第3章

Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power 海权诸要素之探讨

The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the history of the world.

Notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dangers of the sea, both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land. The commercial greatness of Holland was due not only to her shipping at sea, but also to the numerous tranquil water-ways which gave such cheap and easy access to her own interior and to that of Germany. This advantage of carriage by water over that by land was yet more marked in a period when roads were few and very bad, wars frequent and society unsettled, as was the case two hundred years ago. Sea traffic then went in peril of robbers, but was nevertheless safer and quicker than that by land. A Dutch writer of that time, estimating the chances of his country in a war with England, notices among other things that the water-ways of England failed to penetrate the country sufficiently;therefore, the roads being bad, goods from one part of the kingdom to the other must go by sea, and be exposed to capture by the way. As regards purely internal trade, this danger has generally disappeared at the present day. In most civilized countries, now, the destruction or disappearance of the coasting trade would only be an inconvenience, although water transit is still the cheaper. Nevertheless, as late as the wars of the French Republic and the First Empire, those who are familiar with the history of the period, and the light naval literature that has grown up around it, know how constant is the mention of convoys stealing from point to point along the French coast, although the sea swarmed with English cruisers and there were good inland roads.

Under modern conditions, however, home trade is but a part of the business of a country bordering on the sea. Foreign necessaries or luxuries must be brought to its ports, either in its own or in foreign ships, which will return, bearing in exchange the products of the country, whether they be the fruits of the earth or the works of men's hands; and it is the wish of every nation that this shipping business should be done by its own vessels. The ships that thus sail to and fro must have secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as possible, be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage.

This protection in time of war must be extended by armed shipping. The necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment. As the United States has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical consequences. When for any reason sea trade is again found to pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel the revival of the war fleet. It is possible that when a canal route through the Central-American Isthmus is seen to be a near certainty, the aggressive impulse may be strong enough to lead to the same result. This is doubtful, however, because a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days.

As a nation, with its unarmed and armed shipping, launches forth from its own shores, the need is soon felt of points upon which the ships can rely for peaceful trading, for refuge and supplies. In the present day friendly, though foreign, ports are to be found all over the world;and their shelter is enough while peace prevails. It was not always so, nor does peace always endure, though the United States have been favored by so long a continuance of it. In earlier times the merchant seaman, seeking for trade in new and unexplored regions, made his gains at risk of life and liberty from suspicious or hostile nations, and was under great delays in collecting a full and profitable freight. He therefore intuitively sought at the far end of his trade route one or more stations, to be given to him by force or favor, where he could fix himself or his agents in reasonable security, where his ships could lie in safety, and where the merchantable products of the land could be continually collecting, awaiting the arrival of the home fleet, which should carry them to the mother-country. As there was immense gain, as well as much risk, in these early voyages, such establishments naturally multiplied and grew until they became colonies; whose ultimate development and success depended upon the genius and policy of the nation from which they sprang, and form a very great part of the history, and particularly of the sea history, of the world. All colonies had not the simple and natural birth and growth above described. Many were more formal, and purely political, in their conception and founding, the act of the rulers of the people rather than of private individuals; but the trading-station with its after expansion, the work simply of the adventurer seeking gain, was in its reasons and essence the same as the elaborately organized and chartered colony. In both cases the mother-country had won a foothold in a foreign land, seeking a new outlet for what it had to sell, a new sphere for its shipping, more employment for its people, more comfort and wealth for itself.

The needs of commerce, however, were not all provided for when safety had been secured at the far end of the road. The voyages were long and dangerous, the seas often beset with enemies. In the most active days of colonizing there prevailed on the sea a lawlessness the very memory of which is now almost lost, and the days of settled peace between maritime nations were few and far between. Thus arose the demand for stations along the road, like the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for defence and war; the demand for the possession of posts like Gibraltar, Malta, Louisburg, at the entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, — posts whose value was chiefly strategic, though not necessarily wholly so. Colonies and colonial posts were sometimes commercial, sometimes military in their character;and it was exceptional that the same position was equally important in both points of view, as New York was.

In these three things — production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety — is to be found the key to much of the history, as well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea. The policy has varied both with the spirit of the age and with the character and clear-sightedness of the rulers; but the history of the seaboard nations has been less determined by the shrewdness and foresight of governments than by conditions of position, extent, configuration, number and character of their people, — by what are called, in a word, natural conditions. It must however be admitted, and will be seen, that the wise or unwise action of individual men has at certain periods had a great modifying influence upon the growth of sea power in the broad sense, which includes not only the military strength afloat, that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.

The principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations may be enumerated as follows:I. Geographical Position. II. Physical Conformation, including, as connected therewith, natural productions and climate. III. Extent of Territory. IV. Number of Population. V. Character of the People. VI. Character of the Government, including therein the national institutions.

I. Geographical Position. — It may be pointed out, in the first place, that if a nation be so situated that it is neither forced to defend itself by land nor induced to seek extension of its territory by way of the land, it has, by the very unity of its aim directed upon the sea, an advantage as compared with a people one of whose boundaries is continental. This has been a great advantage to England over both France and Holland as a sea power. The strength of the latter was early exhausted by the necessity of keeping up a large army and carrying on expensive wars to preserve her independence; while the policy of France was constantly diverted, sometimes wisely and sometimes most foolishly, from the sea to projects of continental extension. These military efforts expended wealth; whereas a wiser and consistent use of her geographical position would have added to it.

The geographical position may be such as of itself to promote a concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of the naval forces. Here again the British Islands have an advantage over France. The position of the latter, touching the Mediterranean as well as the ocean, while it has its advantages, is on the whole a source of military weakness at sea. The eastern and western French fleets have only been able to unite after passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, in attempting which they have often risked and sometimes suffered loss. The position of the United States upon the two oceans would be either a source of great weakness or a cause of enormous expense, had it a large sea commerce on both coasts.

England, by her immense colonial empire, has sacrificed much of this advantage of concentration of force around her own shores; but the sacrifice was wisely made, for the gain was greater than the loss, as the event proved. With the growth of her colonial system her war fleets also grew, but her merchant shipping and wealth grew yet faster. Still, in the wars of the American Revolution, and of the French Republic and Empire, to use the strong expression of a French author,“England, despite the immense development of her navy, seemed ever, in the midst of riches, to feel all the embarrassment of poverty.”The might of England was sufficient to keep alive the heart and the members; whereas the equally extensive colonial empire of Spain, through her maritime weakness, but offered so many points for insult and injury.

The geographical position of a country may not only favor the concentration of its forces, but give the further strategic advantage of a central position and a good base for hostile operations against its probable enemies. This again is the case with England; on the one hand she faces Holland and the northern powers, on the other France and the Atlantic. When threatened with a coalition between France and the naval powers of the North Sea and the Baltic, as she at times was, her fleets in the Downs and in the Channel, and even that off Brest, occupied interior positions, and thus were readily able to interpose their united force against either one of the enemies which should seek to pass through the Channel to effect a junction with its ally. On either side, also, Nature gave her better ports and a safer coast to approach. Formerly this was a very serious element in the passage through the Channel; but of late, steam and the improvement of her harbors have lessened the disadvantage under which France once labored. In the days of sailing-ships, the English fleet operated against Brest making its base at Torbay and Plymouth. The plan was simply this: in easterly or moderate weather the blockading fleet kept its position without difficulty; but in westerly gales, when too severe, they bore up for English ports, knowing that the French fleet could not get out till the wind shifted, which equally served to bring them back to their station.

The advantage of geographical nearness to an enemy, or to the object of attack, is nowhere more apparent than in that form of warfare which has lately received the name of commercedestroying, which the French call guerre de course. This operation of war, being directed against peaceful merchant vessels which are usually defenceless, calls for ships of small military force. Such ships, having little power to defend themselves, need a refuge or point of support near at hand; which will be found either in certain parts of the sea controlled by the fighting ships of their country, or in friendly harbors. The latter give the strongest support, because they are always in the same place, and the approaches to them are more familiar to the commerce-destroyer than to his enemy. The nearness of France to England has thus greatly facilitated her guerre de course directed against the latter. Having ports on the North Sea, on the Channel, and on the Atlantic, her cruisers started from points near the focus of English trade, both coming and going. The distance of these ports from each other, disadvantageous for regular military combinations, is an advantage for this irregular secondary operation; for the essence of the one is concentration of effort, whereas for commerce-destroying diffusion of effort is the rule. Commerce-destroyers scatter, that they may see and seize more prey. These truths receive illustration from the history of the great French privateers, whose bases and scenes of action were largely on the Channel and North Sea, or else were found in distant colonial regions, where islands like Guadaloupe and Martinique afforded similar near refuge. The necessity of renewing coal makes the cruiser of the present day even more dependent than of old on his port. Public opinion in the United States has great faith in war directed against an enemy's commerce; but it must be remembered that the Republic has no ports very near the great centers of trade abroad.Her geographical position is therefore singularly disadvantageous for carrying on successful commerce-destroying, unless she find bases in the ports of an ally.

If, in addition to facility for offence, Nature has so placed a country that it has easy access to the high sea itself, while at the same time it controls one of the great thoroughfares of the world's traffic, it is evident that the strategic value of its position is very high. Such again is, and to a greater degree was, the position of England. The trade of Holland, Sweden, Russia, Denmark, and that which went up the great rivers to the interior of Germany, had to pass through the Channel close by her doors; for sailing-ships hugged the English coast. This northern trade had, moreover, a peculiar bearing upon sea power; for naval stores, as they are commonly called, were mainly drawn from the Baltic countries.

But for the loss of Gibraltar, the position of Spain would have been closely analogous to that of England. Looking at once upon the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with Cadiz on the one side and Cartagena on the other, the trade to the Levant must have passed under her hands, and that round the Cape of Good Hope not far from her doors. But Gibraltar not only deprived her of the control of the Straits, it also imposed an obstacle to the easy junction of the two divisions of her fleet.

At the present day, looking only at the geographical position of Italy, and not at the other conditions affecting her sea power, it would seem that with her extensive sea-coast and good ports she is very well placed for exerting a decisive influence on the trade route to the Levant and by the Isthmus of Suez. This is true in a degree, and would be much more so did Italy now hold all the islands naturally Italian; but with Malta in the hands of England, and Corsica in those of France, the advantages of her geographical position are largely neutralized. From race affinities and situation those two islands are as legitimately objects of desire to Italy as Gibraltar is to Spain. If the Adriatic were a great highway of commerce, Italy's position would be still more influential. These defects in her geographical completeness, combined with other causes injurious to a full and secure development of sea power, make it more than doubtful whether Italy can for some time be in the front rank among the sea nations.

As the aim here is not an exhaustive discussion, but merely an attempt to show, by illustration, how vitally the situation of a country may affect its career upon the sea, this division of the subject may be dismissed for the present; the more so as instances which will further bring out its importance will continually recur in the historical treatment. Two remarks, however, are here appropriate.

Circumstances have caused the Mediterranean Sea to play a greater part in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size. Nation after nation has striven to control it, and the strife still goes on. Therefore a study of the conditions upon which preponderance in its waters has rested, and now rests, and of the relative military values of different points upon its coasts, will be more instructive than the same amount of effort expended in another field. Furthermore, it has at the present time a very marked analogy in many respects to the Caribbean Sea, — an analogy which will be still closer if a Panama canal-route ever be completed. A study of the strategic conditions of the Mediterranean, which have received ample illustration, will be an excellent prelude to a similar study of the Caribbean, which has comparatively little history.

The second remark bears upon the geographical position of the United States relatively to a Central-American canal. If one be made, and fulfill the hopes of its builders, the Caribbean will be changed from a terminus, and place of local traffic, or at best a broken and imperfect line of travel, as it now is, into one of the great highways of the world. Along this path a great commerce will travel, bringing the interests of the other great nations, the European nations, close along our shores, as they have never been before. With this it will not be so easy as heretofore to stand aloof from international complications. The position of the United States with reference to this route will resemble that of England to the Channel, and of the Mediterranean countries to the Suez route. As regards influence and control over it, depending upon geographical position, it is of course plain that the centre of the national power, the permanent base, (1)is much nearer than that of other great nations. The positions now or hereafter occupied by them on island or mainland, however strong, will be but outposts of their power; while in all the raw materials of military strength no nation is superior to the United States. She is, however, weak in a confessed unpreparedness for war; and her geographical nearness to the point of contention loses some of its value by the character of the Gulf coast, which is deficient in ports combining security from an enemy with facility for repairing war-ships of the first class, without which ships no country can pretend to control any part of the sea. In case of a contest for supremacy in the Caribbean, it seems evident from the depth of the South Pass of the Mississippi, the nearness of New Orleans, and the advantages of the Mississippi Valley for water transit, that the main effort of the country must pour down that valley, and its permanent base of operations be found there. The defence of the entrance to the Mississippi, however, presents peculiar difficulties; while the only two rival ports, Key West and Pensacola, have too little depth of water, and are much less advantageously placed with reference to the resources of the country. To get the full benefit of superior geographical position, these defects must be overcome. Furthermore, as her distance from the Isthmus, though relatively less, is still considerable, the United States will have to obtain in the Caribbean stations fit for contingent, or secondary, bases of operations; which by their natural advantages, susceptibility of defence, and nearness to the central strategic issue, will enable her fleets to remain as near the scene as any opponent. With ingress and egress from the Mississippi sufficiently protected, with such outposts in her hands, and with the communications between them and the home base secured, in short, with proper military preparation, for which she has all necessary means, the preponderance of the United States on this field follows, from her geographical position and her power, with mathematical certainty.

