第2章

INTRODUCTORY 导论

The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence. The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars. On the other hand, wars arising from other causes have been greatly modified in their conduct and issue by the control of the sea. Therefore the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history; and it is in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively, regarded in the following pages.

A study of the military history of the past, such as this, is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and to the skilful conduct of war in the future. Napoleon names among the campaigns to be studied by the aspiring soldier, those of Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar, to whom gunpowder was unknown; and there is a substantial agreement among professional writers that, while many of the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal application, can be elevated to the rank of general principles. For the same reason the study of the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general principles of maritime war, notwithstanding the great changes that have been brought about in naval weapons by the scientific advances of the past half century, and by the introduction of steam as the motive power.

It is doubly necessary thus to study critically the history and experience of naval warfare in the days of sailing-ships, because while these will be found to afford lessons of present application and value, steam navies have as yet made no history which can be quoted as decisive in its teaching. Of the one we have much experimental knowledge; of the other, practically none. Hence theories about the naval warfare of the future are almost wholly presumptive; and although the attempt has been made to give them a more solid basis by dwelling upon the resemblance between fleets of steamships and fleets of galleys moved by oars, which have a long and well-known history, it will be well not to be carried away by this analogy until it has been thoroughly tested. The resemblance is indeed far from superficial. The feature which the steamer and the galley have in common is the ability to move in any direction independent of the wind. Such a power makes a radical distinction between those classes of vessels and the sailing-ship; for the latter can follow only a limited number of courses when the wind blows, and must remain motionless when it fails. But while it is wise to observe things that are alike, it is also wise to look for things that differ; for when the imagination is carried away by the detection of points of resemblance, — one of the most pleasing of mental pursuits, —it is apt to be impatient of any divergence in its new-found parallels, and so may overlook or refuse to recognize such. Thus the galley and the steamship have in common, though unequally developed, the important characteristic mentioned, but in at least two points they differ; and in an appeal to the history of the galley for lessons as to fighting steamships, the differences as well as the likeness must be kept steadily in view, or false deductions may be made. The motive power of the galley when in use necessarily and rapidly declined, because human strength could not long maintain such exhausting efforts, and consequently tactical movements could continue but for a limited time (1); and again, during the galley period offensive weapons were not only of short range, but were almost wholly confined to hand-to-hand encounter. These two conditions led almost necessarily to a rush upon each other, not, however, without some dexterous attempts to turn or double on the enemy, followed by a hand-to-hand mêlée. In such a rush and such a mêlée a great consensus of respectable, even eminent, naval opinion of the present day finds the necessary outcome of modern naval weapons, — a kind of Donnybrook Fair, in which, as the history of mêlées shows, it will be hard to know friend from foe. Whatever may prove to be the worth of this opinion, it cannot claim an historical basis in the sole fact that galley and steamship can move at any moment directly upon the enemy, and carry a beak upon their prow, regardless of the points in which galley and steamship differ. As yet this opinion is only a presumption, upon which final judgment may well be deferred until the trial of battle has given further light. Until that time there is room for the opposite view, — that a mêlée between numerically equal fleets, in which skill is reduced to a minimum, is not the best that can be done with the elaborate and mighty weapons of this age. The surer of himself an admiral is, the finer the tactical development of his fleet, the better his captains, the more reluctant must he necessarily be to enter into a mêlée with equal forces, in which all these advantages will be thrown away, chance reign supreme, and his fleet be placed on terms of equality with an assemblage of ships which have never before acted together. (2)History has lessons as to when mêlées are, or are not, in order.

The galley, then, has one striking resemblance to the steamer, but differs in other important features which are not so immediately apparent and are therefore less accounted of. In the sailing-ship, on the contrary, the striking feature is the difference between it and the more modern vessel; the points of resemblance, though existing and easy to find, are not so obvious, and therefore are less heeded. This impression is enhanced by the sense of utter weakness in the sailing-ship as compared with the steamer, owing to its dependence upon the wind; forgetting that, as the former fought with its equals, the tactical lessons are valid. The galley was never reduced to impotence by a calm, and hence receives more respect in our day than the sailing-ship; yet the latter displaced it and remained supreme until the utilization of steam. The powers to injure an enemy from a great distance, to maneuver for an unlimited length of time without wearing out the men, to devote the greater part of the crew to the offensive weapons instead of to the oar, are common to the sailing vessel and the steamer, and are at least as important, tactically considered, as the power of the galley to move in a calm or against the wind.

In tracing resemblances there is a tendency not only to overlook points of difference, but to exaggerate points of likeness, — to be fanciful. It may be so considered to point out that as the sailing-ship had guns of long range, with comparatively great penetrative power, and carronades, which were of shorter range but great smashing effect, so the modern steamer has its batteries of long-range guns and of torpedoes, the latter being effective only within a limited distance and then injuring by smashing, while the gun, as of old, aims at penetration. Yet these are distinctly tactical considerations, which must affect the plans of admirals and captains; and the analogy is real, not forced. So also both the sailing-ship and the steamer contemplate direct contact with an enemy's vessel, — the former to carry her by boarding, the latter to sink her by ramming; and to both this is the most difficult of their tasks, for to effect it the ship must be carried to a single point of the field of action, whereas projectile weapons may be used from many points of a wide area.

The relative positions of two sailing-ships, or fleets, with reference to the direction of the wind involved most important tactical questions, and were perhaps the chief care of the seamen of that age. To a superficial glance it may appear that since this has become a matter of such indifference to the steamer, no analogies to it are to be found in present conditions, and the lessons of history in this respect are valueless. A more careful consideration of the distinguishing characteristics of the lee and the weather“gage,”(3) directed to their essential features and disregarding secondary details, will show that this is a mistake. The distinguishing feature of the weather-gage was that it conferred the power of giving or refusing battle at will, which in turn carries the usual advantage of an offensive attitude in the choice of the method of attack. This advantage was accompanied by certain drawbacks, such as irregularity introduced into the order, exposure to raking or enfilading cannonade, and the sacrifice of part or all of the artillery-fire of the assailant, — all which were incurred in approaching the enemy. The ship, or fleet, with the lee-gage could not attack; if it did not wish to retreat, its action was confined to the defensive, and to receiving battle on the enemy's terms. This disadvantage was compensated by the comparative ease of maintaining the order of battle undisturbed, and by a sustained artillery-fire to which the enemy for a time was unable to reply. Historically, these favorable and unfavorable characteristics have their counterpart and analogy in the offensive and defensive operations of all ages. The offence undertakes certain risks and disadvantages in order to reach and destroy the enemy; the defence, so long as it remains such, refuses the risks of advance, holds on to a careful, well-ordered position, and avails itself of the exposure to which the assailant submits himself. These radical differences between the weather and the lee gage were so clearly recognized, through the cloud of lesser details accompanying them, that the former was ordinarily chosen by the English, because their steady policy was to assail and destroy their enemy; whereas the French sought the lee-gage, because by so doing they were usually able to cripple the enemy as he approached, and thus evade decisive encounters and preserve their ships. The French, with rare exceptions, subordinated the action of the navy to other military considerations, grudged the money spent upon it, and therefore sought to economize their fleet by assuming a defensive position and limiting its efforts to the repelling of assaults. For this cause the lee-gage, skilfully used, was admirably adapted so long as an enemy displayed more courage than conduct; but when Rodney showed an intention to use the advantage of the wind, not merely to attack, but to make a formidable concentration on a part of the enemy's line, his wary opponent, De Guichen, changed his tactics. In the first of their three actions the Frenchman took the lee-gage; but after recognizing Rodney's purpose he manoeuvred for the advantage of the wind, not to attack, but to refuse action except on his own terms. The power to assume the offensive, or to refuse battle, rests no longer with the wind, but with the party which has the greater speed; which in a fleet will depend not only upon the speed of the individual ships, but also upon their tactical uniformity of action. Henceforth the ships which have the greatest speed will have the weather-gage.

It is not therefore a vain expectation, as many think, to look for useful lessons in the history of sailing-ships as well as in that of galleys. Both have their points of resemblance to the modern ship; both have also points of essential difference, which make it impossible to cite their experiences or modes of action as tactical precedents to be followed. But a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty, or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success. War has such principles; their existence is detected by the study of the past, which reveals them in successes and in failures, the same from age to age. Conditions and weapons change; but to cope with the one or successfully wield the others, respect must be had to these constant teachings of history in the tactics of the battlefield, or in those wider operations of war which are comprised under the name of strategy.

It is however in these wider operations, which embrace a whole theatre of war, and in a maritime contest may cover a large portion of the globe, that the teachings of history have a more evident and permanent value, because the conditions remain more permanent. The theatre of war may be larger or smaller, its difficulties more or less pronounced, the contending armies more or less great, the necessary movements more or less easy, but these are simply differences of scale, of degree, not of kind. As a wilderness gives place to civilization, as means of communication multiply, as roads are opened, rivers bridged, food-resources increased, the operations of war become easier, more rapid, more extensive; but the principles to which they must be conformed remain the same. When the march on foot was replaced by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in turn gave place to railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the scale of time diminished; but the principles which dictated the point at which the army should be concentrated, the direction in which it should move, the part of the enemy's position which it should assail, the protection of communications, were not altered. So, on the sea, the advance from the galley timidly creeping from port to port to the sailingship launching out boldly to the ends of the earth, and from the latter to the steamship of our own time, has increased the scope and the rapidity of naval operations without necessarily changing the principles which should direct them; and the speech of Hermocrates twenty-three hundred years ago, before quoted, contained a correct strategic plan, which is as applicable in its principles now as it was then. Before hostile armies or fleets are brought into contact (a word which perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theatre of war. Among these are the proper function of the navy in the war; its true objective;the point or points upon which it should be concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the maintenance of communications between these depots and the home base; the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping must pass. All these are strategic questions, and upon all these history has a great deal to say. There has been of late a valuable discussion in English naval circles as to the comparative merits of the policies of two great English admirals, Lord Howe and Lord St. Vincent, in the disposition of the English navy when at war with France. The question is purely strategic, and is not of mere historical interest; it is of vital importance now, and the principles upon which its decision rests are the same now as then. St. Vincent's policy saved England from invasion, and in the hands of Nelson and his brother admirals led straight up to Trafalgar.

It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions. This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting, — in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. This view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war;and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage, — a lesson in itself of no mean value.

We may therefore accept now the words of a French tactician, Morogues, who wrote a century and a quarter ago:“Naval tactics are based upon conditions the chief causes of which,namely the arms, may change; which in turn causes necessarily a change in the construction of ships, in the manner of handling them, and so finally in the disposition and handling of fleets.”His further statement, that“it is not a science founded upon principles absolutely invariable,”is more open to criticism. It would be more correct to say that the application of its principles varies as the weapons change. The application of the principles doubtless varies also in strategy from time to time, but the variation is far less; and hence the recognition of the underlying principle is easier. This statement is of sufficient importance to our subject to receive some illustrations from historical events.

