thereby the pursuer manifests an unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to his individual use，has deprived him of his natural liberty，and brought him within his certain control.So，also，encompassing and securing such animals with nets and toils，or otherwise intercepting them in such a manner as to deprive them of their natural liberty，and render escape impossible，may justly be deemed to give possession of them to those persons who，by their industry and labor，have used such means of apprehending them.Barbeyrac seems to have adopted and had in view in his notes，the more accurate opinion of Grotius，with respect to occupancy.That celebrated author (lib.2，ch.8，sec.3，p.309），speaking of occupancy，proceeds thus：“Requiritur autem corporalis quoedam possessio ad dominium adipiscendum； atque ideo，vulnerasse non suf ficit.” But in the following section he explains and qualifies this definition of occupancy：“Sed possessio illa potest non solis manibus，sed instrumentis，ut decipulis，ratibus，laqueis dum duo adsint； primum ut ipsa instrumenta sint in nostra potestate，deinde ut fera，ita inclusa sit，ut exire inde nequeat.” This qualification embraces the full extent of Barbeyrac’s objection to Puffendorf’s definition，and allows as great a latitude to acquiring property by occupancy，as can reasonably be inferred from the words or ideas expressed by Barbeyrac in his notes.The case now under consideration is one of mere pursuit，and presents no circumstances or acts which can bring it within the definition of occupancy by Puffendorf，or Grotius，or the ideas of Barbeyrac upon that subject.

The case cited from 11 Mod.74，130，I think clearly distinguishable from the present； inasmuch as there the action was for maliciously hindering and disturbing the plaintiff in the exercise and enjoyment of a private franchise； and in the report of the same case (3 Salk.9），Holt，Ch.J.，states，that the ducks were in the plaintiff’s decoy pond，and so in his possession，from which it is obvious the court laid much stress in their opinion upon the plaintiff’s possession of the ducks，rationed soli.

We are the more readily inclined to confine possession or occupancy of beasts fer？ natur？，within the limits prescribed by the learned authors above cited，for the sake of certainty，and preserving peace and order in society.If the first seeing，starting or pursuing such animals，without having so wounded，circumvented or ensnared them，so as to deprive them of their natural liberty，and subject them to the control of their pursuer，should afford the basis of actions against others for intercepting and killing them，it would prove a fertile source of quarrels and litigation.

However uncourteous or unkind the conduct of Pierson towards Post，in this instance，may have been，yet this act was productive of no injury or damage for which a legal remedy can be applied.We are of opinion the judgment below was erroneous，and ought to be reversed.

Livingston，J.My opinion differs from that of the court.Of six exceptions，taken to the proceedings below，all are abandoned except the third，which reduces the controversy to a single question.

Whether a person who，with his own hounds，starts and hunts a fox on waste and uninhabited ground，and is on the point of seizing his prey，acquires such an interest in the animal as to have a right of action against another，who in view of the huntsman and his dogs in full pursuit，and with knowledge of the chase，shall kill and carry him away.

This is a knotty point，and should have been submitted to the arbitration of sportsmen，without poring over Justinian，Fleta，Bracton，Puffendorf，Locke，Barbeyrac，or Blackstone，all of whom have been cited：they would have had no difficulty in coming to a prompt and correct conclusion.In a court thus constituted，the skin and carcass of poor Reynard would have been properly disposed of，and a precedent set，interfering with no usage or custom which the experience of ages has sanctioned，and which must be so well known to every votary of Diana.But the parties have referred the question to our judgment，and we must dispose of it as well as we can，from the partial lights we possess，leaving to a higher tribunal the correction of any mistake which we may be so unfortunate as to make.By the pleadings it is admitted that a fox is a “wild and noxious beast”.Both parties have regarded him，as the law of nations does a pirate，“hostem humani generis”，and although “de mortuis nil nisi bonum” be a maxim of our profession，the memory of the deceased has not been spared.His depredations on farmers and on barnyards，have not been forgotten； and to put him to death wherever found，is allowed to be meritorious，and of public benefit.Hence it follows，that our decision should have in view the greatest possible encouragement to the destruction of an animal，so cunning and ruthless in his career.But who would keep a pack of hounds； or what gentleman，at the sound of the horn，and at peep of day，would mount his steed，and for hours together，“sub jove frigido”，or a vertical sun，pursue the windings of this wily quadruped，if，just as night came on，and his stratagems and strength were nearly exhausted，a saucy intruder，who had not shared in the honors or labors of the chase，were permitted to come in at the death，and bear away in triumph the object of pursuit？ Whatever Justinian may have thought of the matter，it must be recollected that his code was compiled many hundred years ago，and it would be very hard indeed，at the distance of so many centuries，not to have a right to establish a rule for ourselves.In his day，we read of no order of men who made it a business，in the language of the declaration in this cause，“with hounds and dogs to find，start，pursue，hunt，and chase”，these animals，and that，too，without any other motive than the preservation of Roman poultry； if this diversion had been then in fashion，the lawyers who composed his institutes，would have taken care not to pass it by，without suitable encouragement.If anything，therefore，in the digests or pandects shall appear to militate against the defendant in error，who，on this occasion，was the fox hunter，we have only to say tempora mutantur； and if men themselves change with the times，why should not laws also undergo an alteration？