II. Physical Conformation. — The peculiar features of the Gulf coast, just alluded to, come properly under the head of Physical Conformation of a country, which is placed second for discussion among the conditions which affect the development of sea power.

The seaboard of a country is one of its frontiers; and the easier the access offered by the frontier to the region beyond, in this case the sea, the greater will be the tendency of a people toward intercourse with the rest of the world by it. If a country be imagined having a long seaboard, but entirely without a harbor, such a country can have no sea trade of its own, no shipping, no navy. This was practically the case with Belgium when it was a Spanish and an Austrian province. The Dutch, in 1648, as a condition of peace after a successful war, exacted that the Scheldt should be closed to sea commerce. This closed the harbor of Antwerp and transferred the sea trade of Belgium to Holland. The Spanish Netherlands ceased to be a sea power.

Numerous and deep harbors are a source of strength and wealth, and doubly so if they are the outlets of navigable streams, which facilitate the concentration in them of a country's internal trade; but by their very accessibility they become a source of weakness in war, if not properly defended. The Dutch in 1667 found little difficulty in ascending the Thames and burning a large fraction of the English navy within sight of London; whereas a few years later the combined fleets of England and France, when attempting a landing in Holland, were foiled by the difficulties of the coast as much as by the valor of the Dutch fleet. In 1778 the harbor of New York, and with it undisputed control of the Hudson River, would have been lost to the English, who were caught at disadvantage, but for the hesitancy of the French admiral. With that control, New England would have been restored to close and safe communication with New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; and this blow, following so closely on Burgoyne's disaster of the year before, would probably have led the English to make an earlier peace. The Mississippi is a mighty source of wealth and strength to the United States; but the feeble defences of its mouth and the number of its subsidiary streams penetrating the country made it a weakness and source of disaster to the Southern Confederacy. And lastly, in 1814, the occupation of the Chesapeake and the destruction of Washington gave a sharp lesson of the dangers incurred through the noblest water-ways, if their approaches be undefended; a lesson recent enough to be easily recalled, but which, from the present appearance of the coast defences, seems to be yet more easily forgotten. Nor should it be thought that conditions have changed; circumstances and details of offence and defence have been modified, in these days as before, but the great conditions remain the same.

Before and during the great Napoleonic wars, France had no port for ships-of-the-line east of Brest. How great the advantage to England, which in the same stretch has two great arsenals, at Plymouth and at Portsmouth, besides other harbors of refuge and supply. This defect of conformation has since been remedied by the works at Cherbourg.

Besides the contour of the coast, involving easy access to the sea, there are other physical conditions which lead people to the sea or turn them from it. Although France was deficient in military ports on the Channel, she had both there and on the ocean, as well as in the Mediterranean, excellent harbors, favorably situated for trade abroad, and at the outlet of large rivers, which would foster internal traffic. But when Richelieu had put an end to civil war, Frenchmen did not take to the sea with the eagerness and success of the English and Dutch. A principal reason for this has been plausibly found in the physical conditions which have made France a pleasant land, with a delightful climate, producing within itself more than its people needed. England, on the other hand, received from Nature but little, and, until her manufactures were developed, had little to export. Their many wants, combined with their restless activity and other conditions that favored maritime enterprise, led her people abroad;and they there found lands more pleasant and richer than their own. Their needs and genius made them merchants and colonists, then manufacturers and producers; and between products and colonies shipping is the inevitable link. So their sea power grew. But if England was drawn to the sea, Holland was driven to it; without the sea England languished, but Holland died. In the height of her greatness, when she was one of the chief factors in European politics, a competent native authority estimated that the soil of Holland could not support more than one eighth of her inhabitants. The manufactures of the country were then numerous and important, but they had been much later in their growth than the shipping interest. The poverty of the soil and the exposed nature of the coast drove the Dutch first to fishing. Then the discovery of the process of curing the fish gave them material for export as well as home consumption, and so laid the corner-stone of their wealth. Thus they had become traders at the time that the Italian republics, under the pressure of Turkish power and the discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope, were beginning to decline, and they fell heirs to the great Italian trade of the Levant. Further favored by their geographical position, intermediate between the Baltic, France, and the Mediterranean, and at the mouth of the German rivers, they quickly absorbed nearly all the carrying-trade of Europe. The wheat and naval stores of the Baltic, the trade of Spain with her colonies in the New World, the wines of France, and the French coastingtrade were, little more than two hundred years ago, transported in Dutch shipping. Much of the carrying-trade of England, even, was then done in Dutch bottoms. It will not be pretended that all this prosperity proceeded only from the poverty of Holland's natural resources. Something does not grow from nothing. What is true, is, that by the necessitous condition of her people they were driven to the sea, and were, from their mastery of the shipping business and the size of their fleets, in a position to profit by the sudden expansion of commerce and the spirit of exploration which followed on the discovery of America and of the passage round the Cape. Other causes concurred, but their whole prosperity stood on the sea power to which their poverty gave birth. Their food, their clothing, the raw material for their manufactures, the very timber and hemp with which they built and rigged their ships (and they built nearly as many as all Europe besides), were imported; and when a disastrous war with England in 1653 and 1654 had lasted eighteen months, and their shipping business was stopped, it is said“the sources of revenue which had always maintained the riches of the State, such as fisheries and commerce, were almost dry. Workshops were closed, work was suspended. The Zuyder Zee became a forest of masts; the country was full of beggars; grass grew in the streets, and in Amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted.”A humiliating peace alone saved them from ruin.

This sorrowful result shows the weakness of a country depending wholly upon sources external to itself for the part it is playing in the world. With large deductions, owing to differences of conditions which need not here be spoken of, the case of Holland then has strong points of resemblance to that of Great Britain now; and there are true prophets, though they seem to be having small honor in their own country, who warn her that the continuance of her prosperity at home depends primarily upon maintaining her power abroad. Men may be discontented at the lack of political privilege; they will be yet more uneasy if they come to lack bread. It is of more interest to Americans to note that the result to France, regarded as a power of the sea, caused by the extent, delightfulness, and richness of the land, has been reproduced in the United States. In the beginning, their forefathers held a narrow strip of land upon the sea, fertile in parts though little developed, abounding in harbors and near rich fishing-grounds. These physical conditions combined with an inborn love of the sea, the pulse of that English blood which still beat in their veins, to keep alive all those tendencies and pursuits upon which a healthy sea power depends. Almost every one of the original colonies was on the sea or on one of its great tributaries. All export and import tended toward one coast. Interest in the sea and an intelligent appreciation of the part it played in the public welfare were easily and widely spread; and a motive more influential than care for the public interest was also active, for the abundance of ship-building materials and a relative fewness of other investments made shipping a profitable private interest. How changed the present condition is, all know. The centre of power is no longer on the seaboard. Books and newspapers vie with one another in describing the wonderful growth, and the still undeveloped riches, of the interior. Capital there finds its best investments, labor its largest opportunities. The frontiers are neglected and politically weak; the Gulf and Pacific coasts actually so, the Atlantic coast relatively to the central Mississippi Valley. When the day comes that shipping again pays, when the three sea frontiers find that they are not only militarily weak, but poorer for lack of national shipping, their united efforts may avail to lay again the foundations of our sea power. Till then, those who follow the limitations which lack of sea power placed upon the career of France may mourn that their own country is being led, by a like redundancy of home wealth, into the same neglect of that great instrument.

Among modifying physical conditions may be noted a form like that of Italy, — a long peninsula, with a central range of mountains dividing it into two narrow strips, along which the roads connecting the different ports necessarily run. Only an absolute control of the sea can wholly secure such communications, since it is impossible to know at what point an enemy coming from beyond the visible horizon may strike; but still, with an adequate naval force centrally posted, there will be good hope of attacking his fleet, which is at once his base and line of communications, before serious damage has been done. The long, narrow peninsula of Florida, with Key West at its extremity, though flat and thinly populated, presents at first sight conditions like those of Italy. The resemblance may be only superficial, but it seems probable that if the chief scene of a naval war were the Gulf of Mexico, the communications by land to the end of the peninsula might be a matter of consequence, and open to attack.

When the sea not only borders, or surrounds, but also separates a country into two or more parts, the control of it becomes not only desirable, but vitally necessary. Such a physical condition either gives birth and strength to sea power, or makes the country powerless. Such is the condition of the present kingdom of Italy, with its islands of Sardinia and Sicily; and hence in its youth and still existing financial weakness it is seen to put forth such vigorous and intelligent efforts to create a military navy. It has even been argued that, with a navy decidedly superior to her enemy's, Italy could better base her power upon her islands than upon her mainland; for the insecurity of the lines of communication in the peninsula, already pointed out, would most seriously embarrass an invading army surrounded by a hostile people and threatened from the sea.

The Irish Sea, separating the British Islands, rather resembles an estuary than an actual division; but history has shown the danger from it to the United Kingdom. In the days of Louis XIV., when the French navy nearly equalled the combined English and Dutch, the gravest complications existed in Ireland, which passed almost wholly under the control of the natives and the French. Nevertheless, the Irish Sea was rather a danger to the English — a weak point in their communications — than an advantage to the French. The latter did not venture their ships-of-the-line in its narrow waters, and expeditions intending to land were directed upon the ocean ports in the south and west. At the supreme moment the great French fleet was sent upon the south coast of England, where it decisively defeated the allies, and at the same time twenty-five frigates were sent to St. George's Channel, against the English communications. In the midst of a hostile people, the English army in Ireland was seriously imperiled, but was saved by the battle of the Boyne and the flight of James II. This movement against the enemy's communications was strictly strategic, and would be just as dangerous to England now as in 1690.

Spain, in the same century, afforded an impressive lesson of the weakness caused by such separation when the parts are not knit together by a strong sea power. She then still retained, as remnants of her past greatness, the Netherlands (now Belgium), Sicily, and other Italian possessions, not to speak of her vast colonies in the New World. Yet so low had the Spanish sea power fallen, that a well-informed and sober-minded Hollander of the day could claim that“in Spain all the coast is navigated by a few Dutch ships; and since the peace of 1648 their ships and seamen are so few that they have publicly begun to hire our ships to sail to the Indies, whereas they were formerly careful to exclude all foreigners from there. … It is manifest,”he goes on,“that the West Indies, being as the stomach to Spain (for from it nearly all the revenue is drawn), must be joined to the Spanish head by a sea force; and that Naples and the Netherlands, being like two arms, they cannot lay out their strength for Spain, nor receive anything thence but by shipping, — all which may easily be done by our shipping in peace, and by it obstructed in war.”Half a century before, Sully, the great minister of Henry IV., had characterized Spain“as one of those States whose legs and arms are strong and powerful, but the heart infinitely weak and feeble.”Since his day the Spanish navy had suffered not only disaster, but annihilation; not only humiliation, but degradation. The consequences briefly were that shipping was destroyed; manufactures perished with it. The government depended for its support, not upon a wide-spread healthy commerce and industry that could survive many a staggering blow, but upon a narrow stream of silver trickling through a few treasure-ships from America, easily and frequently intercepted by an enemy's cruisers. The loss of half a dozen galleons more than once paralyzed its movements for a year. While the war in the Netherlands lasted, the Dutch control of the sea forced Spain to send her troops by a long and costly journey overland instead of by sea; and the same cause reduced her to such straits for necessaries that, by a mutual arrangement which seems very odd to modern ideas, her wants were supplied by Dutch ships, which thus maintained the enemies of their country, but received in return specie which was welcome in the Amsterdam exchange. In America, the Spanish protected themselves as best they might behind masonry, unaided from home; while in the Mediterranean they escaped insult and injury mainly through the indifference of the Dutch, for the French and English had not yet begun to contend for mastery there. In the course of history the Netherlands, Naples, Sicily, Minorca, Havana, Manila, and Jamaica were wrenched away, at one time or another, from this empire without a shipping. In short, while Spain's maritime impotence may have been primarily a symptom of her general decay, it became a marked factor in precipitating her into the abyss from which she has not yet wholly emerged.

Except Alaska, the United States has no outlying possession, — no foot of ground inaccessible by land. Its contour is such as to present few points specially weak from their saliency, and all important parts of the frontiers can be readily attained, — cheaply by water, rapidly by rail. The weakest frontier, the Pacific, is far removed from the most dangerous of possible enemies. The internal resources are boundless as compared with present needs; we can live off ourselves indefinitely in“our little corner,”to use the expression of a French officer to the author. Yet should that little corner be invaded by a new commercial route through the Isthmus, the United States in her turn may have the rude awakening of those who have abandoned their share in the common birthright of all people, the sea.

III. Extent of Territory. — The last of the conditions affecting the development of a nation as a sea power, and touching the country itself as distinguished from the people who dwell there, is Extent of Territory. This may be dismissed with comparatively few words.