The battle of the Nile, in 1798, was not only an overwhelming victory for the English over the French fleet, but had also the decisive effect of destroying the communications between France and Napoleon's army in Egypt. In the battle itself the English admiral, Nelson, gave a most brilliant example of grand tactics, if that be, as has been defined,“the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles as well as during their progress.”The particular tactical combination depended upon a condition now passed away, which was the inability of the lee ships of a fleet at anchor to come to the help of the weather ones before the latter were destroyed; but the principles which underlay the combination, namely, to choose that part of the enemy's order which can least easily be helped, and to attack it with superior forces, has not passed away. The action of Admiral Jervis at Cape St. Vincent, when with fifteen ships he won a victory over twenty-seven, was dictated by the same principle, though in this case the enemy was not at anchor, but under way. Yet men's minds are so constituted that they seem more impressed by the transiency of the conditions than by the undying principle which coped with them. In the strategic effect of Nelson's victory upon the course of the war, on the contrary, the principle involved is not only more easily recognized, but it is at once seen to be applicable to our own day. The issue of the enterprise in Egypt depended upon keeping open the communications with France. The victory of the Nile destroyed the naval force, by which alone the communications could be assured, and determined the final failure; and it is at once seen, not only that the blow was struck in accordance with the principle of striking at the enemy's line of communication, but also that the same principle is valid now, and would be equally so in the days of the galley as of the sailing-ship or steamer.

Nevertheless, a vague feeling of contempt for the past, supposed to be obsolete, combines with natural indolence to blind men even to those permanent strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of naval history. For instance, how many look upon the battle of Trafalgar, the crown of Nelson's glory and the seal of his genius, as other than an isolated event of exceptional grandeur? How many ask themselves the strategic question,“How did the ships come to be just there?”How many realize it to be the final act in a great strategic drama, extending over a year or more, in which two of the greatest leaders that ever lived, Napoleon and Nelson, were pitted against each other? At Trafalgar it was not Villeneuve that failed, but Napoleon that was vanquished; not Nelson that won, but England that was saved; and why? Because Napoleon's combinations failed, and Nelson's intuitions and activity kept the English fleet ever on the track of the enemy, and brought it up in time at the decisive moment. The tactics at Trafalgar, while open to criticism in detail, were in their main features conformable to the principles of war, and their audacity was justified as well by the urgency of the case as by the results; but the great lessons of efficiency in preparation, of activity and energy in execution, and of thought and insight on the part of the English leader during the previous months, are strategic lessons, and as such they still remain good.

In these two cases events were worked out to their natural and decisive end. A third may be cited, in which, as no such definite end was reached, an opinion as to what should have been done may be open to dispute. In the war of the American Revolution, France and Spain became allies against England in 1779. The united fleets thrice appeared in the English Channel, once to the number of sixty-six sail of the line, driving the English fleet to seek refuge in its ports because far inferior in numbers. Now, the great aim of Spain was to recover Gibraltar and Jamaica; and to the former end immense efforts both by land and sea were put forth by the allies against that nearly impregnable fortress. They were fruitless. The question suggested —and it is purely one of naval strategy — is this: Would not Gibraltar have been more surely recovered by controlling the English Channel, attacking the British fleet even in its harbors, and threatening England with annihilation of commerce and invasion at home, than by far greater efforts directed against a distant and very strong outpost of her empire? The English people, from long immunity, were particularly sensitive to fears of invasion, and their great confidence in their fleets, if rudely shaken, would have left them proportionately disheartened. However decided, the question as a point of strategy is fair; and it is proposed in another form by a French officer of the period, who favored directing the great effort on a West India island which might be exchanged against Gibraltar. It is not, however, likely that England would have given up the key of the Mediterranean for any other foreign possession, though she might have yielded it to save her firesides and her capital. Napoleon once said that he would reconquer Pondicherry on the banks of the Vistula. Could he have controlled the English Channel, as the allied fleet did for a moment in 1779, can it be doubted that he would have conquered Gibraltar on the shores of England?

To impress more strongly the truth that history both suggests strategic study and illustrates the principles of war by the facts which it transmits, two more instances will be taken, which are more remote in time than the period specially considered in this work. How did it happen that, in two great contests between the powers of the East and of the West in the Mediterranean, in one of which the empire of the known world was at stake, the opposing fleets met on spots so near each other as Actium and Lepanto? Was this a mere coincidence, or was it due to conditions that recurred, and may recur again? (4)If the latter, it is worthwhile to study out the reason; for if there should again arise a great eastern power of the sea like that of Antony or of Turkey, the strategic questions would be similar. At present, indeed, it seems that the centre of sea power, resting mainly with England and France, is overwhelmingly in the West;but should any chance add to the control of the Black Sea basin, which Russia now has, the possession of the entrance to the Mediterranean, the existing strategic conditions affecting sea power would all be modified. Now, were the West arrayed against the East, England and France would go at once unopposed to the Levant, as they did in 1854, and as England alone went in 1878; in case of the change suggested, the East, as twice before, would meet the West half-way.

At a very conspicuous and momentous period of the world's history, Sea Power had a strategic bearing and weight which has received scant recognition. There cannot now be someone who had the full knowledge necessary for tracing in detail its influence upon the issue of the second Punic War; but the indications which remain are sufficient to warrant the assertion that it was a determining factor. An accurate judgment upon this point cannot be formed by mastering only such facts of the particular contest as have been clearly transmitted, for as usual the naval transactions have been slightingly passed over; there is needed also familiarity with the details of general naval history in order to draw, from slight indications, correct inferences based upon a knowledge of what has been possible at periods whose history is well known. The control of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded harbors. On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however great the inequality of naval strength. It is not therefore inconsistent with the general control of the sea, or of a decisive part of it, by the Roman fleets, that the Carthaginian admiral Bomilcar in the fourth year of the war, after the stunning defeat of Cannae, landed four thousand men and a body of elephants in south Italy; nor that in the seventh year, flying from the Roman fleet off Syracuse, he again appeared at Tarentum, then in Hannibal's hands; nor that Hannibal sent despatch vessels to Carthage; nor even that, at last, he withdrew in safety to Africa with his wasted army. None of these things prove that the government in Carthage could, if it wished, have sent Hannibal the constant support which, as a matter of fact, he did not receive; but they do tend to create a natural impression that such help could have been given. Therefore the statement, that the Roman preponderance at sea had a decisive effect upon the course of the war, needs to be made good by an examination of ascertained facts. Thus the kind and degree of its influence may be fairly estimated.

At the beginning of the war, Mommsen says, Rome controlled the seas. To whatever cause, or combination of causes, it be attributed, this essentially non-maritime state had in the first Punic War established over its sea-faring rival a naval supremacy, which still lasted. In the second war there was no naval battle of importance, — a circumstance which in itself, and still more in connection with other well-ascertained facts, indicates a superiority analogous to that which at other epochs has been marked by the same feature.

As Hannibal left no memoirs, the motives are unknown which determined him to the perilous and almost ruinous march through Gaul and across the Alps. It is certain, however, that his fleet on the coast of Spain was not strong enough to contend with that of Rome. Had it been, he might still have followed the road he actually did, for reasons that weighed with him; but had he gone by the sea, he would not have lost thirty-three thousand out of the sixty thousand veteran soldiers with whom he started.

While Hannibal was making this dangerous march, the Romans were sending to Spain, under the two elder Scipios, one part of their fleet, carrying a consular army. This made the voyage without serious loss, and the army established itself successfully north of the Ebro, on Hannibal's line of communications. At the same time another squadron, with an army commanded by the other consul, was sent to Sicily. The two together numbered two hundred and twenty ships. On its station each met and defeated a Carthaginian squadron with an ease which may be inferred from the slight mention made of the actions, and which indicates the actual superiority of the Roman fleet.

After the second year the war assumed the following shape: Hannibal, having entered Italy by the north, after a series of successes had passed southward around Rome and fixed himself in southern Italy, living off the country, — a condition which tended to alienate the people, and was especially precarious when in contact with the mighty political and military system of control which Rome had there established. It was therefore from the first urgently necessary that he should establish, between himself and some reliable base, that stream of supplies and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called“communications.”There were three friendly regions which might, each or all, serve as such a base, — Carthage itself, Macedonia, and Spain. With the first two, communication could be had only by sea. From Spain, where his firmest support was found, he could be reached by both land and sea, unless an enemy barred the passage; but the sea route was the shorter and easier.

In the first years of the war, Rome, by her sea power, controlled absolutely the basin between Italy, Sicily, and Spain, known as the Tyrrhenian and Sardinian Seas. The sea-coast from the Ebro to the Tiber was mostly friendly to her. In the fourth year, after the battle of Cannae, Syracuse forsook the Roman alliance, the revolt spread through Sicily, and Macedonia also entered into an offensive league with Hannibal. These changes extended the necessary operations of the Roman fleet, and taxed its strength. What disposition was made of it, and how did it thereafter influence the struggle?

The indications are clear that Rome at no time ceased to control the Tyrrhenian Sea, for her squadrons passed unmolested from Italy to Spain. On the Spanish coast also she had full sway till the younger Scipio saw fit to lay up the fleet. In the Adriatic, a squadron and naval station were established at Brindisi to check Macedonia, which performed their task so well that not a soldier of the phalanxes ever set foot in Italy.“The want of a war fleet,”says Mommsen,“paralyzed Philip in all his movements.”Here the effect of Sea Power is not even a matter of inference. In Sicily, the struggle centered about Syracuse. The fleets of Carthage and Rome met there, but the superiority evidently lay with the latter; for though the Carthaginians at times succeeded in throwing supplies into the city, they avoided meeting the Roman fleet in battle. With Lilybaeum, Palermo, and Messina in its hands, the latter was well based in the north coast of the island. Access by the south was left open to the Carthaginians, and they were thus able to maintain the insurrection.

Putting these facts together, it is a reasonable inference, and supported by the whole tenor of the history, that the Roman sea power controlled the sea north of a line drawn from Tarragona in Spain to Lilybaeum (the modern Marsala), at the west end of Sicily, thence round by the north side of the island through the straits of Messina down to Syracuse, and from there to Brindisi in the Adriatic. This control lasted, unshaken, throughout the war. It did not exclude maritime raids, large or small, such as have been spoken of; but it did forbid the sustained and secure communications of which Hannibal was in deadly need.

On the other hand, it seems equally plain that for the first ten years of the war the Roman fleet was not strong enough for sustained operations in the sea between Sicily and Carthage, nor indeed much to the south of the line indicated. When Hannibal started, he assigned such ships as he had to maintaining the communications between Spain and Africa, which the Romans did not then attempt to disturb.

The Roman sea power, therefore, threw Macedonia wholly out of the war. It did not keep Carthage from maintaining a useful and most harassing diversion in Sicily; but it did prevent her sending troops, when they would have been most useful, to her great general in Italy. How was it as to Spain?

Spain was the region upon which the father of Hannibal and Hannibal himself had based their intended invasion of Italy. For eighteen years before this began they had occupied the country, extending and consolidating their power, both political and military, with rare sagacity. They had raised, and trained in local wars, a large and now veteran army. Upon his own departure, Hannibal intrusted the government to his younger brother, Hasdrubal, who preserved toward him to the end a loyalty and devotion which he had no reason to hope from the factioncursed mother-city in Africa.

At the time of his starting, the Carthaginian power in Spain was secured from Cadiz to the river Ebro. The region between this river and the Pyrenees was inhabited by tribes friendly to the Romans, but unable, in the absence of the latter, to oppose a successful resistance to Hannibal. He put them down, leaving eleven thousand soldiers under Hanno to keep military possession of the country, lest the Romans should establish themselves there, and thus disturb his communications with his base.