It may be expected，however，by the learned counsel，that more particular notice be taken of their authorities.I have examined them all，and feel great difficulty in determining，whether to acquire dominion over a thing，before in common，it be sufficient that we barely see it，or know where it is，or wish for it，or make a declaration of our will respecting it； or whether，in the case of wild beasts，setting a trap，or lying in wait，or starting，or pursuing，be enough； or if an actual wounding，or killing，or bodily tact and occupation be necessary.Writers on general law，who have favored us with their speculations on these points，differ on them all； but，great as is the diversity of sentiment among them，some conclusion must be adopted on the question immediately before us.After mature deliberation，I embrace that of Barbeyrac as the most rational and least liable to objection.If at liberty，we might imitate the courtesy of a certain emperor，who，to avoid giving offense to the advocates of any of these different doctrines，adopted a middle course，and by ingenious distinctions，rendered it difficult to say (as often happens after a fierce and angry contest） to whom the palm of victory belonged.He ordained，that if a beast be followed with large dogs and hounds，he shall belong to the hunter，not to the chance occupant； and in like manner，if he be killed or wounded with a lance or sword； but if chased with beagles only，then he passed to the captor，not to the first pursuer.If slain with a dart，a sling，or a bow，he fell to the hunter，if still in chase，and not to him who might afterwards find and seize him.

Now，as we are without any municipal regulations of our own，and the pursuit here，for aught that appears on the case，being with dogs and hounds of imperial stature，we are at liberty to adopt one of the provisions just cited，which comports also with the learned conclusion of Barbeyrac，that property in animals fer？ natur？ may be acquired without bodily touch or manucaption，provided the pursuer be within reach，or have a reasonable prospect (which certainly existed here） of taking what he has thus discovered an intention of converting to his own use.

When we reflect also that the interest of our husbandmen，the most useful of men in any community，will be advanced by the destruction of a beast so pernicious and incorrigible，we cannot greatly err in saying that a pursuit like the present，through waste and unoccupied lands，and which must inevitably and speedily have terminated in corporeal possession，or bodily seisin，confers such a right to the object of it，as to make any one a wrong-doer who shall interfere and shoulder the spoil.The justice’s judgment ought，therefore，in my opinion，to be affirmed.

Judgment of reversal.

Notes：

1.What was the lower court’s judgment？ Why does the majority here reverse that judgment？ What benefits does the majority believe will flow from adopting the rule that the ownership of wild animals is established by catching or killing it，not by chasing it with the intent to catch or kill it？ Do you agree with the majority’s analysis？Why or why not？

2.What reason does the minority opinion give for preferring the alternative rule that ownership of wild animals is established by chasing the animal with the intent to catch or kill it？ Do you agree？ Why or why not？

3.Pierson v.Post：trespass “on the case”–a trespass is a prescribed writ for a legal wrong，usually accompanied by force and arms； since it does not fit in most tort cases in the absence of defendant using force and arms，an “action on the case” developed to supplement the writ.

4.What should be the better law，in your own analysis，that establishes property right in “wild animal” cases？

5.Pierson v.Post present a simple story，and yet a sophisticated legal problem– whose right is superior to others in terms of “wild animal”？ The first to see，first to chase，first to wound，first to trap，or first to get hold of it？

6.Which definition of “occupancy” do you prefer–Puffendorf’s “corporeal possession，” or Barbeyrac’s “hot pursuit + mortal wounding” theories？

7.Under the “capture/fatally wounding” rule，what if an animal is securely trapped，but it will also attract fellow animals that will definitely，by nature，come to its rescue？

8.Suppose you are a judge，in handling a case like this，how broad a rule can you derive from Pierson v.Post？

9.Background of Pierson v.Post.Lodowick Post was a well-to-do Dutchman hunting for leisure with his dogs and hounds when Jesse Pierson，a stoutly built schoolteacher walking home，saw the wounded fox hid in a well，got to it，and killed it.He then took the dead fox in front of Post.Post filed the lawsuit claiming for $25，the highest amount allowed under the Twenty Five Dollars Act and won in the Justice Court.Pierson，backed by his father，successfully appealed to win $121.37 in New York Supreme Court which attracted the best judges and lawyers as well.Pierson’s lawyer was attorney general，and later became a U.S.senator； Post’s lawyer became Mayor of New York and U.S.House Representative； Judge Tompkins became U.S.Vice President； and Judge Livingston became a U.S.Supreme Court Justice.The case，which is usually the first one in any property law class，was more than what appeared to be a trial dispute over a dead fox which would cost less than a dollar at that time.The legal concepts involved excited the politicians and legal scholars then，and no less so even today.For a detailed description of the history，see Pierson v.Post，The New Learning，by Daniel R.Ernst，available at http://www.greenbag.org/v13n1/v13n1_ernst.pdf.