As regards the development of sea power, it is not the total number of square miles which a country contains, but the length of its coast-line and the character of its harbors that are to be considered. As to these it is to be said that, the geographical and physical conditions being the same, extent of sea-coast is a source of strength or weakness according as the population is large or small. A country is in this like a fortress; the garrison must be proportioned to the enceinte. A recent familiar instance is found in the American War of Secession. Had the South had a people as numerous as it was warlike, and a navy commensurate to its other resources as a sea power, the great extent of its sea-coast and its numerous inlets would have been elements of great strength. The people of the United States and the Government of that day justly prided themselves on the effectiveness of the blockade of the whole Southern coast. It was a great feat, a very great feat; but it would have been an impossible feat had the Southerners been more numerous, and a nation of seamen. What was there shown was not, as has been said, how such a blockade can be maintained, but that such a blockade is possible in the face of a population not only unused to the sea, but also scanty in numbers. Those who recall how the blockade was maintained, and the class of ships that blockaded during great part of the war, know that the plan, correct under the circumstances, could not have been carried out in the face of a real navy. Scattered unsupported along the coast, the United States ships kept their places, singly or in small detachments, in face of an extensive network of inland water communications which favored secret concentration of the enemy. Behind the first line of water communications were long estuaries, and here and there strong fortresses, upon either of which the enemy's ships could always fall back to elude pursuit or to receive protection. Had there been a Southern navy to profit by such advantages, or by the scattered condition of the United States ships, the latter could not have been distributed as they were; and being forced to concentrate for mutual support, many small but useful approaches would have been left open to commerce. But as the Southern coast, from its extent and many inlets, might have been a source of strength, so, from those very characteristics, it became a fruitful source of injury. The great story of the opening of the Mississippi is but the most striking illustration of an action that was going on incessantly all over the South. At every breach of the sea frontier, war-ships were entering. The streams that had carried the wealth and supported the trade of the seceding States turned against them, and admitted their enemies to their hearts. Dismay, insecurity, paralysis, prevailed in regions that might, under happier auspices, have kept a nation alive through the most exhausting war. Never did sea power play a greater or a more decisive part than in the contest which determined that the course of the world's history would be modified by the existence of one great nation, instead of several rival States, in the North American continent. But while just pride is felt in the well earned glory of those days, and the greatness of the results due to naval preponderance is admitted, Americans who understand the facts should never fail to remind the over-confidence of their countrymen that the South not only had no navy, not only was not a seafaring people, but that also its population was not proportioned to the extent of the sea-coast which it had to defend.

IV. Number of Population. — After the consideration of the natural conditions of a country should follow an examination of the characteristics of its population as affecting the development of sea power; and first among these will be taken, because of its relations to the extent of the territory, which has just been discussed, the number of the people who live in it. It has been said that in respect of dimensions it is not merely the number of square miles, but the extent and character of the sea-coast that is to be considered with reference to sea power; and so, in point of population, it is not only the grand total, but the number following the sea, or at least readily available for employment on ship-board and for the creation of naval material, that must be counted.

For example, formerly and up to the end of the great wars following the French Revolution, the population of France was much greater than that of England; but in respect of sea power in general, peaceful commerce as well as military efficiency, France was much inferior to England. In the matter of military efficiency this fact is the more remarkable because at times, in point of military preparation at the outbreak of war, France had the advantage; but she was not able to keep it. Thus in 1778, when war broke out, France, through her maritime inscription, was able to man at once fifty ships-of-the-line. England, on the contrary, by reason of the dispersal over the globe of that very shipping on which her naval strength so securely rested, had much trouble in manning forty at home; but in 1782 she had one hundred and twenty in commission or ready for commission, while France had never been able to exceed seventy-one. Again, as late as 1840, when the two nations were on the verge of war in the Levant, a most accomplished French officer of the day, while extolling the high state of efficiency of the French fleet and the eminent qualities of its admiral, and expressing confidence in the results of an encounter with an equal enemy, goes on to say:“Behind the squadron of twenty-one ships-of-the-line which we could then assemble, there was no reserve; not another ship could have been commissioned within six months.”And this was due not only to lack of ships and of proper equipments, though both were wanting.“Our maritime inscription,”he continues,“was so exhausted by what we had done [in manning twenty-one ships], that the permanent levy established in all quarters did not supply reliefs for the men, who were already more than three years on cruise.”

A contrast such as this shows a difference in what is called staying power, or reserve force, which is even greater than appears on the surface; for a great shipping afloat necessarily employs, besides the crews, a large number of people engaged in the various handicrafts which facilitate the making and repairing of naval material, or following other callings more or less closely connected with the water and with craft of all kinds. Such kindred callings give an undoubted aptitude for the sea from the outset. There is an anecdote showing curious insight into this matter on the part of one of England's distinguished seamen, Sir Edward Pellew. When the war broke out in 1793, the usual scarceness of seamen was met. Eager to get to sea and unable to fill his complement otherwise than with landsmen, he instructed his officers to seek for Cornish miners; reasoning from the conditions and dangers of their calling, of which he had personal knowledge, that they would quickly fit into the demands of sea life. The result showed his sagacity, for, thus escaping an otherwise unavoidable delay, he was fortunate enough to capture the first frigate taken in the war in single combat; and what is especially instructive is, that although but a few weeks in commission, while his opponent had been over a year, the losses, heavy on both sides, were nearly equal.

It may be urged that such reserve strength has now nearly lost the importance it once had, because modern ships and weapons take so long to make, and because modern States aim at developing the whole power of their armed force, on the outbreak of war, with such rapidity as to strike a disabling blow before the enemy can organize an equal effort. To use a familiar phrase, there will not be time for the whole resistance of the national fabric to come into play; the blow will fall on the organized military fleet, and if that yield, the solidity of the rest of the structure will avail nothing. To a certain extent this is true; but then it has always been true, though to a less extent formerly than now. Granted the meeting of two fleets which represent practically the whole present strength of their two nations, if one of them be destroyed, while the other remains fit for action, there will be much less hope now than formerly that the vanquished can restore his navy for that war; and the result will be disastrous just in proportion to the dependence of the nation upon her sea power. A Trafalgar would have been a much more fatal blow to England than it was to France, had the English fleet then represented, as the allied fleet did, the bulk of the nation's power. Trafalgar in such a case would have been to England what Austerlitz was to Austria, and Jena to Prussia; an empire would have been laid prostrate by the destruction or disorganization of its military forces, which, it is said, were the favorite objective of Napoleon.

But does the consideration of such exceptional disasters in the past justify the putting a low value upon that reserve strength, based upon the number of inhabitants fitted for a certain kind of military life, which is here being considered? The blows just mentioned were dealt by men of exceptional genius, at the head of armed bodies of exceptional training, esprit-de-corps, and prestige, and were, besides, inflicted upon opponents more or less demoralized by conscious inferiority and previous defeat. Austerlitz had been closely preceded by Ulm, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms without a battle; and the history of the previous years had been one long record of Austrian reverse and French success. Trafalgar followed closely upon a cruise, justly called a campaign, of almost constant failure; and farther back, but still recent, were the memories of St. Vincent for the Spaniards, and of the Nile for the French, in the allied fleet. Except the case of Jena, these crushing overthrows were not single disasters, but final blows; and in the Jena campaign there was a disparity in numbers, equipment, and general preparation for war, which makes it less applicable in considering what may result from a single victory.

England is at the present time the greatest maritime nation in the world; in steam and iron she has kept the superiority she had in the days of sail and wood. France and England are the two powers that have the largest military navies; and it is so far an open question which of the two is the more powerful, that they may be regarded as practically of equal strength in material for a sea war. In the case of a collision can there be assumed such a difference of personnel, or of preparation, as to make it probable that a decisive inequality will result from one battle or one campaign? If not, the reserve strength will begin to tell; organized reserve first, then reserve of seafaring population, reserve of mechanical skill, reserve of wealth. It seems to have been somewhat forgotten that England's leadership in mechanical arts gives her a reserve of mechanics, who can easily familiarize themselves with the appliances of modern iron-clads;and as her commerce and industries feel the burden of the war, the surplus of seamen and mechanics will go to the armed shipping.

The whole question of the value of a reserve, developed or undeveloped, amounts now to this: Have modern conditions of warfare made it probable that, of two nearly equal adversaries, one will be so prostrated in a single campaign that a decisive result will be reached in that time? Sea warfare has given no answer. The crushing successes of Prussia against Austria, and of Germany against France, appear to have been those of a stronger over a much weaker nation, whether the weakness were due to natural causes, or to official incompetency. How would a delay like that of Plevna have affected the fortune of war, had Turkey had any reserve of national power upon which to call?

If there be, as is everywhere admitted, a supreme factor in war, it behooves countries whose genius is essentially not military, whose people, like all free people, object to pay for large military establishments, to see to it that they are at least strong enough to gain the time necessary to turn the spirit and capacity of their subjects into the new activities which war calls for. If the existing force by land or sea is strong enough so to hold out, even though at a disadvantage, the country may rely upon its natural resources and strength coming into play for whatever they are worth, — its numbers, its wealth, its capacities of every kind. If, on the other hand, what force it has can be overthrown and crushed quickly, the most magnificent possibilities of natural power will not save it from humiliating conditions, nor, if its foe be wise, from guarantees which will postpone revenge to a distant future. The story is constantly repeated on the smaller fields of war:“If so-and-so can hold out a little longer, this can be saved or that can be done;”as in sickness it is often said:“If the patient can only hold out so long, the strength of his constitution may pull him through.”

England to some extent is now such a country. Holland was such a country; she would not pay, and if she escaped, it was but by the skin of her teeth.“Never in time of peace and from fear of a rupture,”wrote their great statesman, De Witt,“will they take resolutions strong enough to lead them to pecuniary sacrifices beforehand. The character of the Dutch is such that, unless danger stares them in the face, they are indisposed to lay out money for their own defence. I have to do with a people who, liberal to profusion where they ought to economize, are often sparing to avarice where they ought to spend.”

That our own country is open to the same reproach, is patent to all the world. The United States has not that shield of defensive power behind which time can be gained to develop its reserve of strength. As for a seafaring population adequate to her possible needs, where is it? Such a resource, proportionate to her coast-line and population, is to be found only in a national merchant shipping and its related industries, which at present scarcely exist. It will matter little whether the crews of such ships are native or foreign born, provided they are attached to the flag, and her power at sea is sufficient to enable the most of them to get back in case of war. When foreigners by thousands are admitted to the ballot, it is of little moment that they are given fighting-room on board ship.

Though the treatment of the subject has been somewhat discursive, it may be admitted that a great population following callings related to the sea is, now as formerly, a great element of sea power; that the United States is deficient in that element; and that its foundations can be laid only in a large commerce under her own flag.

V. National Character. — The effect of national character and aptitudes upon the development of sea power will next be considered.

If sea power be really based upon a peaceful and extensive commerce, aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of the nations that have at one time or another been great upon the sea. History almost without exception affirms that this is true. Save the Romans, there is no marked instance to the contrary.

All men seek gain and, more or less, love money; but the way in which gain is sought will have a marked effect upon the commercial fortunes and the history of the people inhabiting a country.

If history may be believed, the way in which the Spaniards and their kindred nation, the Portuguese, sought wealth, not only brought a blot upon the national character, but was also fatal to the growth of a healthy commerce; and so to the industries upon which commerce lives, and ultimately to that national wealth which was sought by mistaken paths. The desire for gain rose in them to fierce avarice; so they sought in the new-found worlds which gave such an impetus to the commercial and maritime development of the countries of Europe, not new fields of industry, not even the healthy excitement of exploration and adventure, but gold and silver. They had many great qualities; they were bold, enterprising, temperate, patient of suffering, enthusiastic, and gifted with intense national feeling. When to these qualities are added the advantages of Spain's position and well-situated ports, the fact that she was first to occupy large and rich portions of the new worlds and long remained without a competitor, and that for a hundred years after the discovery of America she was the leading State in Europe, she might have been expected to take the foremost place among the sea powers. Exactly the contrary was the result, as all know. Since the battle of Lepanto in 1571, though engaged in many wars, no sea victory of any consequence shines on the pages of Spanish history; and the decay of her commerce sufficiently accounts for the painful and sometimes ludicrous inaptness shown on the decks of her ships of war. Doubtless such a result is not to be attributed to one cause only. Doubtless the government of Spain was in many ways such as to cramp and blight a free and healthy development of private enterprise; but the character of a great people breaks through or shapes the character of its government, and it can hardly be doubted that had the bent of the people been toward trade, the action of government would have been drawn into the same current. The great field of the colonies, also, was remote from the centre of that despotism which blighted the growth of old Spain. As it was, thousands of Spaniards, of the working as well as the upper classes, left Spain; and the occupations in which they engaged abroad sent home little but specie, or merchandise of small bulk, requiring but small tonnage. The mother-country herself produced little but wool, fruit, and iron; her manufactures were naught; her industries suffered; her population steadily decreased. Both she and her colonies depended upon the Dutch for so many of the necessaries of life, that the products of their scanty industries could not suffice to pay for them.“So that Holland merchants,”writes a contemporary,“who carry money to most parts of the world to buy commodities, must out of this single country of Europe carry home money, which they receive in payment of their goods.”Thus their eagerly sought emblem of wealth passed quickly from their hands. It has already been pointed out how weak, from a military point of view, Spain was from this decay of her shipping. Her wealth being in small bulk on a few ships, following more or less regular routes, was easily seized by an enemy, and the sinews of war paralyzed; whereas the wealth of England and Holland, scattered over thousands of ships in all parts of the world, received many bitter blows in many exhausting wars, without checking a growth which, though painful, was steady. The fortunes of Portugal, united to Spain during a most critical period of her history, followed the same downward path:although foremost in the beginning of the race for development by sea, she fell utterly behind.“The mines of Brazil were the ruin of Portugal, as those of Mexico and Peru had been of Spain; all manufactures fell into insane contempt; ere long the English supplied the Portuguese not only with clothes, but with all merchandise, all commodities, even to salt-fish and grain. After their gold, the Portuguese abandoned their very soil; the vineyards of Oporto were finally bought by the English with Brazilian gold, which had only passed through Portugal to be spread throughout England.”We are assured that in fifty years, five hundred millions of dollars were extracted from“the mines of Brazil, and that at the end of the time Portugal had but twentyfive millions in specie,”— a striking example of the difference between real and fictitious wealth.