Cnaeus Scipio, however, arrived on the spot by sea the same year with twenty thousand men, defeated Hanno, and occupied both the coast and interior north of the Ebro. The Romans thus held ground by which they entirely closed the road between Hannibal and reinforcements from Hasdrubal, and whence they could attack the Carthaginian power in Spain; while their own communications with Italy, being by water, were secured by their naval supremacy. They made a naval base at Tarragona, confronting that of Hasdrubal at Cartagena, and then invaded the Carthaginian dominions. The war in Spain went on under the elder Scipios, seemingly a side issue, with varying fortune for seven years; at the end of which time Hasdrubal inflicted upon them a crushing defeat, the two brothers were killed, and the Carthaginians nearly succeeded in breaking through to the Pyrenees with reinforcements for Hannibal. The attempt, however, was checked for the moment; and before it could be renewed, the fall of Capua released twelve thousand veteran Romans, who were sent to Spain under Claudius Nero, a man of exceptional ability, to whom was due later the most decisive military movement made by any Roman general during the Second Punic War. This seasonable reinforcement, which again assured the shaken grip on Hasdrubal's line of march, came by sea, — a way which, though most rapid and easy, was closed to the Carthaginians by the Roman navy.

Two years later the younger Publius Scipio, celebrated afterward as Africanus, received the command in Spain, and captured Cartagena by a combined military and naval attack; after which he took the most extraordinary step of breaking up his fleet and transferring the seamen to the army. Not contented to act merely as the“containing”(5) force against Hasdrubal by closing the passes of the Pyrenees, Scipio pushed forward into southern Spain, and fought a severe but indecisive battle on the Guadalquivir; after which Hasdrubal slipped away from him, hurried north, crossed the Pyrenees at their extreme west, and pressed on to Italy, where Hannibal's position was daily growing weaker, the natural waste of his army not being replaced.

The war had lasted ten years, when Hasdrubal, having met little loss on the way, entered Italy at the north. The troops he brought, could they be safely united with those under the command of the unrivalled Hannibal, might give a decisive turn to the war, for Rome herself was nearly exhausted; the iron links which bound her own colonies and the allied States to her were strained to the utmost, and some had already snapped. But the military position of the two brothers was also perilous in the extreme. One being at the river Metaurus, the other in Apulia, two hundred miles apart, each was confronted by a superior enemy, and both these Roman armies were between their separated opponents. This false situation, as well as the long delay of Hasdrubal's coming, was due to the Roman control of the sea, which throughout the war limited the mutual support of the Carthaginian brothers to the route through Gaul. At the very time that Hasdrubal was making his long and dangerous circuit by land, Scipio had sent eleven thousand men from Spain by sea to reinforce the army opposed to him. The upshot was that messengers from Hasdrubal to Hannibal, having to pass over so wide a belt of hostile country, fell into the hands of Claudius Nero, commanding the southern Roman army, who thus learned the route which Hasdrubal intended to take. Nero correctly appreciated the situation, and, escaping the vigilance of Hannibal, made a rapid march with eight thousand of his best troops to join the forces in the north. The junction being effected, the two consuls fell upon Hasdrubal in overwhelming numbers and destroyed his army; the Carthaginian leader himself falling in the battle. Hannibal's first news of the disaster was by the head of his brother being thrown into his camp. He is said to have exclaimed that Rome would now be mistress of the world;and the battle of Metaurus is generally accepted as decisive of the struggle between the two States.

The military situation which finally resulted in the battle of the Metaurus and the triumph of Rome may be summed up as follows: To overthrow Rome it was necessary to attack her in Italy at the heart of her power, and shatter the strongly linked confederacy of which she was the head. This was the objective. To reach it, the Carthaginians needed a solid base of operations and a secure line of communications. The former was established in Spain by the genius of the great Barca family; the latter was never achieved. There were two lines possible, — the one direct by sea, the other circuitous through Gaul. The first was blocked by the Roman sea power, the second imperiled and finally intercepted through the occupation of northern Spain by the Roman army. This occupation was made possible through the control of the sea, which the Carthaginians never endangered. With respect to Hannibal and his base, therefore, Rome occupied two central positions, Rome itself and northern Spain, joined by an easy interior line of communications, the sea; by which mutual support was continually given.

Had the Mediterranean been a level desert of land, in which the Romans held strong mountain ranges in Corsica and Sardinia, fortified posts at Tarragona, Lilybaeum, and Messina, the Italian coast-line nearly to Genoa, and allied fortresses in Marseilles and other points; had they also possessed an armed force capable by its character of traversing that desert at will, but in which their opponents were very inferior and therefore compelled to a great circuit in order to concentrate their troops, the military situation would have been at once recognized, and no words would have been too strong to express the value and effect of that peculiar force. It would have been perceived, also, that the enemy's force of the same kind might, however inferior in strength, make an inroad, or raid, upon the territory thus held, might burn a village or waste a few miles of borderland, might even cut off a convoy at times, without, in a military sense, endangering the communications. Such predatory operations have been carried on in all ages by the weaker maritime belligerent, but they by no means warrant the inference irreconcilable with the known facts,“that neither Rome nor Carthage could be said to have undisputed mastery of the sea,”because“Roman fleets sometimes visited the coasts of Africa, and Carthaginian fleets in the same way appeared off the coast of Italy.”In the case under consideration, the navy played the part of such a force upon the supposed desert; but as it acts on an element strange to most writers, as its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense determining influence upon the history of that era, and consequently upon the history of the world, has been overlooked. If the preceding argument is sound, it is as defective to omit sea power from the list of principal factors in the result, as it would be absurd to claim for it an exclusive influence.

Instances such as have been cited, drawn from widely separated periods of time, both before and after that specially treated in this work, serve to illustrate the intrinsic interest of the subject, and the character of the lessons which history has to teach. As before observed, these come more often under the head of strategy than of tactics; they bear rather upon the conduct of campaigns than of battles, and hence are fraught with more lasting value. To quote a great authority in this connection, Jomini says:“Happening to be in Paris near the end of 1851, a distinguished person did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in fire arms would cause any great modifications in the way of making war. I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of tactics, but that in great strategic operations and the grand combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the application of the principles which had led to the success of great generals in all ages;of Alexander and Caesar, as well as of Frederick and Napoleon.”This study has become more than ever important now to navies, because of the great and steady power of movement possessed by the modern steamer. The best-planned schemes might fail through stress of weather in the days of the galley and the sailing-ship; but this difficulty has almost disappeared. The principles which should direct great naval combinations have been applicable to all ages, and are deducible from history; but the power to carry them out with little regard to the weather is a recent gain.

The definitions usually given of the word“strategy”confine it to military combinations embracing one or more fields of operations, either wholly distinct or mutually dependent, but always regarded as actual or immediate scenes of war. However this may be on shore, a recent French author is quite right in pointing out that such a definition is too narrow for naval strategy.“This,”he says,“differs from military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as in war. Indeed, in peace it may gain its most decisive victories by occupying in a country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions which would perhaps hardly be got by war. It learns to profit by all opportunities of settling on some chosen point of a coast, and to render definitive an occupation which at first was only transient.”A generation that has seen England within ten years occupy successively Cyprus and Egypt, under terms and conditions on their face transient, but which have not yet led to the abandonment of the positions taken, can readily agree with this remark; which indeed receives constant illustration from the quiet persistency with which all the great sea powers are seeking position after position, less noted and less noteworthy than Cyprus and Egypt, in the different seas to which their people and their ships penetrate.

“Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country;”and therefore its study has an interest and value for all citizens of a free country, but especially for those who are charged with its foreign and military relations.

The general conditions that either are essential to or powerfully affect the greatness of a nation upon the sea will now be examined; after which a more particular consideration of the various maritime nations of Europe at the middle of the seventeenth century, where the historical survey begins, will serve at once to illustrate and give precision to the conclusions upon the general subject.

Note:

The brilliancy of Nelson's fame, dimming as it does that of all his contemporaries, and the implicit trust felt by England in him as the one man able to save her from the schemes of Napoleon, should not of course obscure the fact that only one portion of the field was, or could be, occupied by him. Napoleon's aim, in the campaign which ended at Trafalgar, was to unite in the West Indies the French fleets of Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort, together with a strong body of Spanish ships, thus forming an overwhelming force which he intended should return together to the English Channel and cover the crossing of the French army. He naturally expected that, with England's interests scattered all over the world, confusion and distraction would arise from ignorance of the destination of the French squadrons, and the English navy be drawn away from his objective point. The portion of the field committed to Nelson was the Mediterranean, where he watched the great arsenal of Toulon and the highways alike to the East and to the Atlantic.This was inferior in consequence to no other, and assumed additional importance in the eyes of Nelson from his conviction that the former attempts on Egypt would be renewed. Owing to this persuasion he took at first a false step, which delayed his pursuit of the Toulon fleet when it sailed under the command of Villeneuve; and the latter was further favored by a long continuance of fair winds, while the English had head winds. But while all this is true, while the failure of Napoleon's combinations must be attributed to the tenacious grip of the English blockade off Brest, as well as to Nelson's energetic pursuit of the Toulon fleet when it escaped to the West Indies and again on its hasty return to Europe, the latter is fairly entitled to the eminent distinction which history has accorded it, and which is asserted in the text. Nelson did not, indeed, fathom the intentions of Napoleon. This may have been owing, as some have said, to lack of insight; but it may be more simply laid to the usual disadvantage under which the defence lies before the blow has fallen, of ignorance as to the point threatened by the offence. It is insight enough to fasten on the key of a situation; and what this Nelson rightly saw was the fleet, not the station. Consequently, his action has afforded a striking instance of how tenacity of purpose and untiring energy in execution can repair a first mistake and baffle deeply laid plans. His Mediterranean command embraced many duties and cares; but amid and dominating them all, he saw clearly the Toulon fleet as the controlling factor there, and an important factor in any naval combination of the Emperor. Hence his attention was unwaveringly fixed upon it;so much so that he called it“his fleet,”a phrase which has somewhat vexed the sensibilities of French critics. This simple and accurate view of the military situation strengthened him in taking the fearless resolution and bearing the immense responsibility of abandoning his station in order to follow“his fleet.”Determined thus on a pursuit the undeniable wisdom of which should not obscure the greatness of mind that undertook it, he followed so vigorously as to reach Cadiz on his return a week before Villeneuve entered Ferrol, despite unavoidable delays arising from false information and uncertainty as to the enemy's movements. The same untiring ardor enabled him to bring up his own ships from Cadiz to Brest in time to make the fleet there superior to Villeneuve's, had the latter persisted in his attempt to reach the neighborhood. The English, very inferior in aggregate number of vessels to the allied fleets, were by this seasonable reinforcement of eight veteran ships put into the best possible position strategically, as will be pointed out in dealing with similar conditions in the war of the American Revolution. Their forces were united in one great fleet in the Bay of Biscay, interposed between the two divisions of the enemy in Brest and Ferrol, superior in number to either singly, and with a strong probability of being able to deal with one before the other could come up. This was due to able action all round on the part of the English authorities; but above all other factors in the result stands Nelson's single-minded pursuit of“his fleet.”