The English and Dutch were no less desirous of gain than the southern nations. Each in turn has been called“a nation of shopkeepers;”but the jeer, in so far as it is just, is to the credit of their wisdom and uprightness. They were no less bold, no less enterprising, no less patient. Indeed, they were more patient, in that they sought riches not by the sword but by labor, which is the reproach meant to be implied by the epithet; for thus they took the longest, instead of what seemed the shortest, road to wealth. But these two peoples, radically of the same race, had other qualities, no less important than those just named, which combined with their surroundings to favor their development by sea. They were by nature business-men, traders, producers, negotiators. Therefore both in their native country and abroad, whether settled in the ports of civilized nations, or of barbarous eastern rulers, or in colonies of their own foundation, they everywhere strove to draw out all the resources of the land, to develop and increase them. The quick instinct of the born trader, shopkeeper if you will, sought continually new articles to exchange; and this search, combined with the industrious character evolved through generations of labor, made them necessarily producers. At home they became great as manufacturers;abroad, where they controlled, the land grew richer continually, products multiplied, and the necessary exchange between home and the settlements called for more ships. Their shipping therefore increased with these demands of trade, and nations with less aptitude for maritime enterprise, even France herself, great as she has been, called for their products and for the service of their ships. Thus in many ways they advanced to power at sea. This natural tendency and growth were indeed modified and seriously checked at times by the interference of other governments, jealous of a prosperity which their own people could invade only by the aid of artificial support, — a support which will be considered under the head of governmental action as affecting sea power.

The tendency to trade, involving of necessity the production of something to trade with, is the national characteristic most important to the development of sea power. Granting it and a good seaboard, it is not likely that the dangers of the sea, or any aversion to it, will deter a people from seeking wealth by the paths of ocean commerce. Where wealth is sought by other means, it may be found; but it will not necessarily lead to sea power. Take France. France has a fine country, an industrious people, an admirable position. The French navy has known periods of great glory, and in its lowest estate has never dishonored the military reputation so dear to the nation. Yet as a maritime State, securely resting upon a broad basis of sea commerce, France, as compared with other historical sea-peoples, has never held more than a respectable position. The chief reason for this, so far as national character goes, is the way in which wealth is sought. As Spain and Portugal sought it by digging gold out of the ground, the temper of the French people leads them to seek it by thrift, economy, hoarding. It is said to be harder to keep than to make a fortune. Possibly; but the adventurous temper, which risks what it has to gain more, has much in common with the adventurous spirit that conquers worlds for commerce. The tendency to save and put aside, to venture timidly and on a small scale, may lead to a general diffusion of wealth on a like small scale, but not to the risks and development of external trade and shipping interests. To illustrate, — and the incident is given only for what it is worth, —a French officer, speaking to the author about the Panama Canal, said:“I have two shares in it. In France we don't do as you, where a few people take a great many shares each. With us a large number of people take one share or a very few. When these were in the market my wife said to me,‘You take two shares, one for you and one for me.'”As regards the stability of a man's personal fortunes this kind of prudence is doubtless wise; but when excessive prudence or financial timidity becomes a national trait, it must tend to hamper the expansion of commerce and of the nation's shipping. The same caution in money matters, appearing in another relation of life, has checked the production of children, and keeps the population of France nearly stationary.

The noble classes of Europe inherited from the Middle Ages a supercilious contempt for peaceful trade, which has exercised a modifying influence upon its growth, according to the national character of different countries. The pride of the Spaniards fell easily in with this spirit of contempt, and co-operated with that disastrous unwillingness to work and wait for wealth which turned them away from commerce. In France, the vanity which is conceded even by Frenchmen to be a national trait led in the same direction. The numbers and brilliancy of the nobility, and the consideration enjoyed by them, set a seal of inferiority upon an occupation which they despised. Rich merchants and manufacturers sighed for the honors of nobility, and upon obtaining them, abandoned their lucrative professions. Therefore, while the industry of the people and the fruitfulness of the soil saved commerce from total decay, it was pursued under a sense of humiliation which caused its best representatives to escape from it as soon as they could. Louis XIV., under the influence of Colbert, put forth an ordinance“authorizing all noblemen to take an interest in merchant ships, goods and merchandise, without being considered as having derogated from nobility, provided they did not sell at retail;”and the reason given for this action was,“that it imports the good of our subjects and our own satisfaction, to efface the relic of a public opinion, universally prevalent, that maritime commerce is incompatible with nobility.”But a prejudice involving conscious and open superiority is not readily effaced by ordinances, especially when vanity is a conspicuous trait in national character; and many years later Montesquieu taught that it is contrary to the spirit of monarchy that the nobility should engage in trade.

In Holland there was a nobility; but the State was republican in name, allowed large scope to personal freedom and enterprise, and the centres of power were in the great cities. The foundation of the national greatness was money — or rather wealth. Wealth, as a source of civic distinction, carried with it also power in the State; and with power there went social position and consideration. In England the same result obtained. The nobility were proud; but in a representative government the power of wealth could be neither put down nor overshadowed. It was patent to the eyes of all; it was honored by all; and in England, as well as Holland, the occupations which were the source of wealth shared in the honor given to wealth itself. Thus, in all the countries named, social sentiment, the outcome of national characteristics, had a marked influence upon the national attitude toward trade.

In yet another way does the national genius affect the growth of sea power in its broadest sense; and that is in so far as it possesses the capacity for planting healthy colonies. Of colonization, as of all other growths, it is true that it is most healthy when it is most natural. Therefore colonies that spring from the felt wants and natural impulses of a whole people will have the most solid foundations; and their subsequent growth will be surest when they are least trammelled from home, if the people have the genius for independent action. Men of the past three centuries have keenly felt the value to the mother-country of colonies as outlets for the home products and as a nursery for commerce and shipping; but efforts at colonization have not had the same general origin, nor have different systems all had the same success. The efforts of statesmen, however far-seeing and careful, have not been able to supply the lack of strong natural impulse; nor can the most minute regulation from home produce as good results as a happier neglect, when the germ of self-development is found in the national character. There has been no greater display of wisdom in the national administration of successful colonies than in that of unsuccessful. Perhaps there has been even less. If elaborate system and supervision, careful adaptation of means to ends, diligent nursing, could avail for colonial growth, the genius of England has less of this systematizing faculty than the genius of France; but England, not France, has been the great colonizer of the world. Successful colonization, with its consequent effect upon commerce and sea power, depends essentially upon national character; because colonies grow best when they grow of themselves, naturally. The character of the colonist, not the care of the home government, is the principle of the colony's growth.

This truth stands out the clearer because the general attitude of all the home governments toward their colonies was entirely selfish. However founded, as soon as it was recognized to be of consequence, the colony became to the home country a cow to be milked; to be cared for, of course, but chiefly as a piece of property valued for the returns it gave. Legislation was directed toward a monopoly of its external trade; the places in its government afforded posts of value for occupants from the mother-country; and the colony was looked upon, as the sea still so often is, as a fit place for those who were ungovernable or useless at home. The military administration, however, so long as it remains a colony, is the proper and necessary attribute of the home government.

The fact of England's unique and wonderful success as a great colonizing nation is too evident to be dwelt upon; and the reason for it appears to lie chiefly in two traits of the national character. The English colonist naturally and readily settles down in his new country, identifies his interest with it, and though keeping an affectionate remembrance of the home from which he came, has no restless eagerness to return. In the second place, the Englishman at once and instinctively seeks to develop the resources of the new country in the broadest sense. In the former particular he differs from the French, who were ever longingly looking back to the delights of their pleasant land; in the latter, from the Spaniards, whose range of interest and ambition was too narrow for the full evolution of the possibilities of a new country.

The character and the necessities of the Dutch led them naturally to plant colonies; and by the year 1650 they had in the East Indies, in Africa, and in America a large number, only to name which would be tedious. They were then far ahead of England in this matter. But though the origin of these colonies, purely commercial in its character, was natural, there seems to have been lacking to them a principle of growth.“In planting them they never sought an extension of empire, but merely an acquisition of trade and commerce. They attempted conquest only when forced by the pressure of circumstances. Generally they were content to trade under the protection of the sovereign of the country.”This placid satisfaction with gain alone, unaccompanied by political ambition, tended, like the despotism of France and Spain, to keep the colonies mere commercial dependencies upon the mother-country, and so killed the natural principle of growth.

Before quitting this head of the inquiry, it is well to ask how far the national character of Americans is fitted to develop a great sea power, should other circumstances become favorable.

It seems scarcely necessary, however, to do more than appeal to a not very distant past to prove that, if legislative hindrances be removed, and more remunerative fields of enterprise filled up, the sea power will not long delay its appearance. The instinct for commerce, bold enterprise in the pursuit of gain, and a keen scent for the trails that lead to it, all exist; and if there be in the future any fields calling for colonization, it cannot be doubted that Americans will carry to them all their inherited aptitude for self-government and independent growth.

VI. Character of the Government. — In discussing the effects upon the development of a nation's sea power exerted by its government and institutions, it will be necessary to avoid a tendency to over-philosophizing, to confine attention to obvious and immediate causes and their plain results, without prying too far beneath the surface for remote and ultimate influences.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that particular forms of government with their accompanying institutions, and the character of rulers at one time or another, have exercised a very marked influence upon the development of sea power. The various traits of a country and its people which have so far been considered constitute the natural characteristics with which a nation, like a man, begins its career; the conduct of the government in turn corresponds to the exercise of the intelligent will-power, which, according as it is wise, energetic and persevering, or the reverse, causes success or failure in a man's life or a nation's history.

It would seem probable that a government in full accord with the natural bias of its people would most successfully advance its growth in every respect; and, in the matter of sea power, the most brilliant successes have followed where there has been intelligent direction by a government fully imbued with the spirit of the people and conscious of its true general bent. Such a government is most certainly secured when the will of the people, or of their best natural exponents, has some large share in making it; but such free governments have sometimes fallen short, while on the other hand despotic power, wielded with judgment and consistency, has created at times a great sea commerce and a brilliant navy with greater directness than can be reached by the slower processes of a free people. The difficulty in the latter case is to insure perseverance after the death of a particular despot.

England having undoubtedly reached the greatest height of sea power of any modern nation, the action of her government first claims attention. In general direction this action has been consistent, though often far from praiseworthy. It has aimed steadily at the control of the sea. One of its most arrogant expressions dates back as far as the reign of James I., when she had scarce any possessions outside her own islands; before Virginia or Massachusetts was settled. Here is Richelieu's account of it: -

“The Duke of Sully, minister of Henry IV. [one of the most chivalrous princes that ever lived], having embarked at Calais in a French ship wearing the French flag at the main, was no sooner in the Channel than, meeting an English despatch-boat which was there to receive him, the commander of the latter ordered the French ship to lower her flag. The Duke, considering that his quality freed him from such an affront, boldly refused; but this refusal was followed by three cannon-shot, which, piercing his ship, pierced the heart likewise of all good Frenchmen. Might forced him to yield what right forbade, and for all the complaints he made he could get no better reply from the English captain than this:‘That just as his duty obliged him to honor the ambassador's rank, it also obliged him to exact the honor due to the flag of his master as sovereign of the sea.’If the words of King James himself were more polite, they nevertheless had no other effect than to compel the Duke to take counsel of his prudence, feigning to be satisfied, while his wound was all the time smarting and incurable. Henry the Great had to practise moderation on this occasion; but with the resolve another time to sustain the rights of his crown by the force that, with the aid of time, he should be able to put upon the sea.”

This act of unpardonable insolence, according to modern ideas, was not so much out of accord with the spirit of nations in that day. It is chiefly noteworthy as the most striking, as well as one of the earliest indications of the purpose of England to assert herself at all risks upon the sea; and the insult was offered under one of her most timid kings to an ambassador immediately representing the bravest and ablest of French sovereigns. This empty honor of the flag, a claim insignificant except as the outward manifestation of the purpose of a government, was as rigidly exacted under Cromwell as under the kings. It was one of the conditions of peace yielded by the Dutch after their disastrous war of 1654. Cromwell, a despot in everything but name, was keenly alive to all that concerned England's honor and strength, and did not stop at barren salutes to promote them. Hardly yet possessed of power, the English navy sprang rapidly into a new life and vigor under his stern rule. England's rights, or reparation for her wrongs, were demanded by her fleets throughout the world, — in the Baltic, in the Mediterranean, against the Barbary States, in the West Indies; and under him the conquest of Jamaica began that extension of her empire, by force of arms, which has gone on to our own days. Nor were equally strong peaceful measures for the growth of English trade and shipping forgotten. Cromwell's celebrated Navigation Act declared that all imports into England or her colonies must be conveyed exclusively in vessels belonging to England herself, or to the country in which the products carried were grown or manufactured. This decree, aimed specially at the Dutch, the common carriers of Europe, was resented throughout the commercial world; but the benefit to England, in those days of national strife and animosity, was so apparent that it lasted long under the monarchy. A century and a quarter later we find Nelson, before his famous career had begun, showing his zeal for the welfare of England's shipping by enforcing this same act in the West Indies against American merchant-ships. When Cromwell was dead, and Charles II. sat on the throne of his father, this king, false to the English people, was yet true to England's greatness and to the traditional policy of her government on the sea. In his treacherous intrigues with Louis XIV., by which he aimed to make himself independent of Parliament and people, he wrote to Louis:“There are two impediments to a perfect union. The first is the great care France is now taking to create a commerce and to be an imposing maritime power. This is so great a cause of suspicion with us, who can possess importance only by our commerce and our naval force, that every step which France takes in this direction will perpetuate the jealousy between the two nations.”In the midst of the negotiations which preceded the detestable attack of the two kings upon the Dutch republic, a warm dispute arose as to who should command the united fleets of France and England. Charles was inflexible on this point.“It is the custom of the English,”said he,“to command at sea;”and he told the French ambassador plainly that, were he to yield, his subjects would not obey him. In the projected partition of the United Provinces he reserved for England the maritime plunder in positions that controlled the mouths of the rivers Scheldt and Meuse. The navy under Charles preserved for some time the spirit and discipline impressed on it by Cromwell's iron rule; though later it shared in the general decay of morale which marked this evil reign. Monk, having by a great strategic blunder sent off a fourth of his fleet, found himself in 1666 in presence of a greatly superior Dutch force. Disregarding the odds, he attacked without hesitation, and for three days maintained the fight with honor, though with loss. Such conduct is not war; but in the single eye that looked to England's naval prestige and dictated his action, common as it was to England's people as well as to her government, has lain the secret of final success following many blunders through the centuries. Charles's successor, James II., was himself a seaman, and had commanded in two great sea-fights. When William III. came to the throne, the governments of England and Holland were under one hand,and continued united in one purpose against Louis XIV. until the Peace of Utrecht in 1713; that is, for a quarter of a century. The English government more and more steadily, and with conscious purpose, pushed on the extension of her sea dominion and fostered the growth of her sea power. While as an open enemy she struck at France upon the sea, so as an artful friend, many at least believed, she sapped the power of Holland afloat. The treaty between the two countries provided that of the sea forces Holland should furnish three eighths, England five eighths, or nearly double. Such a provision, coupled with a further one which made Holland keep up an army of 102,000 against England's 40,000, virtually threw the land war on one and the sea war on the other. The tendency, whether designed or not, is evident; and at the peace, while Holland received compensation by land, England obtained, besides commercial privileges in France, Spain, and the Spanish West Indies, the important maritime concessions of Gibraltar and Port Mahon in the Mediterranean; of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson's Bay in North America. The naval power of France and Spain had disappeared; that of Holland thenceforth steadily declined. Posted thus in America, the West Indies, and the Mediterranean, the English government thenceforth moved firmly forward on the path which made of the English kingdom the British Empire. For the twenty-five years following the Peace of Utrecht, peace was the chief aim of the ministers who directed the policy of the two great seaboard nations, France and England; but amid all the fluctuations of continental politics in a most unsettled period, abounding in petty wars and shifty treaties, the eye of England was steadily fixed on the maintenance of her sea power. In the Baltic, her fleets checked the attempts of Peter the Great upon Sweden, and so maintained a balance of power in that sea, from which she drew not only a great trade but the chief part of her naval stores, and which the Czar aimed to make a Russian lake. Denmark endeavored to establish an East India company aided by foreign capital; England and Holland not only forbade their subjects to join it, but threatened Denmark, and thus stopped an enterprise they thought adverse to their sea interests. In the Netherlands, which by the Utrecht Treaty had passed to Austria, a similar East India company, having Ostend for its port, was formed, with the emperor's sanction. This step, meant to restore to the Low Countries the trade lost to them through their natural outlet of the Scheldt, was opposed by the sea powers England and Holland; and their greediness for the monopoly of trade, helped in this instance by France, stifled this company also after a few years of struggling life. In the Mediterranean, the Utrecht settlement was disturbed by the emperor of Austria, England's natural ally in the then existing state of European politics. Backed by England, he, having already Naples, claimed also Sicily in exchange for Sardinia. Spain resisted; and her navy, just beginning to revive under a vigorous minister, Alberoni, was crushed and annihilated by the English fleet off Cape Passaro in 1718; while the following year a French army, at the bidding of England, crossed the Pyrenees and completed the work by destroying the Spanish dockyards. Thus England, in addition to Gibraltar and Mahon in her own hands, saw Naples and Sicily in those of a friend, while an enemy was struck down. In Spanish America, the limited privileges to English trade, wrung from the necessities of Spain, were abused by an extensive and scarcely disguised smuggling system; and when the exasperated Spanish government gave way to excesses in the mode of suppression, both the minister who counselled peace and the opposition which urged war defended their opinions by alleging the effects of either upon England's sea power and honor. While England's policy thus steadily aimed at widening and strengthening the bases of her sway upon the ocean, the other governments of Europe seemed blind to the dangers to be feared from her sea growth. The miseries resulting from the overweening power of Spain in days long gone by seemed to be forgotten; forgotten also the more recent lesson of the bloody and costly wars provoked by the ambition and exaggerated power of Louis XIV. Under the eyes of the statesmen of Europe there was steadily and visibly being built up a third overwhelming power, destined to be used as selfishly, as aggressively, though not as cruelly, and much more successfully than any that had preceded it. This was the power of the sea, whose workings, because more silent than the clash of arms, are less often noted, though lying clearly enough on the surface. It can scarcely be denied that England's uncontrolled dominion of the seas, during almost the whole period chosen for our subject, was by long odds the chief among the military factors that determined the final issue. (2)So far, however, was this influence from being foreseen after Utrecht, that France for twelve years, moved by personal exigencies of her rulers, sided with England against Spain; and when Fleuri came into power in 1726, though this policy was reversed, the navy of France received no attention, and the only blow at England was the establishment of a Bourbon prince, a natural enemy to her, upon the throne of the two Sicilies in 1736. When war broke out with Spain in 1739, the navy of England was in numbers more than equal to the combined navies of Spain and France; and during the quarter of a century of nearly uninterrupted war that followed, this numerical disproportion increased. In these wars England, at first instinctively, afterward with conscious purpose under a government that recognized her opportunity and the possibilities of her great sea power, rapidly built up that mighty colonial empire whose foundations were already securely laid in the characteristics of her colonists and the strength of her fleets. In strictly European affairs her wealth, the outcome of her sea power, made her play a conspicuous part during the same period. The system of subsidies, which began half a century before in the wars of Marlborough and received its most extensive development half a century later in the Napoleonic wars, maintained the efforts of her allies, which would have been crippled, if not paralyzed, without them. Who can deny that the government which with one hand strengthened its fainting allies on the continent with the life-blood of money, and with the other drove its own enemies off the sea and out of their chief possessions, Canada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Havana, Manila, gave to its country the foremost role in European politics; and who can fail to see that the power which dwelt in that government, with a land narrow in extent and poor in resources, sprang directly from the sea? The policy in which the English government carried on the war is shown by a speech of Pitt, the master-spirit during its course, though he lost office before bringing it to an end. Condemning the Peace of 1763, made by his political opponent, he said:“France is chiefly, if not exclusively, formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to us, above all, through the injury to her which results from it. You have left to France the possibility of reviving her navy.”Yet England's gains were enormous;her rule in India was assured, and all North America east of the Mississippi in her hands. By this time the onward path of her government was clearly marked out, had assumed the force of a tradition, and was consistently followed. The war of the American Revolution was, it is true, a great mistake, looked at from the point of view of sea power; but the government was led into it insensibly by a series of natural blunders. Putting aside political and constitutional considerations, and looking at the question as purely military or naval, the case was this: The American colonies were large and growing communities at a great distance from England. So long as they remained attached to the mother-country, as they then were enthusiastically, they formed a solid base for her sea power in that part of the world; but their extent and population were too great, when coupled with the distance from England, to afford any hope of holding them by force, if any powerful nations were willing to help them. This“if,”however, involved a notorious probability; the humiliation of France and Spain was so bitter and so recent that they were sure to seek revenge, and it was well known that France in particular had been carefully and rapidly building up her navy. Had the colonies been thirteen islands, the sea power of England would quickly have settled the question; but instead of such a physical barrier they were separated only by local jealousies which a common danger sufficiently overcame. To enter deliberately on such a contest, to try to hold by force so extensive a territory, with a large hostile population, so far from home, was to renew the Seven Years’War with France and Spain, and with the Americans, against, instead of for, England. The Seven Years’War had been so heavy a burden that a wise government would have known that the added weight could not be borne, and have seen it was necessary to conciliate the colonists. The government of the day was not wise, and a large element of England's sea power was sacrificed; but by mistake, not wilfully; through arrogance, not through weakness.

This steady keeping to a general line of policy was doubtless made specially easy for successive English governments by the clear indications of the country's conditions. Singleness of purpose was to some extent imposed. The firm maintenance of her sea power, the haughty determination to make it felt, the wise state of preparation in which its military element was kept, were yet more due to that feature of her political institutions which practically gave the government, during the period in question, into the hands of a class, — a landed aristocracy. Such a class, whatever its defects otherwise, readily takes up and carries on a sound political tradition, is naturally proud of its country's glory, and comparatively insensible to the sufferings of the community by which that glory is maintained. It readily lays on the pecuniary burden necessary for preparation and for endurance of war. Being as a body rich, it feels those burdens less. Not being commercial, the sources of its own wealth are not so immediately endangered, and it does not share that political timidity which characterizes those whose property is exposed and business threatened, — the proverbial timidity of capital. Yet in England this class was not insensible to anything that touched her trade for good or ill. Both houses of Parliament vied in careful watchfulness over its extension and protection, and to the frequency of their inquiries a naval historian attributes the increased efficiency of the executive power in its management of the navy. Such a class also naturally imbibes and keeps up a spirit of military honor, which is of the first importance in ages when military institutions have not yet provided the sufficient substitute in what is called esprit-de-corps. But although full of class feeling and class prejudice, which made themselves felt in the navy as well as elsewhere, their practical sense left open the way of promotion to its highest honors to the more humbly born; and every age saw admirals who had sprung from the lowest of the people. In this the temper of the English upper class differed markedly from that of the French. As late as 1789, at the outbreak of the Revolution, the French Navy List still bore the name of an official whose duty was to verify the proofs of noble birth on the part of those intending to enter the naval school.

Since 1815, and especially in our own day, the government of England has passed very much more into the hands of the people at large. Whether her sea power will suffer therefrom remains to be seen. Its broad basis still remains in a great trade, large mechanical industries, and an extensive colonial system. Whether a democratic government will have the foresight, the keen sensitiveness to national position and credit, the willingness to insure its prosperity by adequate outpouring of money in times of peace, all which are necessary for military preparation, is yet an open question. Popular governments are not generally favorable to military expenditure, however necessary, and there are signs that England tends to drop behind.

It has already been seen that the Dutch Republic, even more than the English nation, drew its prosperity and its very life from the sea. The character and policy of its government were far less favorable to a consistent support of sea power. Composed of seven provinces, with the political name of the United Provinces, the actual distribution of power may be roughly described to Americans as an exaggerated example of States Rights. Each of the maritime provinces had its own fleet and its own admiralty, with consequent jealousies. This disorganizing tendency was partly counteracted by the great preponderance of the Province of Holland, which alone contributed five sixths of the fleet and fifty-eight per cent of the taxes, and consequently had a proportionate share in directing the national policy. Although intensely patriotic, and capable of making the last sacrifices for freedom, the commercial spirit of the people penetrated the government, which indeed might be called a commercial aristocracy, and made it averse to war, and to the expenditures which are necessary in preparing for war. As has before been said, it was not until danger stared them in the face that the burgomasters were willing to pay for their defences. While the republican government lasted, however, this economy was practised least of all upon the fleet; and until the death of John De Witt, in 1672, and the peace with England in 1674, the Dutch navy was in point of numbers and equipment able to make a fair show against the combined navies of England and France. Its efficiency at this time undoubtedly saved the country from the destruction planned by the two kings. With De Witt's death the republic passed away, and was followed by the practically monarchical government of William of Orange. The life-long policy of this prince, then only eighteen, was resistance to Louis XIV. and to the extension of French power. This resistance took shape upon the land rather than the sea, — a tendency promoted by England's withdrawal from the war. As early as 1676, Admiral De Ruyter found the force given him unequal to cope with the French alone. With the eyes of the government fixed on the land frontier, the navy rapidly declined. In 1688, when William of Orange needed a fleet to convoy him to England, the burgomasters of Amsterdam objected that the navy was incalculably decreased in strength, as well as deprived of its ablest commanders. When king of England, William still kept his position as stadtholder, and with it his general European policy, he found in England the sea power he needed, and used the resources of Holland for the land war. This Dutch prince consented that in the allied fleets, in councils of war, the Dutch admirals should sit below the junior English captain; and Dutch interests at sea were sacrificed as readily as Dutch pride to the demands of England. When William died, his policy was still followed by the government which succeeded him. Its aims were wholly centred upon the land, and at the Peace of Utrecht, which closed a series of wars extending over forty years, Holland, having established no sea claim, gained nothing in the way of sea resources, of colonial extension, or of commerce.

Of the last of these wars an English historian says:“The economy of the Dutch greatly hurt their reputation and their trade. Their men-of-war in the Mediterranean were always victualled short, and their convoys were so weak and ill-provided that for one ship that we lost, they lost five, which begat a general notion that we were the safer carriers, which certainly had a good effect. Hence it was that our trade rather increased than diminished in this war.”

From that time Holland ceased to have a great sea power, and rapidly lost the leading position among the nations which that power had built up. It is only just to say that no policy could have saved from decline this small, though determined, nation, in face of the persistent enmity of Louis XIV. The friendship of France, insuring peace on her landward frontier, would have enabled her, at least for a longer time, to dispute with England the dominion of the seas; and as allies the navies of the two continental States might have checked the growth of the enormous sea power which has just been considered. Sea peace between England and Holland was only possible by the virtual subjection of one or the other, for both aimed at the same object. Between France and Holland it was otherwise; and the fall of Holland proceeded, not necessarily from her inferior size and numbers, but from faulty policy on the part of the two governments. It does not concern us to decide which was the more to blame.