This interesting series of strategic movements ended on the 14th of August, when Villeneuve, in despair of reaching Brest, headed for Cadiz, where he anchored on the 20th. As soon as Napoleon heard of this, after an outburst of rage against the admiral, he at once dictated the series of movements which resulted in Ulm and Austerlitz, abandoning his purposes against England. The battle of Trafalgar, fought October 21, was therefore separated by a space of two months from the extensive movements of which it was nevertheless the outcome. Isolated from them in point of time, it was none the less the seal of Nelson's genius, affixed later to the record he had made in the near past. With equal truth it is said that England was saved at Trafalgar, though the Emperor had then given up his intended invasion; the destruction there emphasized and sealed the strategic triumph which had noiselessly foiled Napoleon's plans.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Thus Hermocrates of Syracuse, advocating the policy of thwarting the Athenian expedition against his city (B. C. 413) by going boldly to meet it, and keeping on the flank of its line of advance, said:“As their advance must be slow, we shall have a thousand opportunities to attack them; but if they clear their ships for action and in a body bear down expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at their oars, and when spent with toil we can fall upon them.”

[2] The writer must guard himself from appearing to advocate elaborate tactical movements issuing in barren demonstrations. He believes that a fleet seeking a decisive result must close with its enemy, but not until some advantage has been obtained for the collision, which will usually be gained by manoeuvring, and will fall to the best drilled and managed fleet. In truth, barren results have as often followed upon headlong, close encounters as upon the most timid tactical trifling.

[3] A ship was said to have the weather-gage, or“the advantage of the wind,”or“to be to windward,”when the wind allowed her to steer for her opponent, and did not let the latter head straight for her. The extreme case was when the wind blew direct from one to the other; but there was a large space on either side of this line to which the term“weather-gage”applied. If the lee ship be taken as the centre of a circle, there were nearly three eighths of its area in which the other might be and still keep the advantage of the wind to a greater or less degree. Lee is the opposite of weather.

[4] The battle of Navarino (1827) between Turkey and the Western Powers was fought in this neighborhood.

[5] A“containing”force is one to which, in a military combination, is assigned the duty of stopping, or delaying the advance of a portion of the enemy, while the main effort of the army or armies is being exerted in a different quarter.

海权之历史，虽说绝非全部，却也在很大程度上，是一种对于国家间你争我斗、相互竞争以及以战争而告终之暴力的记述。在人们还没有揭示出控制海上贸易增长与繁荣的真正原则之前，海上贸易对于各国财富与实力所产生的深远影响，就早已清晰地显现出来了。为了确保所属民族能够占有此种利益中超过其应得的份额，各国都会不遗余力地排斥其他国家，要么是通过和平的立法途径，用垄断或者禁止性条例；要么便是在立法途径失败之后，直接动用武力。利益冲突，即为了多占有贸易利益份额和远方那些归属未定的商业地区——就算不是为了全部占有——而发生冲突，这会激发冲突双方的愤怒之情，从而引发战争。另一方面，那些因为其他缘故而引发的战争，其进程与结果也受到了海洋控制权的极大影响。所以，海权的历史，既涵盖了某一民族试图在海洋上或者通过海洋来变得强大的所有行为，同时在很大程度上也是一种军事史；因此下文所涉及的，虽说并非全部，但主要还是军事这个方面的内容。

许多伟大的军事领袖都曾告诫我们，像本书这样来研究过去的军事史，对于在未来形成正确的军事思想，对于在未来熟练地进行战争，都是至关重要的。拿破仑曾从尚不知火药为何物的亚历山大大帝、汉尼拔和恺撒等人所进行的战争中，为手下那些有所抱负的士兵指定了一些必须加以研习的战役；而专业的史学家们实际上也一致认为，虽说随着武器的发展，战争的许多情况世世代代都不相同，但历史这所学校中还是有着某些亘古不变的教训，它们得到了普遍的应用，因而能够被提升到一般原理的高度。我们也会发现，出于同样的原因，尽管在过去的半个世纪中，科技的进步和引入蒸汽动力已经使得海军的武器装备发生了巨变，但通过阐述海上战争的一般原则来研究过去的海权历史，还是很有教育意义的。

因此，批判性地研究帆船时期海上战争的历史与经验就更加必要了；尽管这些历史与经验为目前的海战提供了可以应用与颇有意义的教训，但汽船时代的海军，迄今为止还没有名垂史册，也没有什么具有决定性意义的战争经验可供引述。对于帆船时期的海战，我们有着许多的经验性知识；而对于汽船时代的海战，我们却几乎一无所知。因此，关于未来海战的诸多理论，差不多完全都是假定性的；尽管人们已经试着通过仔细研究汽船舰队与有着悠久历史且众所周知、以桨驱动的桨帆船队之间的相似之处，来给这些理论以更加坚实的基础，但我们最好还是不要陶醉于这种类推的方法，除非此种方法得到了彻底的验证。二者之间的这种相似性，实际上绝非只是表面上的。汽船与桨帆船的共同特征是，它们都能够不依赖于风向，能够转向自如地航行。这种能力，使得此类船舶与帆船有了根本性的区别；因为后者在有风的时候，只能沿着数量有限的一些航线航行，而若是无法沿着这些航线航行，它们就只能在原地打转了。不过，虽说观察相似之处很明智，但寻找相异的方面也是很可取的；因为当我们的想像力全都沉迷于探究事物的相似点——这是一种最令人愉快的精神追求——时，倘若新发现的相似物中出现什么不一致的地方，我们就极容易失去耐心，从而可能忽视或者不愿承认这种不一致。因此，桨帆船与汽船虽说发展情况并不相同，但都有着上述共同的特征；不过，它们之间至少也有着两点不同，而在桨帆船的历史中寻求与汽船相似的作战教训过程中，我们必须始终记住其差异与相似点，否则我们可能会得出错误的推论。在航行的时候，桨帆船的动力会不可避免地迅速下降，因为这是一件相当累人的工作，人力不可能长久坚持，所以桨帆船只能持续进行有限时间的战术运动（1）；再则，桨帆船时代所用的攻击性武器非但射程短，而且差不多完全属于短兵相接式的武器。这两个条件，几乎不可避免地导致了交战双方的相互袭击，但也不乏巧妙地攻击或夹击敌舰的方法，然后才是短兵相接的混战。就是在这种袭击和混战当中，人们对于目前海军那种可敬的、甚至是卓越的观点达成了一种重大的共识，从而发现了现代海军武器所导致的必然结果——即一种“唐尼布鲁克集市”[1]式的局面；正如混战历史所表明的那样，在此种局面中，我们是很难分清谁是敌人谁是友军的。无论这种观点的最终价值如何，我们都不能仅凭桨帆船与汽船能够在任何时候直接进逼敌人、并且在船头装上金属撞角这一事实，而不顾桨帆船与汽船的差异，就说这种观点有了历史基础。到目前为止，这种观点还只是一种假设，我们不妨等到经过战斗验证、进行了进一步的阐述之后，再来做出最终的判断。在此之前，还是可以存在与之相对立的观点的——即对于数量相等的舰队来说，发生那种基本上无需战术的混战，并不是如今这个时代利用精巧而强大的武器所能取得的最佳结果。一位舰队司令越有把握，其舰队的战术发展得越完善，其手下的舰长们越称职，他就必然会越不愿意去与数量相等的敌军展开混战；因为这样一来，所有的这些优势便会付之东流，谁占上风全凭运气，而他手下的舰队就会跟那种以前从未集中作过战的乌合之众没什么两样了（2）。至于何时适于混战或者不适于混战，历史上是有着许多教训的。

桨帆船与汽船虽说有着显著的相似之处，但在许多重要的特点上，它们却各具差异；由于这些重要特点并不是全都非常明显，因此我们都较少重视它们。相反，对于帆船而言，其显著特征却是它们与更为现代化的船舶之间的差异；虽说二者之间也存在相似之处，且这些相似之处也不难发现，但由于它们并不是很明显，因而我们同样也较少留意。这种印象，因帆船相比于汽船来说必须依赖风向而显示出全然不如汽船的这种感觉强化了；忘掉这一点，就像帆船在与其对手作战的时候那样，那么其中的战术教训就是正确的了。桨帆船从未在风平浪静的时候无法行动，因此才在我们这个时代受到了比帆船更多的敬重；不过，帆船还是取代了桨帆船，并且直至采用蒸汽动力之前，一直都保持着霸主的地位。能够从远距离击伤敌人，机动时间不受限制且不会让船员们累得筋疲力尽，大部分船员能够去控制攻击性武器而不是去划桨——这些本领，是帆船和汽船的共同特征；并且从战术上来考虑，它们起码也像桨帆船能够在无风情况下航行或者能够逆风行驶的本领一样重要。

在探究相似之处的过程中，我们都有一种倾向：不但会忽视有所差异的地方，还会夸大其相似之处——从而使得这种相似之处显得非常奇怪。我们可以这样来考虑：正如帆船装有射程较远、相对穿透力较大的火炮，以及虽说射程较短、却会产生巨大粉碎性效果的大口径火炮那样，现代汽船也装备了远程火炮组和鱼雷组——鱼雷仅在有限的距离内才能发挥作用，而火炮则跟原来的一样，旨在利用其穿透效果。不过，这些无疑都属于战术方面的问题，必然会影响到舰队司令与舰长们的作战计划；因而这种类推就是事实，而非牵强附会。所以，帆船与汽船也都会希望与敌舰短兵相接——前者通过强行登船攻占敌舰，而后者则通过猛撞来击沉敌舰；对于这两种船舶来说，此种任务都是极其艰巨的，因为要想完成这一任务，就得让自己的舰艇处于战场的某个位置上，可在这一位置上，敌方却可以在大范围内的多个位置上，使用投射武器来攻击我方。

两艘帆船或者两支舰队根据风向而定的相对位置，涉及到了绝大多数重要的战术问题，因此可能也是那个时代海军主要关注的问题。从表面上来看，似乎是由于这个方面对汽船来说变得无关紧要了，而这方面的历史教训也是毫无意义的，所以在目前的条件下不应当再进行什么类推。然而，倘若更加细致地考虑“下风”与“上风”（3）的一些显著特征，把注意力放在它们的基本特点上，而不去考虑那些次要细节的话，我们就会看出，这种想法是错误的。处于上风位置的显著特征是，能够想打就打、不想打就不打，并且反过来，还具有了在采取攻势时可以选择进攻方式的优势。当然，这种优势也伴随着某些弊端，诸如打乱战斗序列，会暴露在敌方斜向或纵向炮火的攻击之下，以及损失攻击用的部分或全部炮火等等——这一切，都会在逼近敌舰的过程中出现。而处于下风位置的船只或舰队则无法进击；倘若不想撤退，那么它的行动就只能是防御，只能是按照敌方的条件来被动作战。这种劣势，却会因保持战斗序列相对较易、可以进行持续炮击并令敌方一时无法还击的优势而得到弥补。从历史来看，这些有利或者不利的特点，在各个时代的进攻战和防御战中，都有着与之相对应和相类似的地方。进攻一方会冒着某些危险和劣势去接近并摧毁敌军；而防御的一方只要保持着防守态势，就不会贸然进击，就会保持着谨慎而有序的阵势，并且可以利用进攻者不得不暴露于我方炮火之下的机会。人们已经透过种种较小的细节，非常清楚地认识到了上风位置与下风位置的这些根本差异，所以英国人才通常选择上风位置——英国人的一贯政策，便是进攻和消灭敌人；而法国人则喜欢下风位置，因为他们这样做，往往能够在敌人逼近的过程中削弱敌军实力，并且往往还能够让自己避开决战，从而保存好己方的舰艇实力。除了极少数例外情况，法国人一向都认为海军作战的重要性不如其他军种，一向都不愿意为海军多花军费，故他们更愿意通过采取守势，只愿意击退敌军的进攻，以便充分利用好自己的舰队。出于这一原因，只要敌方表现得有勇无谋，法国人就会令人佩服地加以调整，巧妙地利用下风位置；不过，当罗德尼[2]打算利用风向优势，非但要发动攻击，还想集中火力猛攻敌军防线一部的时候，其小心谨慎的对手基申伯爵却改变了战术。在双方3次作战行动的第一次中，法军处于下风位置；但意识到了罗德尼的目的之后，基申伯爵便利用风向优势，率领舰队进行了机动——不过其目的不是为了进攻，而是为了拒绝应战，为了只在能够按照自己意愿行事的情况下作战。所以，能够采取攻势或者能够拒绝应战，就不再取决于风向，而是取决于速度更快的那一方了；对于整支舰队而言，则不仅取决于每艘舰船的速度，还取决于它们在作战时的战术一致性。自此以后，那些速度最快的舰船就会占据上风位置了。