France, admirably situated for the possession of sea power, received a definite policy for the guidance of her government from two great rulers, Henry IV. and Richelieu. With certain well-defined projects of extension eastward upon the land were combined a steady resistance to the House of Austria, which then ruled in both Austria and Spain, and an equal purpose of resistance to England upon the sea. To further this latter end, as well as for other reasons, Holland was to be courted as an ally. Commerce and fisheries as the basis of sea power were to be encouraged, and a military navy was to be built up. Richelieu left what he called his political will, in which he pointed out the opportunities of France for achieving sea power, based upon her position and resources; and French writers consider him the virtual founder of the navy, not merely because he equipped ships, but from the breadth of his views and his measures to insure sound institutions and steady growth. After his death, Mazarin inherited his views and general policy, but not his lofty and martial spirit, and during his rule the newly formed navy disappeared. When Louis XIV. took the government into his own hands, in 1661, there were but thirty ships of war, of which only three had as many as sixty guns. Then began a most astonishing manifestation of the work which can be done by absolute government ably and systematically wielded. That part of the administration which dealt with trade, manufactures, shipping, and colonies, was given to a man of great practical genius, Colbert, who had served with Richelieu and had drunk in fully his ideas and policy. He pursued his aims in a spirit thoroughly French. Everything was to be organized, the spring of everything was in the minister's cabinet.“To organize producers and merchants as a powerful army, subjected to an active and intelligent guidance, so as to secure an industrial victory for France by order and unity of efforts, and to obtain the best products by imposing on all workmen the processes recognized as best by competent men. … To organize seamen and distant commerce in large bodies like the manufactures and internal commerce, and to give as a support to the commercial power of France a navy established on a firm basis and of dimensions hitherto unknown,”—such, we are told, were the aims of Colbert as regards two of the three links in the chain of sea power. For the third, the colonies at the far end of the line, the same governmental direction and organization were evidently purposed; for the government began by buying back Canada, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the French West India Islands from the parties who then owned them. Here, then, is seen pure, absolute, uncontrolled power gathering up into its hands all the reins for the guidance of a nation's course, and proposing so to direct it as to make, among other things, a great sea power.

To enter into the details of Colbert's action is beyond our purpose. It is enough to note the chief part played by the government in building up the sea power of the State, and that this very great man looked not to any one of the bases on which it rests to the exclusion of the others, but embraced them all in his wise and provident administration. Agriculture, which increases the products of the earth, and manufactures, which multiply the products of man's industry;internal trade routes and regulations, by which the exchange of products from the interior to the exterior is made easier; shipping and customs regulations tending to throw the carrying-trade into French hands, and so to encourage the building of French shipping, by which the home and colonial products should be carried back and forth; colonial administration and development, by which a far-off market might be continually growing up to be monopolized by the home trade; treaties with foreign States favoring French trade, and imposts on foreign ships and products tending to break down that of rival nations, — all these means, embracing countless details, were employed to build up for France (1) Production; (2) Shipping; (3) Colonies and Markets, — in a word, sea power. The study of such a work is simpler and easier when thus done by one man, sketched out by a kind of logical process, than when slowly wrought by conflicting interests in a more complex government. In the few years of Colbert's administration is seen the whole theory of sea power put into practice in the systematic, centralizing French way; while the illustration of the same theory in English and Dutch history is spread over generations. Such growth, however, was forced, and depended upon the endurance of the absolute power which watched over it; and as Colbert was not king, his control lasted only till he lost the king's favor. It is, however, most interesting to note the results of his labors in the proper field for governmental action — in the navy. It has been said that in 1661, when he took office, there were but thirty armed ships, of which three only had over sixty guns. In 1666 there were seventy, of which fifty were ships of the line and twenty were fire-ships; in 1671, from seventy the number had increased to one hundred and ninety-six. In 1683 there were one hundred and seven ships of from twenty-four to one hundred and twenty guns, twelve of which carried over seventy-six guns, besides many smaller vessels. The order and system introduced into the dock-yards made them vastly more efficient than the English. An English captain,a prisoner in France while the effect of Colbert's work still lasted in the hands of his son, writes: -

“When I was first brought prisoner thither, I lay four months in a hospital at Brest for care of my wounds. While there I was astonished at the expedition used in manning and fitting out their ships, which till then I thought could be done nowhere sooner than in England, where we have ten times the shipping, and consequently ten times the seamen, they have in France; but there I saw twenty sail of ships, of about sixty guns each, got ready in twenty days’time; they were brought in and the men were discharged; and upon an order from Paris they were careened, keeled up, rigged, victualled, manned, and out again in the said time with the greatest ease imaginable. I likewise saw a ship of one hundred guns that had all her guns taken out in four or five hours’time; which I never saw done in England in twenty-four hours, and this with the greatest ease and less hazard than at home. This I saw under my hospital window.”

A French naval historian cites certain performances which are simply incredible, such as that the keel of a galley was laid at four o'clock and that at nine she left port, fully armed. These traditions may be accepted as pointing, with the more serious statements of the English officer, to a remarkable degree of system and order, and abundant facilities for work.

Yet all this wonderful growth, forced by the action of the government, withered away like Jonah's gourd when the government's favor was withdrawn. Time was not allowed for its roots to strike down deep into the life of the nation. Colbert's work was in the direct line of Richelieu's policy, and for a time it seemed there would continue the course of action which would make France great upon the sea as well as predominant upon the land. For reasons which it is not yet necessary to give, Louis came to have feelings of bitter enmity against Holland;and as these feelings were shared by Charles II., the two kings determined on the destruction of the United Provinces. This war, which broke out in 1672, though more contrary to natural feeling on the part of England, was less of a political mistake for her than for France, and especially as regards sea power. France was helping to destroy a probable, and certainly an indispensable, ally; England was assisting in the ruin of her greatest rival on the sea, at this time, indeed, still her commercial superior. France, staggering under debt and utter confusion in her finances when Louis mounted the throne, was just seeing her way clear in 1672, under Colbert's reforms and their happy results. The war, lasting six years, undid the greater part of his work. The agricultural classes, manufactures, commerce, and the colonies, all were smitten by it; the establishments of Colbert languished, and the order he had established in the finances was overthrown. Thus the action of Louis — and he alone was the directing government of France — struck at the roots of her sea power, and alienated her best sea ally. The territory and the military power of France were increased, but the springs of commerce and of a peaceful shipping had been exhausted in the process; and although the military navy was for some years kept up with splendor and efficiency, it soon began to dwindle, and by the end of the reign had practically disappeared. The same false policy, as regards the sea, marked the rest of this reign of fifty-four years. Louis steadily turned his back upon the sea interests of France, except the fighting-ships, and either could not or would not see that the latter were of little use and uncertain life, if the peaceful shipping and the industries, by which they were supported, perished. His policy, aiming at supreme power in Europe by military strength and territorial extension, forced England and Holland into an alliance, which, as has before been said, directly drove France off the sea, and indirectly swamped Holland's power thereon. Colbert's navy perished, and for the last ten years of Louis’life no great French fleet put to sea, though there was constant war. The simplicity of form in an absolute monarchy thus brought out strongly how great the influence of government can be upon both the growth and the decay of sea power.

The latter part of Louis’life thus witnessed that power failing by the weakening of its foundations, of commerce, and of the wealth that commerce brings. The government that followed, likewise absolute, of set purpose and at the demand of England, gave up all pretence of maintaining an effective navy. The reason for this was that the new king was a minor; and the regent, being bitterly at enmity with the king of Spain, to injure him and preserve his own power, entered into alliance with England. He aided her to establish Austria, the hereditary enemy of France, in Naples and Sicily to the detriment of Spain, and in union with her destroyed the Spanish navy and dock-yards. Here again is found a personal ruler disregarding the sea interests of France, ruining a natural ally, and directly aiding, as Louis XIV. indirectly and unintentionally aided, the growth of a mistress of the seas. This transient phase of policy passed away with the death of the regent in 1726; but from that time until 1760 the government of France continued to disregard her maritime interests. It is said, indeed, that owing to some wise modifications of her fiscal regulations, mainly in the direction of free trade (and due to Law, a minister of Scotch birth), commerce with the East and West Indies wonderfully increased, and that the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique became very rich and thriving; but both commerce and colonies lay at the mercy of England when war came, for the navy fell into decay. In 1756, when things were no longer at their worst, France had but forty-five ships-of-the-line, England nearly one hundred and thirty; and when the forty-five were to be armed and equipped, there was found to be neither material nor rigging nor supplies; not even enough artillery. Nor was this all.

“Lack of system in the government,”says a French writer,“brought about indifference, and opened the door to disorder and lack of discipline. Never had unjust promotions been so frequent; so also never had more universal discontent been seen. Money and intrigue took the place of all else, and brought in their train commands and power. Nobles and upstarts, with influence at the capital and self-sufficiency in the seaports, thought themselves dispensed with merit. Waste of the revenues of the State and of the dock-yards knew no bounds. Honor and modesty were turned into ridicule. As if the evils were not thus great enough, the ministry took pains to efface the heroic traditions of the past which had escaped the general wreck. To the energetic fights of the great reign succeeded, by order of the court,‘affairs of circumspection.’To preserve to the wasted material a few armed ships, increased opportunity was given to the enemy. From this unhappy principle we were bound to a defensive as advantageous to the enemy as it was foreign to the genius of our people. This circumspection before the enemy, laid down for us by orders, betrayed in the long run the national temper; and the abuse of the system led to acts of indiscipline and defection under fire, of which a single instance would vainly be sought in the previous century.”

A false policy of continental extension swallowed up the resources of the country, and was doubly injurious because, by leaving defenceless its colonies and commerce, it exposed the greatest source of wealth to be cut off, as in fact happened. The small squadrons that got to sea were destroyed by vastly superior force; the merchant shipping was swept away, and the colonies, Canada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, India, fell into England's hands. If it did not take too much space, interesting extracts might be made, showing the woful misery of France, the country that had abandoned the sea, and the growing wealth of England amid all her sacrifices and exertions. A contemporary writer has thus expressed his view of the policy of France at this period: -

“France, by engaging so heartily as she has done in the German war, has drawn away so much of her attention and her revenue from her navy that it enabled us to give such a blow to her maritime strength as possibly she may never be able to recover. Her engagement in the German war has likewise drawn her from the defence of her colonies, by which means we have conquered some of the most considerable she possessed. It has withdrawn her from the protection of her trade, by which it is entirely destroyed, while that of England has never, in the profoundest peace, been in so flourishing a condition. So that, by embarking in this German war, France has suffered herself to be undone, so far as regards her particular and immediate quarrel with England.”

In the Seven Years’War France lost thirty-seven ships-of-the-line and fifty-six frigates, —a force three times as numerous as the whole navy of the United States at any time in the days of sailing-ships.“For the first time since the Middle Ages,”says a French historian, speaking of the same war,“England had conquered France single-handed, almost without allies, France having powerful auxiliaries. She had conquered solely by the superiority of her government.”Yes; but it was by the superiority of her government using the tremendous weapon of her sea power, — the reward of a consistent policy perseveringly directed to one aim.

The profound humiliation of France, which reached its depths between 1760 and 1763, at which latter date she made peace, has an instructive lesson for the United States in this our period of commercial and naval decadence. We have been spared her humiliation; let us hope to profit by her subsequent example. Between the same years (1760 and 1763) the French people rose, as afterward in 1793, and declared they would have a navy.“Popular feeling, skilfully directed by the government, took up the cry from one end of France to the other,‘The navy must be restored.’Gifts of ships were made by cities, by corporations, and by private subscriptions. A prodigious activity sprang up in the lately silent ports; everywhere ships were building or repairing.”This activity was sustained; the arsenals were replenished, the material of every kind was put on a satisfactory footing, the artillery reorganized, and ten thousand trained gunners drilled and maintained.

The tone and action of the naval officers of the day instantly felt the popular impulse, for which indeed some loftier spirits among them had been not only waiting but working. At no time was greater mental and professional activity found among French naval officers than just then, when their ships had been suffered to rot away by governmental inaction. Thus a prominent French officer of our own day writes: -

“The sad condition of the navy in the reign of Louis XV., by closing to officers the brilliant career of bold enterprises and successful battles, forced them to fall back upon themselves. They drew from study the knowledge they were to put to the proof some years later, thus putting into practice that fine saying of Montesquieu,‘Adversity is our mother, Prosperity our step-mother.’… By the year 1769 was seen in all its splendor that brilliant galaxy of officers whose activity stretched to the ends of the earth, and who embraced in their works and in their investigations all the branches of human knowledge. The Académie de Marine, founded in 1752, was reorganized.”

The Académie's first director, a post-captain named Bigot de Morogues, wrote an elaborate treatise on naval tactics, the first original work on the subject since Paul Hoste's, which it was designed to supersede. Morogues must have been studying and formulating his problems in tactics in days when France had no fleet, and was unable so much as to raise her head at sea under the blows of her enemy. At the same time England had no similar book;and an English lieutenant, in 1762, was just translating a part of Hoste's great work, omitting by far the larger part. It was not until nearly twenty years later that Clerk, a Scotch private gentleman, published an ingenious study of naval tactics, in which he pointed out to English admirals the system by which the French had thwarted their thoughtless and ill-combined attacks.(3)“The researches of the Académie de Marine, and the energetic impulse which it gave to the labors of officers, were not, as we hope to show later, without influence upon the relatively prosperous condition in which the navy was at the beginning of the American war.”

It has already been pointed out that the American War of Independence involved a departure from England's traditional and true policy, by committing her to a distant land war, while powerful enemies were waiting for an opportunity to attack her at sea. Like France in the then recent German wars, like Napoleon later in the Spanish war, England, through undue selfconfidence, was about to turn a friend into an enemy, and so expose the real basis of her power to a rude proof. The French government, on the other hand, avoided the snare into which it had so often fallen. Turning her back on the European continent, having the probability of neutrality there, and the certainty of alliance with Spain by her side, France advanced to the contest with a fine navy and a brilliant, though perhaps relatively inexperienced, body of officers. On the other side of the Atlantic she had the support of a friendly people, and of her own or allied ports, both in the West Indies and on the continent. The wisdom of this policy, the happy influence of this action of the government upon her sea power, is evident; but the details of the war do not belong to this part of the subject. To Americans, the chief interest of that war is found upon the land; but to naval officers upon the sea, for it was essentially a sea war. The intelligent and systematic efforts of twenty years bore their due fruit; for though the warfare afloat ended with a great disaster, the combined efforts of the French and Spanish fleets undoubtedly bore down England's strength and robbed her of her colonies. In the various naval undertakings and battles the honor of France was upon the whole maintained; though it is difficult, upon consideration of the general subject, to avoid the conclusion that the inexperience of French seamen as compared with English, the narrow spirit of jealousy shown by the noble corps of officers toward those of different antecedents, and above all, the miserable traditions of three quarters of a century already alluded to, the miserable policy of a government which taught them first to save their ships, to economize the material, prevented French admirals from reaping, not the mere glory, but the positive advantages that more than once were within their grasp. When Monk said the nation that would rule upon the sea must always attack, he set the keynote to England's naval policy; and had the instructions of the French government consistently breathed the same spirit, the war of 1778 might have ended sooner and better than it did. It seems ungracious to criticise the conduct of a service to which, under God, our nation owes that its birth was not a miscarriage; but writers of its own country abundantly reflect the spirit of the remark. A French officer who served afloat during this war, in a work of calm and judicial tone, says: -

“What must the young officers have thought who were at Sandy Hook with D'Estaing, at St. Christopher with De Grasse, even those who arrived at Rhode Island with De Ternay, when they saw that these officers were not tried at their return?”

Again, another French officer, of much later date, justifies the opinion expressed, when speaking of the war of the American Revolution in the following terms: -

“It was necessary to get rid of the unhappy prejudices of the days of the regency and of Louis XV.; but the mishaps of which they were full were too recent to be forgotten by our ministers. Thanks to a wretched hesitation, fleets, which had rightly alarmed England, became reduced to ordinary proportions. Intrenching themselves in a false economy, the ministry claimed that, by reason of the excessive expenses necessary to maintain the fleet, the admirals must be ordered to maintain the‘greatest circumspection,’as though in war half measures have not always led to disasters. So, too, the orders given to our squadron chiefs were to keep the sea as long as possible, without engaging in actions which might cause the loss of vessels difficult to replace; so that more than once complete victories, which would have crowned the skill of our admirals and the courage of our captains, were changed into successes of little importance. A system which laid down as a principle that an admiral should not use the force in his hands, which sent him against the enemy with the foreordained purpose of receiving rather than making the attack, a system which sapped moral power to save material resources, must have unhappy results. … It is certain that this deplorable system was one of the causes of the lack of discipline and startling defections which marked the periods of Louis XVI., of the [first] Republic, and of the [first] Empire.”

Within ten years of the peace of 1783 came the French Revolution; but that great upheaval which shook the foundations of States, loosed the ties of social order, and drove out of the navy nearly all the trained officers of the monarchy who were attached to the old state of things, did not free the French navy from a false system. It was easier to overturn the form of government than to uproot a deep-seated tradition. Here again a third French officer, of the highest rank and literary accomplishments, speaking of the inaction of Villeneuve, the admiral who commanded the French rear at the battle of the Nile, and who did not leave his anchors while the head of the column was being destroyed: -

“A day was to come [Trafalgar] in which Villeneuve in his turn, like De Grasse before him, and like Duchayla, would complain of being abandoned by part of his fleet. We have come to suspect some secret reason for this fatal coincidence. It is not natural that among so many honorable men there should so often be found admirals and captains incurring such a reproach. If the name of some of them is to this very day sadly associated with the memory of our disasters, we may be sure the fault is not wholly their own. We must rather blame the nature of the operations in which they were engaged, and that system of defensive war prescribed by the French government, which Pitt, in the English Parliament, proclaimed to be the forerunner of certain ruin. That system, when we wished to renounce it, had already penetrated our habits; it had, so to say, weakened our arms and paralyzed our self-reliance. Too often did our squadrons leave port with a special mission to fulfill, and with the intention of avoiding the enemy; to fall in with him was at once a piece of bad luck. It was thus that our ships went into action; they submitted to it instead of forcing it. … Fortune would have hesitated longer between the two fleets, and not have borne in the end so heavily against ours, if Brueys, meeting Nelson half way, could have gone out to fight him. This fettered and timid war, which Villaret and Martin had carried on, had lasted long, thanks to the circumspection of some English admirals and the traditions of the old tactics. It was with these traditions that the battle of the Nile had broken;the hour for decisive action had come.”

Some years later came Trafalgar, and again the government of France took up a new policy with the navy. The author last quoted speaks again: -

“The emperor, whose eagle glance traced plans of campaign for his fleets as for his armies, was wearied by these unexpected reverses. He turned his eyes from the one field of battle in which fortune was faithless to him, and decided to pursue England elsewhere than upon the seas; he undertook to rebuild his navy, but without giving it any part in the struggle which became more furious than ever. … Nevertheless, far from slackening, the activity of our dock-yards redoubled. Every year ships-of-the-line were either laid down or added to the fleet. Venice and Genoa, under his control, saw their old splendors rise again, and from the shores of the Elbe to the head of the Adriatic all the ports of the continent emulously seconded the creative thought of the emperor. Numerous squadrons were assembled in the Scheldt, in Brest Roads, and in Toulon. … But to the end the emperor refused to give this navy, full of ardor and self-reliance, an opportunity to measure its strength with the enemy. … Cast down by constant reverses, he had kept up our armed ships only to oblige our enemies to blockades whose enormous cost must end by exhausting their finances.”

When the empire fell, France had one hundred and three ships-of-the-line and fifty-five frigates.

To turn now from the particular lessons drawn from the history of the past to the general question of the influence of government upon the sea career of its people, it is seen that that influence can work in two distinct but closely related ways.

First, in peace: The government by its policy can favor the natural growth of a people's industries and its tendencies to seek adventure and gain by way of the sea; or it can try to develop such industries and such sea-going bent, when they do not naturally exist; or, on the other hand, the government may by mistaken action check and fetter the progress which the people left to themselves would make. In any one of these ways the influence of the government will be felt, making or marring the sea power of the country in the matter of peaceful commerce; upon which alone, it cannot be too often insisted, a thoroughly strong navy can be based.

Secondly, for war: The influence of the government will be felt in its most legitimate manner in maintaining an armed navy, of a size commensurate with the growth of its shipping and the importance of the interests connected with it. More important even than the size of the navy is the question of its institutions, favoring a healthful spirit and activity, and providing for rapid development in time of war by an adequate reserve of men and of ships and by measures for drawing out that general reserve power which has before been pointed to, when considering the character and pursuits of the people. Undoubtedly under this second head of warlike preparation must come the maintenance of suitable naval stations, in those distant parts of the world to which the armed shipping must follow the peaceful vessels of commerce. The protection of such stations must depend either upon direct military force, as do Gibraltar and Malta, or upon a surrounding friendly population, such as the American colonists once were to England, and, it may be presumed, the Australian colonists now are. Such friendly surroundings and backing, joined to a reasonable military provision, are the best of defences, and when combined with decided preponderance at sea, make a scattered and extensive empire, like that of England, secure; for while it is true that an unexpected attack may cause disaster in some one quarter, the actual superiority of naval power prevents such disaster from being general or irremediable. History has sufficiently proved this. England's naval bases have been in all parts of the world; and her fleets have at once protected them, kept open the communications between them, and relied upon them for shelter.

Colonies attached to the mother-country afford, therefore, the surest means of supporting abroad the sea power of a country. In peace, the influence of the government should be felt in promoting by all means a warmth of attachment and a unity of interest which will make the welfare of one the welfare of all, and the quarrel of one the quarrel of all; and in war, or rather for war, by inducing such measures of organization and defence as shall be felt by all to be a fair distribution of a burden of which each reaps the benefit.

Such colonies the United States has not and is not likely to have. As regards purely military naval stations, the feeling of her people was probably accurately expressed by an historian of the English navy a hundred years ago, speaking then of Gibraltar and Port Mahon.“Military governments,”said he,“agree so little with the industry of a trading people, and are in themselves so repugnant to the genius of the British people, that I do not wonder that men of good sense and of all parties have inclined to give up these, as Tangiers was given up.”Having therefore no foreign establishments, either colonial or military, the ships of war of the United States, in war, will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their own shores. To provide resting-places for them, where they can coal and repair, would be one of the first duties of a government proposing to itself the development of the power of the nation at sea.

As the practical object of this inquiry is to draw from the lessons of history inferences applicable to one's own country and service, it is proper now to ask how far the conditions of the United States involve serious danger, and call for action on the part of the government, in order to build again her sea power. It will not be too much to say that the action of the government since the Civil War, and up to this day, has been effectively directed solely to what has been called the first link in the chain which makes sea power. Internal development, great production, with the accompanying aim and boast of self-sufficingness, such has been the object, such to some extent the result. In this the government has faithfully reflected the bent of the controlling elements of the country, though it is not always easy to feel that such controlling elements are truly representative, even in a free country. However that may be, there is no doubt that, besides having no colonies, the intermediate link of a peaceful shipping, and the interests involved in it, are now likewise lacking. In short, the United States has only one link of the three.

The circumstances of naval war have changed so much within the last hundred years, that it may be doubted whether such disastrous effects on the one hand, or such brilliant prosperity on the other, as were seen in the wars between England and France, could now recur. In her secure and haughty sway of the seas England imposed a yoke on neutrals which will never again be borne; and the principle that the flag covers the goods is forever secured. The commerce of a belligerent can therefore now be safely carried on in neutral ships, except when contraband of war or to blockaded ports; and as regards the latter, it is also certain that there will be no more paper blockades. Putting aside therefore the question of defending her seaports from capture or contribution, as to which there is practical unanimity in theory and entire indifference in practice, what need has the United States of sea power? Her commerce is even now carried on by others; why should her people desire that which, if possessed, must be defended at great cost? So far as this question is economical, it is outside the scope of this work; but conditions which may entail suffering and loss on the country by war are directly pertinent to it. Granting therefore that the foreign trade of the United States, going and coming, is on board ships which an enemy cannot touch except when bound to a blockaded port, what will constitute an efficient blockade? The present definition is, that it is such as to constitute a manifest danger to a vessel seeking to enter or leave the port. This is evidently very elastic. Many can remember that during the Civil War, after a night attack on the United States fleet off Charleston, the Confederates next morning sent out a steamer with some foreign consuls on board, who so far satisfied themselves that no blockading vessel was in sight that they issued a declaration to that effect. On the strength of this declaration some Southern authorities claimed that the blockade was technically broken, and could not be technically re-established without a new notification. Is it necessary, to constitute a real danger to blockade-runners, that the blockading fleet should be in sight? Half a dozen fast steamers, cruising twenty miles off-shore between the New Jersey and Long Island coast, would be a very real danger to ships seeking to go in or out by the principal entrance to New York; and similar positions might effectively blockade Boston, the Delaware, and the Chesapeake. The main body of the blockading fleet, prepared not only to capture merchant-ships but to resist military attempts to break the blockade, need not be within sight, nor in a position known to the shore. The bulk of Nelson's fleet was fifty miles from Cadiz two days before Trafalgar, with a small detachment watching close to the harbor. The allied fleet began to get under way at 7 A.M., and Nelson, even under the conditions of those days, knew it by 9.30. The English fleet at that distance was a very real danger to its enemy. It seems possible, in these days of submarine telegraphs, that the blockading forces in-shore and offshore, and from one port to another, might be in telegraphic communication with one another along the whole coast of the United States, readily giving mutual support; and if, by some fortunate military combination, one detachment were attacked in force, it could warn the others and retreat upon them. Granting that such a blockade off one port were broken on one day, by fairly driving away the ships maintaining it, the notification of its being re-established could be cabled all over the world the next. To avoid such blockades there must be a military force afloat that will at all times so endanger a blockading fleet that it can by no means keep its place. Then neutral ships, except those laden with contraband of war, can come and go freely, and maintain the commercial relations of the country with the world outside.

It may be urged that, with the extensive sea-coast of the United States, a blockade of the whole line cannot be effectively kept up. No one will more readily concede this than officers who remember how the blockade of the Southern coast alone was maintained. But in the present condition of the navy, and, it may be added, with any additions not exceeding those so far proposed by the government, (4)the attempt to blockade Boston, New York, the Delaware, the Chesapeake, and the Mississippi, in other words, the great centres of export and import, would not entail upon one of the large maritime nations efforts greater than have been made before. England has at the same time blockaded Brest, the Biscay coast, Toulon, and Cadiz, when there were powerful squadrons lying within the harbors. It is true that commerce in neutral ships can then enter other ports of the United States than those named; but what a dislocation of the carrying traffic of the country, what failure of supplies at times, what inadequate means of transport by rail or water, of dockage, of lighterage, of warehousing, will be involved in such an enforced change of the ports of entry! Will there be no money loss, no suffering, consequent upon this? And when with much pain and expense these evils have been partially remedied, the enemy may be led to stop the new inlets as he did the old. The people of the United States will certainly not starve, but they may suffer grievously. As for supplies which are contraband of war, is there not reason to fear that the United States is not now able to go alone if an emergency should arise?