因此，既从帆船的历史、又从桨帆船的历史中寻求有益的教训，并不像很多人所认为的那样，只是一种徒劳无用的期望。这两种船只，与现代舰艇既有类似之处，也有根本性的差异，使得我们不可能将这些舰船的战斗经历或战斗模式，当成可以沿用的战术先例。不过，先例与基本原则并不相同，也不如基本原则那样有价值。前者可能原本就是有瑕疵的，或者可能在环境改变之后并不适用了；后者则植根于事物的本质当中，并且在应用的时候，无论因环境改变而有多么的变化无穷，它都会保持着某种标准，而我们在战斗中，则必须遵照这一标准才能获胜。战争中的确存在着这样一些基本原则；前人的研究已经揭示了它们的存在，无论获胜抑或失败，这些原则世世代代都是一样的。作战环境与作战武器都会变化；而为了应对作战环境，或者成功地运用好作战武器，我们就必须遵守那些大规模战争中属于临场战术或战略范畴的那些亘古不变的历史教训才行。

然而，正是在这些范围更广泛、涵盖了整个战场的战争中，也正是在可能覆盖了全球大部分区域的海战中，这些历史教训有着一种更为明显、也更为恒久的意义，因为它们的战争环境更为恒定。虽说战场范围可能或大或小，作战困难可能或显著或不显著，交战双方的军队可能强大或不强大，必要的战术运动可能容易不容易，但这些情况都只是范围或程度上的差异，而不是类别上有差异。虽然随着蛮荒被文明所取代，随着交通方式越来越多，随着道路开辟、河流架桥、粮食资源的增加，作战也变得更加容易、更加快捷、范围更加广泛了，但是作战时必须遵循的那些基本原则，却依然如故。徒步行军被马车运送部队所取代，而马车运送又被铁路运送所取代之后，行军距离就大大增加了，或者，假如您愿意那样说的话，就是行军时间缩短了；但决定部队在哪里集结、部队向哪个方向运动、进袭敌人哪个部分和保护交通要道这些基本原则，却并未改变。所以，在海上，从桨帆船小心翼翼地在港口之间潜行，到帆船大胆出航至天涯海角，从帆船再到我们现在的蒸汽轮船，这种进步在增加了海军的作战范围和速度的同时，并没有必然地改变了指导海军作战的那些基本原则；而之前我们引述过的2300多年前赫莫克拉提斯[3]所说的话，也蕴含了一种正确的战略规划，其基本原则在如今与当时并无两样，仍然可加以应用。在与敌方部队或舰队发生接触之前（这样说，可能要比其他区分战术与战略的说法要更好），有许多问题需要进行决断，它们涉及到贯穿了整个战场的整体作战计划。其中包括：海军在战争中应当发挥的正确作用；海军的真正目标；海军应当集结的一处或多处地点；燃煤和军需补给站的建立；这些补给站与国内大本营之间交通补给线的维护；贸易破坏战作为一种决定性的或者辅助性的作战行动，具有什么样的军事意义；最有效地进行贸易破坏战的方法，是用分散的巡洋舰呢，还是有效地控制商船所必经的某一重要的航运中心……所有这些都属于战略问题；而关于这些问题，历史上也有着诸多的经验可循。近来，英国的海军界进行了一场很有意义的讨论，评价了豪勋爵[4]和圣文森特勋爵[5]这两位伟大的英国海军司令在英法战争中部署海军时各自所定政策的相对贡献。这个问题纯粹是战略性的，并非只有历史价值；如今这一问题则具有至关重要的意义，而决策所依赖的那些基本原则，在如今和当时都是相同的。圣文森特勋爵的政策使得英国免遭入侵，而在纳尔逊[6]及其同行海军将领的执行下，又直接导致了特拉法尔加海战那次大捷。

尤其是在当时的海军战略领域，过去的经验教训有着不可抹杀的意义。这些教训，非但具有示范基本原则的作用，还因为环境的相对稳定性而具有先例的作用。对于战术而言，当战略考量使得双方的舰队狭路相逢的时候，这一点却没有那样明显了。人类不安于现状，一直都在进步，使得武器不停地更新换代；随之而来的，则必然是作战方式的不断改变，即在战场上排兵布阵、部署舰船的方式在不断地发生着改变。这样一来，许多研究海洋问题的人就产生了一种倾向，认为研究过去的经验教训带来不了什么益处，认为这样做是在浪费时间。虽说这种观点很正常，但它不仅全然忽视了那些显著的战略考量——正是这些战略上的考量，既使得各国都纷纷建造舰队、控制着各国的作战范围，也改变了、并且仍将继续改变世界的历史；而且，即便是从战术上来看，这也是一种片面而狭隘的观点。在作战时，过去是获胜还是失败，取决于是否遵照战争的基本原则去作战；而那些仔细研究获胜或失败原因的海军人士，则不仅会发现并逐渐吸收这些基本原则，还会提高自己的能力，使之能够在战术性地运用自己所处时代的舰船和武器的过程中，应用这些基本原则。这些人还会发现，战术不仅随着武器的改变而改变——此种情形是必然的——而且这些变化之间的时间跨度都很久。这种情况无疑是因为，武器的改良在于一两个人的力量，而战术上的改变则必须克服整个保守阶层的惰性才行；这种惰性，正是一种巨大的弊端。只有通过坦诚地认识到每一种变革，通过仔细研究新舰艇、新武器的长处与局限，并且采取相应的办法，根据形成其战略的特性来对它们加以利用，才能纠正这一弊端。历史业已表明，虽说不要指望军人经常会不遗余力地来这样做，但那些这样做了的人，在战场上都会获得巨大的优势——这种教训，本身就具有极大的价值。

因此，如今我们可以接受法国战术家莫罗盖[7]的训导了。他在125年前曾这样写道：“海军之战术，乃是以其主因——即武器装备——可能发生变化之前提为基础；此种主因，转而必然导致船舶结构、操作方法发生改变，并因而最终使得舰队之部署与调遣发生改变。”他还进一步指出，“此非一种以绝对不变原则为基础之科学”，但这一说法却更易招来人们的批评。更恰当一点的说法应当是，对海军战术基本原则的应用，会随着武器装备的改变而不断改变。而应用这些基本原则时，在战术上无疑也是时常变化着的，只不过这种变化要小得多罢了，所以认识到这些基本原则也要容易得多。他的这一说法，对于我们论述的主题非常重要，从而让我们可以从历史事件中获得某些实例。

1798年的尼罗河河口之战[8]，不仅是英国海军对法国舰队一次压倒性的胜利，还对摧毁法国与位于埃及的拿破仑所率军队之间的交通补给产生了关键性的影响。此战中，英国海军司令纳尔逊为世人提供了一个极为杰出的“大战术”战例——假如可以这样说的话——正如“大战术”的定义所指出的那样：“在战前与战中都充分组合的艺术。”特殊的战术组合，取决于如今已经不再存在的一种前提，即舰队中处于下风位置且已泊锚的船只，无法在处于上风位置的舰船被摧毁之前赶去救援；但是，此种战术组合的基本原则——即选择敌方战斗序列中最难施以援手的部分，用优势兵力加以攻击——却并未过时。海军司令杰维斯在圣文森特角之战中，以15艘舰船对阵敌方的27艘战舰并取得了胜利，遵循的正是相同的原则，只是在此役中，敌方的舰船并非停泊着，而是在航行中。然而，人们的思维却具有定式，他们对于环境无常的印象，似乎比对支配环境的基本原则更为深刻。与此相反，在纳尔逊获胜而对此次战争所产生的战略效果当中，涉及的基本原则却不但容易看出，还能让我们马上就明白，这一原则可以应用到我们所处的这个时代来。埃及战事中哪方获胜的问题，取决于能否让此处与法国之间的交通补给保持畅通。尼罗河河口大捷，摧毁了本可确保补给畅通的法国海军，从而决定了法国的最终失败；而我们马上也能看出，此次出击遵循的正是打击敌人交通补给线的原则，并且这一原则如今仍然有效。

尽管如此，人们还是怀有一种模糊的感觉，认为过去已被淘汰，从而轻视过去；再加上天生的惰性，所以即便是海军历史上那些非常明显、具有永久意义的战略教训，他们也看不到。比如说，有多少人，不会将属于纳尔逊司令荣耀巅峰、标志着其天才的特拉法尔加海战，看成只是一件异常宏伟的孤立事件呢？有多少人，问过自己这样一个战略性的问题：“那些舰船如何正好处于那里呢？”又有多少人认识到了，此次海战是为时一年或更久的一部宏大战略戏剧所上演的最后一幕，是拿破仑与纳尔逊这两位历史上最伟大的领袖在这幕大戏中相互对垒呢？在特拉法尔加海战中，并非是维尔纳夫[9]失利，而是拿破仑战败了；也并非是纳尔逊赢了，而是英格兰得救了。为什么呢？这是因为，拿破仑的战术组合失败了，而纳尔逊的洞察力与积极性却让英国舰队一直追击着敌人，从而让舰队在关键时刻及时抵达了战场。特拉法尔加海战所用的战术，虽说在细节上容易招致批评，但其主要特征还是符合战争原则的，而战术上的大胆创新，也因当时形势紧急以及结果取胜而变得合情合理了；不过，此战最大的教训，是备战富有效率、执行积极有力，以及英军统帅在战前数月间的深思熟虑和洞察入微。它们都是战略意义上的教训；就其本身而论，这些教训如今对我们来说仍然是很有裨益的。

在这两个战例中，战事都是以自然而具有决定意义的方式结束的。我们还可以看一看第三个战例：在这个战例中，由于没有出现如此明确的结果，所以对于该不该采用那样的战略战术，人们可能就会众说纷纭了。在美国革命战争中，法国和西班牙在1779年结成了同盟，共同对抗英国。法、西联合舰队曾3次进击英吉利海峡，前线作战舰船一度达到了66艘；由于英军舰船数量远不及对方，所以英国舰队只得回港避战。此时，西班牙的最大目标就是夺回直布罗陀和牙买加；为了实现前一目标，对直布罗陀这个固若金汤的要塞，法、西同盟从海陆两个方面都尽了极大的努力。但这些努力，却全都无果而终。当时人们提出了一个问题——并且是一个纯粹的海军战略问题：如果控制英吉利海峡，进攻即便是泊在港口里的英军舰队，用摧毁其贸易、进攻其本土来威胁英国，比起费劲得多地去进攻英帝国这处偏远而坚固的前哨基地，是不是会更有把握来收复直布罗陀呢？由于长期未受战争困扰，英国民众尤其担心外敌入侵；并且，倘若有力地动摇他们对于英国舰队的极大信心，就会让他们变得同等程度地泄气了。无论从哪个方面来判断，作为一种战略，这个问题都是很有利的；但这个问题，却是当时一位法国军官用另一种方式提出来的，这名军官支持大力攻取西印度群岛中一处可以用来与直布罗陀进行交换的岛屿。然而，尽管可能会为了保护家园和首都而屈从，但英国是不太可能因为外国占领了该国别的领土而心甘情愿地放弃进出地中海的这处门户的。拿破仑曾经宣称，他会在维斯瓦河沿岸夺回庞迪切里。倘若他能像1779年法、西联合舰队暂时所做的那样，控制住英吉利海峡，那我们还能不能怀疑，他会在英国的海滩上夺回直布罗陀呢？

为了让大家对于历史既启发我们去进行战略研究、又通过史实阐明了战争原则这一道理的印象更加深刻，我们还可以举出另外两个战例来；它们发生的时间，比本书专门研究的这一时期更为久远。东西列强中，在地中海地区有两个敌对的大国，其中一个在已知世界所建立的那个帝国正危若累卵；双方舰队数次狭路相逢，彼此之间相距像阿克提姆与勒班陀[10]两地那样近——这种情况是怎样发生的呢？这是纯属巧合呢，还是由于出现了相同的条件并且可能再次重现呢？（4）倘若属于后者，那么就值得研究，来找出其中的原因。因为，如果将来会重新崛起一个东方的海洋大国，就像安东尼或者土耳其帝国那样，那么所涉及的战略问题就是相似的了。的确，在如今看来，海上力量主要集中于英、法两国，它们似乎在西方占有绝对优势；但是，假如除了控制如今处于俄国手中的黑海盆地，有可能再占领地中海入口的话，那么，影响制海权的现有战略条件，就会全盘改变了。如今，倘若西方能够联合起来，一致对抗东方，则英、法两国马上就会像它们在1854年、英国独自于1878年所干的那样，直取黎凡特[11]，并且所向无敌；而一旦形势发生前面所提到的那种改变，那么东方国家就会像以前的那两次一样，向西方俯首称臣了。

在世界历史上一个值得注意的重要时期，制海权具有战略上的意义和重要性，但人们却并未充分认识到这种意义和重要性。如今，已经不可能再有人拥有全面而必要的知识，来详细地探究制海权对于第二次布匿战争[12]的结局所带来的影响了；不过，此次战争所遗留下来的迹象，仍然足以让我们断言：制海权是当时的一个决定性因素。要想对这一点形成一种准确的判断，仅仅掌握某次特定战争业已清晰地呈现出来的一些事实是不够的，因为在这些事实当中，海军事务照例已经被人们漫不经心地忽略掉了；所以，我们还需要熟悉海军通史的详细内容，以便根据一些细微的迹象，在了解那些众所周知的历史时期可能发生了什么的基础之上，做出正确的推断。不管有多千真万确，控制海洋都并不意味着，敌方的单艘舰船或者小型舰队就无法偷偷出港、就无法穿过那些或多或少有船只出没的海域、就无法对漫长海岸线上那些未设防的地方进行骚扰、就无法进入被封锁的海港了。恰恰相反，历史业已表明，在一定程度上，无论双方的海军实力悬殊有多巨大，势弱的一方都总有可能实施这样的遁避之法。因此，在罗马舰队全面掌控了海洋或者控制了海上关键区域的情况下，迦太基的海军统帅波米尔卡在开战后的第四年中，即令人叹为观止的坎尼[13]大捷之后，还能率4000士兵和一队大象在意大利南部登陆，在第七年中，他避开了锡拉丘兹海岸边的罗马舰队，再次出现在当时为汉尼拔所控制的塔伦特姆，而汉尼拔能够派遣快船前往迦太基，与罗马控制了海洋并不矛盾；甚至最后汉尼拔率领手下的残兵败将安全地撤往非洲，这些都与罗马控制了海洋并不矛盾。这些事情中，没有哪一件表明，迦太基的政府可能不断地为汉尼拔派遣了援军，而事实上，汉尼拔却从未得到过这样的支援；不过，这些东西的确会让人产生一种自然而然的印象，以为迦太基政府很可能对汉尼拔进行了这样的支援。因此，说罗马在海上所拥有的优势对于此次战争进程产生了决定性影响这句话，需要通过对业已确定的事实进行仔细研究，才能得到证实。这样，它产生了什么样的影响、影响的程度如何，就可以得到公正的评价了。

蒙森[14]曾经说过，在战争初期，罗马控制着海洋。无论是出于什么样的原因，还是由于种种原因的结合，在第一次布匿战争期间，本质上并不属于海洋国家的罗马，竟然胜过了习惯于航海的对手，掌握了制海权，并且后来还一直保持着这种状态。在第二次布匿战争中，并未发生过什么重大的海战——这种情况本身，连同人们已经确定了的、与这种情况相关的其他事实，都显示出了一种优势；而这一点，与其他时代以同一特征为标志的情况则是类似的。

由于汉尼拔并未留下回忆录，所以促使他下定决心经由高卢并翻越阿尔卑斯山，从而踏上那条危机四伏、几近毁灭之途的动机，我们已经不得而知。然而，可以肯定的是，他部署在西班牙沿海的那支舰队并不强大，并不足以与罗马舰队相抗衡。就算这支舰队足够强大、能够与罗马舰队抗衡，他可能也会由于受到种种原因所左右，仍然踏上他实际所走的那条进军路线；但如果走的是海路，那么，他出发时所率的那60000名能征善战的士兵中，就不会损失掉33000人了。

就在汉尼拔开始这一危险进军之时，罗马人正派两位大西庇阿率罗马舰队一部，运送一支执政官集团军[15]前往西班牙。这支舰队在航行过程中并无重大损失，那支陆军则成功地在埃布罗河以北、汉尼拔的交通补给线上扎下了营寨。与此同时，另一支小型舰队与一支由另一名执政官所指挥的部队，则被派往了西西里。这两支舰队合起来，舰船数量达到了220艘。它们在各自的战斗位置上，分别遭遇并击退了一支迦太基的小型舰队，且胜得轻而易举；这一点，可以从人们对战斗过程只是一笔带过的事实就可以推断出来，也显示出了罗马舰队的真正优势。

第二年过后，此次战争的形势是：从北部进入意大利、打了一系列胜仗的汉尼拔，已经绕过罗马向南进军，并在意大利南部驻扎下来，就地征取军粮——这种情况，往往会使民心背离，而在涉及到罗马帝国在该国所建立的那种强大的政治与军事制度时，则尤为危险。因此他的第一要务，就应当是在他自己与某个可靠基地之间，建立起畅通的补给与援兵线，用现代战争的话来说，就是应当建立起一条“交通补给线”。当时有3个友好地区，就是迦太基本土、马其顿和西班牙，它们各自或者合起来都可以形成这样的一个基地。对于前面两个地区而言，提供交通补给只能经由海上。而从最坚定地支持汉尼拔的西班牙，则既可以从陆上、也可以从海上获取补给，除非有敌军拦截；不过，海路更近，也更容易。

在此次战争最初的那几年中，罗马通过其制海权完全掌控了位于意大利、西西里和西班牙之间的海域，即如今我们所知的第勒尼安海与撒丁尼亚海。从埃布罗河到台伯河的沿岸地区，多半都与罗马交好。在第四年的坎尼之战后，锡拉丘兹背弃了与罗马的同盟，整个西西里都发生了叛乱，而马其顿也与汉尼拔结成了攻守同盟。这些变化，使得罗马舰队的作战次数越来越多，因而削弱了舰队的实力。那么，罗马舰队做了什么样的部署，而此后罗马舰队又是如何影响到整个战争的呢？

种种迹象都很清楚地表明，罗马从未停止过对第勒尼安海的控制，因为该国的各分舰队一直都畅通无阻地往来于意大利和西班牙之间。而在西班牙沿海，直到小西庇阿认为可以让舰队退役之前，罗马也都掌握着完全的控制权。在亚得里亚海，罗马则在布林迪西建立了一支小型舰队和一个军港，以遏制马其顿；这支舰队和军港的作用非常巨大，使得以方阵[16]著称的马其顿步兵从未踏上过意大利一步。“由于没有一支军舰舰队，”蒙森曾这样说，“所以腓力五世[17]在所有行动中都力不从心。”制海权在此处所产生的影响，就不再是一种推理了。在西西里，战争主要以锡拉丘兹为中心。迦太基与罗马双方的舰队在此遭遇，但优势显然在罗马舰队这一边；因为，尽管迦太基人多次把给养投入了城中，一直避免与罗马舰队直接交锋。由于掌控着利利俾、巴勒莫和墨西拿等地，所以罗马舰队一直牢牢地据守着西西里岛北部沿海。但迦太基人仍然可以从该岛南部进入，因此才能继续与罗马对抗。

把这些事实放在一起来看，我们便可推断出一个合理且被整个历史进程所支持的结论来：从西班牙的塔拉戈纳到西西里岛西端的利利俾（即如今的马尔萨拉），然后绕过该岛北侧，经由墨西拿海峡，向南至锡拉丘兹，再到亚得里亚海上的布林迪西，此线以北的海域，都由罗马海军控制着。并且，在整个战争期间，罗马都牢牢地保持着这种控制权。这并不是说，罗马并未受到过前面已经提及的、规模或大或小的海上袭扰；不过，它却确确实实地阻断了汉尼拔所急需的那种既不间断又很安全的交通补给。

另一方面，在此次战争的前10年间，罗马舰队仍然不够强大，无法在西西里与迦太基之间的海域持续作战，实际上也无法在前述那条线以南的许多海域持续作战，这一点似乎也同样非常明显。汉尼拔在出征之时，曾指派手下的一些船只在西班牙和非洲之间运送补给，而罗马人当时却并未试图去袭扰这些船只。

因此，虽然罗马的制海权将马其顿完全踢出了此次战争之外，但它并没有阻止迦太基在西西里维持其有效的、干扰性的牵制力量；不过，它的确让迦太基在最有利的时候，无法向在意大利的汉尼拔这位伟大的将领派遣援军。至于西班牙，情况又如何呢？

汉尼拔之父与汉尼拔本人，都是因西班牙这一地区而产生了入侵意大利的企图。在入侵意大利的18年之前，他们就占领了西班牙，并以极为罕见的远见卓识，扩充并巩固了他们的政治和军事权力。在一场场局部战争中，他们招募并训练出了一支庞大、此时已身经百战的军队。汉尼拔出征之后，就将该国的行政委托给了其弟弟哈斯德鲁巴；后者至死都对汉尼拔忠心耿耿、毫无二心，而汉尼拔根本就不用指望从非洲那个派系林立、争斗不休的宗主国获得此种忠诚。

当他出征之时，迦太基在西班牙的势力范围，从加的斯到埃布罗河都很牢固。在埃布罗河与比利牛斯山脉之间的地区，生活着与罗马人交好的一些部落；不过，倘若没有罗马人撑腰，这些部落是无法成功地抵抗汉尼拔的。汉尼拔镇压了这些部落，留下汉诺[18]率11000士卒武力镇守该国，以防罗马军队前来夺取并袭扰他与大本营之间的交通补给线。

然而，就在同一年间，格尼乌斯·西庇阿从海上率20000兵力也抵达了这一地区；他打败了汉诺，占领了沿海以及埃布罗河以北的内陆地区。这样一来，罗马人就站稳了脚跟，完全封锁了汉尼拔部与哈斯德鲁巴援军之间的道路，并由此可以去进攻西班牙的迦太基政权；而他们自己与意大利之间经由海上的交通补给，则因其海军优势而得以确保安全了。他们在塔拉戈纳建立了一个海军基地，以此来对抗位于卡塔赫纳的哈斯德鲁巴部的海军基地，然后侵入了迦太基的领土。西班牙之战是在两位大西庇阿的指挥之下进行的，尽管看上去似乎并不重要，但双方势力此消彼长，竟打了7年的拉锯战；最后，哈斯德鲁巴给了他们沉重一击，罗马军队一败涂地，大西庇阿兄弟俩战死，而迦太基人也差不多打通了通往比利牛斯山脉的道路，能够去支援汉尼拔部了。可是，当时这一尝试却遭到了罗马军队的拦截；而不待他们再一次试图支援，加普亚又被攻陷，腾出了12000名身经百战的罗马士兵，由克劳狄乌斯·尼禄率领，被派往西班牙。尼禄具有非凡的才能，后来在第二次布匿战争中，罗马将领最具决定意义的军事行动，都应归功于他。这支如及时之雨的援军是经由海路到达的，它重新控制了因哈斯德鲁巴部进军而本已岌岌可危的形势；海路虽说极为快捷和容易，但罗马海军却在海上已经完全阻断了迦太基人。

两年之后，更年轻的普布利乌斯·西庇阿——即后来声名显著的“非洲征服者”大西庇阿——接掌了西班牙之战的指挥权，并联合陆海两军攻取了卡塔赫纳；然后，他便干出了一桩惊世之举：他解散了所率的舰队，并将水兵并入了陆军。由于并不满足于仅仅当一支“牵制”（5）力量，不满足于只是封锁比利牛斯山脉的各处关隘来对抗哈斯德鲁巴部，所以西庇阿率军推进到了西班牙南部，并在瓜达基维尔河上进行了一场具有决定意义的恶战；此战之后，哈斯德鲁巴部便弃战远遁，向北突入，越过比利牛斯山脉西端，奋力推进到了意大利——其时，身处意大利的汉尼拔，由于所率军队的伤亡人员没有得到补充，所以处境正日益不妙。

当哈斯德鲁巴一路几乎没有什么损失的从北部突入意大利后，此时这场战争已经持续打了10年。他所率的军队，倘若能够与所向披靡的汉尼拔所指挥的军队安全会师的话，可能会决定性地逆转整个战争，因为罗马当时本身已经被拖得筋疲力尽了；把各殖民地以及各盟国与罗马绑在一起的那种强大纽带，已经绷到了最大限度，有些地方还开始喀喀作响了。不过，汉尼拔与哈斯德鲁巴两兄弟的形势，也已经危险到了极点。他们当中，一部位于梅陶罗河，另一部则位于阿普利亚，二者相距200英里，各自都面临着一支精锐敌军，而两支罗马军队也全都夹在这两兄弟所率部队之间。这种错误的阵势，以及哈斯德鲁巴久久未能前来支援汉尼拔部，都是由于罗马掌握了制海权；而整个战争期间，罗马的制海权都在阻碍着迦太基的这两兄弟在穿越高卢的进军路线上相互支援。就在哈斯德鲁巴正率军经由陆路，进行这种路途遥远而又危险重重的迂回之时，西庇阿却已从西班牙派遣了11000名士兵，经由海路前去支援与哈斯德鲁巴对抗的那支军队了。结果，哈斯德鲁巴派到汉尼拔那儿去的信使，由于不得不越过多个敌对国家，便落入了指挥南部罗马军队的克劳狄乌斯·尼禄手里，使得尼禄获悉了哈斯德鲁巴计划的行军路线。尼禄正确地评估了此时的形势，在没有引起汉尼拔警觉的情况下，率领手下的8000精锐，飞速驰往北方参战。南北两军会师之后，这两位执政官便以压倒性的兵力开始进攻，击溃了哈斯德鲁巴部；这位迦太基将领本人也在战斗中阵亡了。直到敌军将他弟弟的头颅扔进军营，汉尼拔才得知这一噩耗。据说，当时他大叫大喊，说罗马此后就会是世界霸主了；而人们也一致公认，梅陶罗河一役是这两国之间的关键一战。

最终导致梅陶罗河一役和罗马获胜的军事形势，可以归结如下：要想打倒罗马，就必须在属于其权力中心的意大利发起攻击，并且打破以其为首的强大同盟。这是目标。而要想实现这一目标，迦太基人需要有一个牢固的作战基地和一条安全的交通补给线。伟大的巴尔卡家族凭借他们的才能，已经在西班牙建立起了牢固的作战基地；但后者，却一直都未能实现。迦太基人有两条可能的进军路线——其一是直接从海上进击，而另一条则是穿过高卢，迂回进击。第一条被罗马的海上力量所阻，第二条则危险重重，并且最终也因罗马军队占领西班牙北部而被截断了。罗马军队通过制海权，是可以这样占领西班牙北部的，而迦太基人却一直都没有危及到罗马的制海权。因此，对于汉尼拔及其大本营来说，罗马就占据了两个中枢位置，即罗马本土和西班牙北部地区，它们之间通过毫不费力的内部交通补给线——即海路——相连；通过海路，两地的罗马军队都进行了持续的相互支援。

假如地中海是一处平坦的陆上沙漠，罗马人掌控了科西嘉岛和撒丁岛上那些坚固的山脉，在靠近热那亚的意大利海岸线上的塔拉戈纳、利利俾和墨西拿等地筑有要塞，并且将马赛与其他各地的要塞都联合起来；假如他们还拥有一支武装力量，特点是能够随时越过这个沙漠，而敌人则没有这种能力，因而不得不绕上一大圈才能把军队集结起来；那么，我们马上就能看出此时的军事形势，并且无论怎样高度评价这支特殊军队的价值和作用，也不过分。我们或许还可以认识到，无论兵力多么弱小，同样的一支敌军也可能突袭或袭击罗马所占领土，可能让一个村庄变成焦土或者让其数英里的边陲变成不毛之地，甚至还可能时不时地切断一支护航舰队，但这些从军事意义来看，都并非威胁到了敌方的交通补给线。历朝历代，海上交战国中的弱势一方都曾经进行过这种掠夺性的军事行动，但我们却决不能仅凭这种军事行动，便做出与下述公认事实相矛盾的推断；这些事实就是：“既不能说罗马无可争议地掌控着海上，也不能说迦太基无可争议地掌控着海上”，因为“罗马舰队有时会造访非洲沿岸，而迦太基的舰队也同样会出现在意大利沿海”。在前面假定的这种情形中，海军所起的作用，正是所设沙漠中这样一支部队的作用；不过，由于海军是在大多数史家都不熟悉的环境中作战，由于海上军事人员从远古以来一直就是很奇特的一类人，没有他们自己的“先知书”，人们既不了解他们本身，也不了解他们所从事的这个行业，所以，海军对于那个时代的历史、并因此而对整个世界历史所产生的巨大而具有决定意义的影响，就被人们忽视了。假如前述论点站得住脚，那么，将制海权从结论的主要因素当中略去就是不全面的，跟宣称只有制海权产生了影响这种说法一样荒谬。

诸如本书中我们已经引用的这些例子，都是广泛地从各个时期中选取出来的，既有本书专门论述的这个时期之前的，也有之后的；它们都阐明了这一主题的内在价值，以及这些历史教训的特征。正如我们在前面已经说过的那样，这些战例常常都被归入了战略的范畴，而不是战术的范畴；由于它们针对的是战役的指挥，而不是战斗的指挥，因此具有更多的持久性价值。要引用这个方面的伟人名言的话，则有约米尼[19]，他曾说：“1851年末，有位杰出人士恰来巴黎，蒙其赏光问我道，近来火器之改良，会不会给战争方式带来什么巨大的变化。我回答道，此种改良很可能会对战术细节产生影响，但在大的战略行动和大的战役组合中，必须将那些让历代的伟大将领获得成功的基本原则加以应用，方能取胜；诸如亚历山大大帝和恺撒大帝的战争，以及腓特烈大帝和拿破仑的战争。”此种研究，如今由于汽船具有极大而稳定的机动能力而对海军变得越发重要了。在桨帆船和帆船时代，精心制定的作战方案，可能会因天气恶劣而流产；但如今，这个难题差不多已经不复存在了。指导海军进行大战略组合的那些基本原则，历代皆可通用，亦可从历史事实中推断出来；不过，几乎不用考虑天气状况就能应用这些基本原则，却是近来才做得到的。

人们给“战略”这个词所下的定义，通常都将其限制为包含一个或多个作战场所的军事组合；虽说这些战场或是完全独立，或是互为唇齿，但往往都被看作是实际的或直接的战争现场。无论对于陆上战争而言情况如何，近代一位法国作家的观点都是相当正确的；他曾指出，这一定义对于海军战略来说太过狭隘。他说：“这与军事战略不同，因为无论是和平时期还是战时，军事战略都是必需的。事实上，在和平时期，可以运用战略，占领一国当中可能难以通过发动战争而获取的某些战略要地——或是通过出钱购买，或是通过缔结条约，来获取最具决定性的胜利。战略教导人们，应当利用好在沿岸某处选定之地安营扎寨的一切机会，并让起初只是暂时的占据状况变成确定无疑的占领状态。”看到了英国在10年之间，通过表面上属于暂据、迄今却仍未放弃这些所占之地的条款和条件，相继占领了塞浦路斯和埃及的那一代人，都是会欣然同意这种说法的；事实上，在不同的海域，凡是本国人民和本国舰船所到之处，所有的海洋大国都在不声不响、孜孜不倦地寻找着一个又一个战略要地——虽说它们都不如塞浦路斯和埃及那样知名和值得注意——就经常说明了这一点。“无论是和平时期还是战争时期，海军战略实际上都以确立、维持并扩大一国之制海权为最终目标”；因此，研究海军战略，对于一个自由国家的所有国民来说都是很有意义的；而对那些从事外交与军事关系的人来说，则尤为有价值。

下面，我们就来对那些要么属于必不可少的、要么会强有力地影响到一国制海权的一般性条件来进行研究；然后，再对17世纪中叶欧洲的各个海洋国家加以更为详尽的思考，从此处开始进行历史考察，马上就会正确地阐明我们根据总主题所得出的那些结论了。

注：

虽说纳尔逊的声望与其同时代的所有人一样正在日渐没落，但他的赫赫威名，以及英国人坚定不移地相信他才是能够将英国从拿破仑的阴谋中拯救出来的人，自然不应当掩盖这样一个事实：他只是，或者说只可能是各大作战区域中的一分子。在以特拉法尔加海战告终的那场战役中，拿破仑的目标，是将位于布雷斯特、土伦和罗什福尔的法国舰队与一群强大的西班牙舰船在西印度群岛联合起来，从而形成一支无人能敌的海军力量，并且打算让这支舰队返回英吉利海峡，去掩护法国陆军渡海。由于英国在世界各地都有殖民地，所以他自然希望，英国人会因为不知道法国舰队的目的地是哪儿而产生困惑，并将英国海军调离他所针对的目标。纳尔逊负责的是地中海地区，他在那里警戒着土伦这个大军港，以及通往东方与大西洋的各条交通要道。这件事情的重要性并不亚于其他行动，而由于确信拿破仑还会像以前那样企图攻取埃及，所以在纳尔逊看来，这样做就更加重要了。因为有着这种信念，所以纳尔逊首先就走错了一步棋，拖延了他对由维尔纳夫所指挥的土伦舰队的追击；后者又因碰上长久持续的顺风、英军却需顶风航行而获得了更大的优势。不过，虽说拿破仑战术组合的失败必须归因于英军对于布雷斯特沿岸顽强有力的封锁，以及当土伦舰队遁往西印度群岛、之后又匆匆返回欧洲时，纳尔逊率军进行了积极有力的追击这两个因素，但历史所给予且在本书正文中得到维护的那种殊荣，纳尔逊还是当之无愧的。实际上，纳尔逊并未看穿拿破仑的意图。有人说，这或许是由于纳尔逊缺乏眼力所致；不过，将原因归结于常见的不利条件可能会更加简单：在这种不利条件下，由于不知道对方进攻的危险程度，所以都是先于攻击发起之前进行防守。能够抓住局势的关键，固然很具眼力；而这位纳尔逊，当时却只看到了舰队，而不是自己的战斗位置。因此，他的行动就给我们提供了一个突出的例子，表明不屈不挠地坚持目标且在执行过程中坚持不懈，是如何能够纠正最初所犯的错误，并且挫败对方经过深思熟虑而制定的计划的。他在地中海地区的指挥权，包括了许许多多的职责和操心事；但其中最主要的一项，却是他毫无疑问地认为土伦舰队是那里的控制性因素，也是法兰西帝国所有海军组合中的一个重要因素。因此，他才死死地盯着这支舰队；他如此关注，以至于将其称作是“他的舰队”，而这句话，曾经还让法国的评论家们感情上有点儿受不了呢。纳尔逊对军事形势所抱的这种简单而准确的见解，使得他既坚定又无畏地下定决心，承担起为追击“他的舰队”而放弃战斗岗位的巨大责任。由于决意这样去进行追击，从中体现出来的那种不可否认的智慧，并不会使承担此项任务的人蒙羞，所以他追赶得不遗余力；虽说由于虚假情报以及不确定敌军动向的原因，不可避免地耽搁了一些时日，但在返回途中，他还是在维尔纳夫进入费罗尔之前一周便到达了加的斯。也正是这种相同的不懈激情，使得他能够及时将自己的舰队从加的斯调往布雷斯特，从而让那里的兵力超过了维尔纳夫，以防后者试图强行进击布雷斯特附近。那里的英军舰船在总数上本来大大劣于法、西联合舰队，但这一次却得到了8艘经验丰富的舰艇及时支援，并被部署到了最佳的战略位置上——后面在研究美国革命战争中与此相似的一些形势时，我们还会指出这一点。英军在比斯开湾汇合成了一支庞大的舰队，楔在了布雷斯特与费罗尔的两支敌军分舰队之间，不但舰船数量超过了其中的任何一支，而且很可能不待另一支前来支援就可以消灭掉其中的一支。这是由于英国当局处处都采取了出色的行动；不过，在导致这一结果的所有因素当中，最主要的还是纳尔逊一门心思地追击“他的舰队”。

这一系列有趣的战略运动在8月14日结束了；此时，由于前往布雷斯特无望，维尔纳夫便向加的斯进发，并于8月20日在加的斯泊锚了。拿破仑一听到这个消息，对这位海军司令大发了一通雷霆，之后马上就放弃了他对抗英国的那些目标，命令海军进行了一系列战略机动，结果引发了乌尔姆之战与奥斯特利茨之战。因此，10月21日进行的特拉法尔加海战，虽说同全面的军事行动之间有着两个月的间隙，却是这些军事机动所导致的结果。尽管时间上同这些军事机动并不相连，但此战仍然是纳尔逊天才的标志，后来又被添进他在不久前所立下的赫赫战功之中了。有人说，虽然拿破仑这位法兰西皇帝当时已经放弃了自己的入侵计划，但特拉法尔加海战还是拯救了英国，这种说法同样也是正确的；而此处对法军的毁灭性打击，则突出标志了那种无声无息地挫败拿破仑入侵计划的战略大捷。

原注：

（1）比如，锡拉丘兹的赫莫克拉提斯主张，采用大胆出击、阻遏进击其城邦的雅典远征军（公元前413年）并且坚守雅典远征军进军路线侧翼的政策；他曾说：“由于他们的进军必定缓慢下来，所以我们就有无数的机会去进攻他们了；若是他们整理好船只来作战，准备全体出动、袭击我们的话，那他们就必须奋力划桨，而待他们筋疲力尽之时，我们就可以进攻了。”

（2）作者一定是想防止让自己显得似乎是在提倡进行复杂的、导致无益佯动的战术机动。他认为，虽说一支想获得决定性战果的舰队必须接近敌人，但并非一定要待获得某种优势来进行碰撞才罢休；这种优势，通常都会通过舰船的机动获得，并且属于训练最有素、指挥得最好的那支舰队。事实上，无效的佯动过后，往往就是仓促轻率的短兵相接，或者极为胆怯的战术拖延了。

（3）当风向允许一艘舰船驶向敌舰，而敌舰却无法径直驶向我方的时候，我们就说这艘船处于上风位置，或者“拥有风向优势”，或者说“顺风”。最极端的情形，便是海风从此舰径直吹向彼舰；不过，在这条线左右两边的广大范围之内，都可用“上风”这个术语。倘若将处于下风位置的舰船看作是一个圆的圆心，那么另一艘船可以在这个圆大约八分之三的面积范围内，或多或少地利用风向优势。“下风”即是“上风”的对立面。

（4）土耳其与西方列强之间的纳瓦里诺之战（1827年）就发生在此处附近。

（5）“牵制”部队是指，在一个联合军事单元中，在部队主力投入别的战场作战时，受命阻止或拖延敌军一部进击的队伍。

译者注：

[1] Donnybrook Fair：唐尼布鲁克集市。指1885年以前，曾经在爱尔兰都柏林东南郊唐尼布鲁克市所举办的、以酒色殴斗著称的一种一年一度的集市。

[2] 罗德尼（George Brydges Rodney,1719～1792）。英国军事家、海军上将，获封罗德尼男爵一世（1st Baron Rodney）。1780年4月7日，他率英国舰队与基申伯爵所率法国海军在马提尼克岛（南美加勒比海地区的一个法国殖民地）海域发生海战。基申伯爵（Comte De Guichen, 1712～1790），法国军事家，海军上将。在马提尼克岛海战中，英法双方基本上不分胜负。

[3] Hermocrates：赫莫克拉提斯（公元前5世纪～公元前407年）。伯罗奔尼撒战争中雅典城邦发动西西里远征时期的一位将军，也是柏拉图晚期的对话集《蒂迈欧》（Timaeus）和《克里提亚斯》（Critias）中的人物。

[4] Lord Howe：豪勋爵（Richard Howe, 1726～1799）。英国的军事家、舰队司令，曾任海军大臣，获封第一任豪伯爵。他既是一位才能卓异的海军指挥官，也是一位较有远见的政治家。

[5] Lord St. Vincent：圣文森特勋爵（原名John Jervis, 1735～1823）。英国海军司令、国会议员，曾指挥舰队参加了“七年战争”、美国独立战争等多次战争。1797年，他在圣文森特角海战中取胜，从而声名大噪，并获封第一任圣文森特伯爵。

[6] 纳尔逊（Horatio Nelson, 1758～1805）。英国海军指挥官、军事家，以杰出的领导才能与非常规战术著称，曾获数次海战大捷，1805年死于特拉法尔加海战。

[7] 莫罗盖（Sébastien-Francois Bigot, Vicomte de Morogues,1706～1781）。法国炮兵专家和海军战术家，著有《海军战术》（Tactique navale）一书。

[8] The Battle of the Nile：尼罗河河口之战。英、法两国海军于1798年8月1日至2日在尼罗河河口附近发生的一次海战，以英军获胜告终。它是法国大革命战争中最重要的一次海战。由于战斗发生处为阿布基尔湾（Aboukir Bay），故此役又称“阿布基尔湾海战”。

[9] 维尔纳夫（Silvestre de Villeneuve,1763～1806）。法国贵族、海军将领，在1798年的尼罗河河口之战中，他为一艘主力舰的舰长。此役中拿破仑的埃及远征军舰队被纳尔逊歼灭，只有维尔纳夫的这艘舰艇和其他3艘得以逃脱。而在1805年的特拉法尔加海战中，他指挥无方，使得所率的法、西联合舰队再度惨败于纳尔逊之手，而他本人也成了英军的俘虏。

[10] Actium and Lepanto：阿克提姆和勒班陀。都是希腊地名，且都发生过历史上著名的海战。前者如今称为“圣尼古拉奥斯”，公元前31年古罗马帝国的屋大维与安东尼曾在此为争夺帝国的最高权力而爆发海战，以安东尼失败告终；后者如今在希腊语中称为“纳夫帕克托斯（Návpaktos）”,1571年欧洲列强曾在此击败了土耳其帝国。

[11] Levant：黎凡特。指地中海东部的西亚地区，包括埃及和希腊以东诸国和地区，故也译为“远东”或“东方”。

[12] Punic War：布匿战争。古罗马帝国与古迦太基之间为争夺地中海沿岸地区霸权而进行的3次战争，亦称迦太基战争。Punic一词，源于当时罗马人称迦太基为Punici。第一次布匿战争从公元前264年至公元前241年，第二次发生在公元前218年至公元前201年间，第三次则从公元前149年至公元前146年。其中，第二次布匿战争最为有名，当时迦太基一方的统帅即是汉尼拔。

[13] Cannae：坎尼。古城名，在今意大利东南部巴列塔的奥凡托河注入亚得里亚海附近。公元216年，古罗马和迦太基进行的第二次布匿战争期间，迦太基统帅汉尼拔率军和古罗马决战于此，并获大捷。

[14] 蒙森（Christian Matthias Theodor Mommsen,1817～1903）。德国古典学者、法学家、历史学家、记者、政治家、考古学家和作家，1902年诺贝尔文学奖的获得者，著有《罗马史》等作品。

[15] Consular army：执政官（所率）集团军。古罗马最常见的一种部队单元和战斗序列，一般包括两个罗马军团和两支兵力相等的同盟部队，总兵力达2万人。

[16] Phalanx:（马其顿）方阵。一种早期步兵作战时所用的战术。在荷马时代以前，步兵打起仗来像一窝蜂似的，杂乱无章，所以，具有严格阵法的马其顿方阵能够轻易地打败数量上占优势但较混乱的敌人，这在当时可以说是战术上的创新。

[17] 腓力五世（Philip V，公元前238年～前179年），马其顿国王。他在第二次布匿战争中与迦太基结盟，对罗马宣战，从而开始了马其顿战争。

[18] Hanno：汉诺。迦太基将领中有多人均叫此名，但此处的“汉诺”应指汉尼拔的另一个弟弟。

[19] 约米尼（Antoine-Henri Jomini,1779～1869）。法国将领、军事家和作家，曾在瑞士、法国和俄国军队中服役，被誉为“现代战略之父”。