The question is eminently one in which the influence of the government should make itself felt, to build up for the nation a navy which, if not capable of reaching distant countries, shall at least be able to keep clear the chief approaches to its own. The eyes of the country have for a quarter of a century been turned from the sea; the results of such a policy and of its opposite will be shown in the instance of France and of England. Without asserting a narrow parallelism between the case of the United States and either of these, it may safely be said that it is essential to the welfare of the whole country that the conditions of trade and commerce should remain, as far as possible, unaffected by an external war. In order to do this, the enemy must be kept not only out of our ports, but far away from our coasts.(5)

Can this navy be had without restoring the merchant shipping? It is doubtful. History has proved that such a purely military sea power can be built up by a despot, as was done by Louis XIV.; but though so fair seeming, experience showed that his navy was like a growth which having no root soon withers away. But in a representative government any military expenditure must have a strongly represented interest behind it, convinced of its necessity. Such an interest in sea power does not exist, cannot exist here without action by the government. How such a merchant shipping should be built up, whether by subsidies or by free trade, by constant administration of tonics or by free movement in the open air, is not a military but an economical question. Even had the United States a great national shipping, it may be doubted whether a sufficient navy would follow; the distance which separates her from other great powers, in one way a protection, is also a snare. The motive, if any there be, which will give the United States a navy, is probably now quickening in the Central American Isthmus. Let us hope it will not come to the birth too late.

Here concludes the general discussion of the principal elements which affect, favorably or unfavorably, the growth of sea power in nations. The aim has been, first to consider those elements in their natural tendency for or against, and then to illustrate by particular examples and by the experience of the past. Such discussions, while undoubtedly embracing a wider field, yet fall mainly within the province of strategy, as distinguished from tactics. The considerations and principles which enter into them belong to the unchangeable, or unchanging, order of things, remaining the same, in cause and effect, from age to age. They belong, as it were, to the Order of Nature, of whose stability so much is heard in our day; whereas tactics, using as its instruments the weapons made by man, shares in the change and progress of the race from generation to generation. From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock. There will next be examined the general history of Europe and America, with particular reference to the effect exercised upon that history, and upon the welfare of the people, by sea power in its broad sense. From time to time, as occasion offers, the aim will be to recall and reinforce the general teaching, already elicited, by particular illustrations. The general tenor of the study will therefore be strategical, in that broad definition of naval strategy which has before been quoted and accepted:“Naval strategy has for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country.”In the matter of particular battles, while freely admitting that the change of details has made obsolete much of their teaching, the attempt will be made to point out where the application or neglect of true general principles has produced decisive effects; and, other things being equal, those actions will be preferred which, from their association with the names of the most distinguished officers, may be presumed to show how far just tactical ideas obtained in a particular age or a particular service. It will also be desirable, where analogies between ancient and modern weapons appear on the surface, to derive such probable lessons as they offer, without laying undue stress upon the points of resemblance. Finally, it must be remembered that, among all changes, the nature of man remains much the same; the personal equation, though uncertain in quantity and quality in the particular instance, is sure always to be found.

FOOTNOTES:

(1) By a base of permanent operations“is understood a country whence come all the resources, where are united the great lines of communication by land and water, where are the arsenals and armed posts.”

(2) An interesting proof of the weight attributed to the naval power of Great Britain by a great military authority will be found in the opening chapter of Jomini's“History of the Wars of the French Revolution.”He lays down, as a fundamental principle of European policy, that an unlimited expansion of naval force should not be permitted to any nation which cannot be approached by land, — a description which can apply only to Great Britain.

(3) Whatever may be thought of Clerk's claim to originality in constructing a system of naval tactics, and it has been seriously impugned, there can be no doubt that his criticisms on the past were sound. So far as the author knows, he in this respect deserves credit for an originality remarkable in one who had the training neither of a seaman nor of a military man.

(4) Since the above was written, the secretary of the navy, in his report for 1889, has recommended a fleet which would make such a blockade as here suggested very hazardous.

(5) The word“defence”in war involves two ideas, which for the sake of precision in thought should be kept separated in the mind. There is defence pure and simple, which strengthens itself and awaits attack. This may be called passive defence. On the other hand, there is a view of defence which asserts that safety for one's self, the real object of defensive preparation, is best secured by attacking the enemy. In the matter of seacoast defence, the former method is exemplified by stationary fortifications, submarine mines, and generally all immobile works destined simply to stop an enemy if he tries to enter. The second method comprises all those means and weapons which do not wait for attack, but go to meet the enemy's fleet, whether it be but for a few miles, or whether to his own shores. Such a defence may seem to be really offensive war, but it is not;it becomes offensive only when its object of attack is changed from the enemy's fleet to the enemy's country. England defended her own coasts and colonies by stationing her fleets off the French ports, to fight the French fleet if it came out. The United States in the Civil War stationed her fleets off the Southern ports, not because she feared for her own, but to break down the Confederacy by isolation from the rest of the world, and ultimately by attacking the ports. The methods were the same; but the purpose in one case was defensive, in the other offensive.

The confusion of the two ideas leads to much unnecessary wrangling as to the proper sphere of army and navy in coast-defence. Passive defences belong to the army; everything that moves in the water to the navy, which has the prerogative of the offensive defence. If seamen are used to garrison forts, they become part of the land forces, as surely as troops, when embarked as part of the complement, become part of the sea forces.

从政治和社会的观点来看，海洋首先并且最为明显地呈现给人们的就是，它是一条广袤的通途；或者更准确一点来说，是一条宽广的公用通道，人们可以在这条通道上向四面八方通行。但其中存在着一些交通繁忙的线路，这表明还是有着一些控制性的原因，才使得人们选择了这些交通路线而不是其他的。这些交通路线被称作“商路”；而决定它们成为商路的原因，则应从世界历史中去寻找。

虽说海洋上有着人类所熟知或者不熟知的种种危险，但经由水路旅行或者说水上交通，一向都比陆路更容易，花费也更少。荷兰的贸易业之所以获得了伟大的成就，不仅是由于其海上航运，也是由于它有着无数风平浪静的水道，使得人们可以经由费用不高而快捷的通道进入荷兰以及德国内地。水路运输相对于陆路运输的这一优势，在陆路数量很少、路况又不佳、战乱频繁、社会不安定的历史时期，则显得更为突出，就像200年前的情况那样。虽说那时的海上交通有遭遇海盗的危险，但还是比陆上交通更加安全和快捷。当时的一位荷兰史学家在评估荷兰与英国开战的可能性时，从中注意到了一个事实，那就是英国的水道并未充分深入到该国内陆；由于陆路状况糟糕，故要将货物从英国的一地运往另一地，就必须经由海路，所以在途中就有可能被敌军夺取。至于纯粹的内陆贸易，如今通常都已不再存在这种危险了。目前，在大多数文明国家，即便沿海贸易遭到破坏或者没有沿海贸易，也只是会让人觉得不方便罢了；但是，水上交通依然是费用较低的一种运输方式。虽说如此，晚至法兰西共和国与法兰西第一帝国的战争期间，那些熟悉这一时期历史的人都知道，而从发展于这一时期的一些消遣性海军文学作品当中也可看出，人们经常提及沿着法国海岸线到处劫掠的私掠船队，尽管此时海上到处都是英国的巡逻舰船，而英国国内也有着良好的内陆道路。

然而，在现代环境下，国内贸易只是沿海国家商业的一部分罢了。外国出产的生活必需品和奢侈品，都得用本国船只或外国船只运送到本国的港口来；然后，这些船只又会载上该国的产品返航，或是农产品，或是手工艺品；而每一个国家，都希望这种海上运输由本国的船只来进行。如此往来航行的船只，必须拥有安全的返航港口，并且在整个航行过程中，必须充分得到本国的保护才行。

在战争时期，就必须由武装运送来实施此种护卫了。因此，从严格意义上来说，之所以需要海军，原因即在于存在和平海运这一事实；并且，海军会随着和平海运的消失而消失，除非是一个国家有着侵略野心，纯粹将它作为军事编制中的一个分支。由于美国目前并无侵略目标，由于其海上贸易已经消失，所以其武装舰船数量减少、民众对海军兴趣渐失，完全是一种合乎逻辑的结果。但无论出于何种原因，只要人们再次发现海上贸易有利可图，就会重新出现一种规模巨大的海运事业，迫使军事舰队重新发展起来。有可能，当穿过中美地峡的运河开通之后，那种侵略的欲望可能会很强大，从而导致出现相同的结果。然而，这一点还是未知之数，因为一个太平而趋利的国家是不会眼光远大的；而要做好充分的军事准备，则需要远大的眼光，尤其是在如今这个时代。

一旦一个国家的非武装舰船或者武装舰船从本国海岸起航，人们很快就会感受到船只赖以进行和平贸易、避难和补给的种种需要了。如今，世界各地都可找到虽说陌生、态度却很友好的港口；当和平是世界主流的时候，有这些港口的庇护就足够了。不过，虽说美国已经得天独厚，享受了长久的和平形势，但情况不会总是这样，而和平也并非总能永远持续下去。在早期，那些希望同新的、未开发的地区进行贸易的海上商务人士，是冒着自己的生命危险，在猜忌或者怀有敌意的国度上岸；并且，要想采集到能够装满船只、有利可赚的货物，往往耗时甚久。因此，他们会本能地在商路的尽头寻找一个或者多个驻地，无论是通过武力取得还是通过好感获取，以便让自己或代办们在该地拥有合理的安全保障，让自己的船只能够安全地泊锚，并且能够持续采集该地的适销商品，然后等着本国舰队到来，带领他们回国。由于利润巨大，风险也高，所在这些早期的航海活动中，这样的驻地自然就越来越多，最后变成了各个殖民地；这些殖民地的最终发展和成功，则取决于其所属国家当中的天才人物和政策，而其发展与成功又构成了世界历史，尤其是世界海洋史的一大组成部分。殖民地的出现和发展，并非都像上面所描述的那样简单而自然。许多殖民地在其计划与成立之时，都是统治者的行动而非个人行为，所以更多的是一种形式，纯属政治考量；不过，贸易站点及其日后的扩张和探险者唯求谋利的行为，它们的出发点与本质，都跟经过深思熟虑的组织并特许建立起来的殖民地是一样的。在这两种情况下，母国都是在国外获得了据点，找到了出售本国商品的新途径和一种新的海运领域，使本国人民有了新的就业机会，并使本国获得了支援和财富。

然而，当商路另一端的安全得到了保障之后，所有的贸易需求并非全都就此得到了满足。航程既遥远又危险，而海上经常到处都是敌人。在各国纷纷进行殖民的那些年代，海洋基本上处于一种无法无天的状况，可如今的人几乎都已完全忘记了；当时的海洋国家之间通过和平解决争端的情况，是极为罕见的。这样一来，就需要在商路沿线设立驻地了，比如好望角、圣海伦那以及毛里求斯，其主要目的原本并非是为了贸易，而是为了防卫和作战；这样一来，也就需要占据诸如直布罗陀、马耳他和圣劳伦斯湾入口的路易斯堡等要塞了——占领这些要塞的意义，主要是战略性的，虽说情况并非一概如此。从特征上来看，殖民地和殖民据点有的时候是商业性的，有的时候又是军事性的；同一个地方从两个方面来看都同等重要，比如纽约，则属于例外情况。

在这三个方面——产品与商品贸易的必要性，实施商品贸易的海运，促进和扩大海运规模并且通过增加安全地点而有助于保护海运的殖民地——当中，我们可以看到大部分历史、政策以及临海国家的关键线索。政策既会随着时代精神的不同而改变，也会随着历任统治者的性格与眼光不同而改变；但沿海国家的历史，却较少由政府的英明与远见所决定，更多的是取决于其地理位置、国土范围、资源配置、人口数量以及民族性格——总而言之，即是由我们所称的自然条件所决定。然而，我们非但必须承认，而将来也会看到，个人在某些特定时期的英明之举或不明智的行为，对于广义上的海权发展会产生一种极大的修正性影响；这种影响，不但包括利用武力统治海洋或其一部分的海上军事力量，还包括了和平贸易，以及使得军事性舰队自然而健全地出现并且是确保军事性舰队安全之基础的海运。

影响到各国制海权的主要条件，可以列举如下：（一）地理位置。（二）自然结构，包括与之相关的自然物产与气候。（三）领土范围。（四）人口数量。（五）民族性格。（六）政府的特征，包括其国家机构的特征。

（一）地理位置——首先不妨指出，倘若一个国家的地理位置，使得它既无需在陆地上捍卫自身，也不会受到诱惑，经由陆路去试图扩张自己的领土范围，那么，由于其目标一致针对的是海洋，所以它跟那些边境之一为陆地的民族相比，就具有了一种优势。作为一个海洋大国，英国胜过法国和荷兰的一大优势一直就是这一点。荷兰的力量，早就因为必须维持一支庞大的陆军、必须进行代价巨大的战争来保护本国的独立而消耗殆尽了；而法国的政策有的时候非常英明，有的时候又极为愚蠢，目标一直都在从海上扩张向陆上扩张偏移。这些军事活动都会消耗国家的财力；而更聪明地坚持利用本国的地理位置，却是会增加国家财力的。

地理位置本身既可以促进海军进行集结，又可以迫使海军解散。在这个方面，不列颠群岛又一次具备了胜过法兰西的一种优势。后者的位置既临地中海，又临大西洋，尽管也有着自己的优势，但总体上却是使得法国海上力量薄弱的一个原因。分处东、西两面的法国舰队，只有穿过直布罗陀海峡之后才能汇合起来；法国舰队经常冒着这样的危险，有时还损失惨重。地处两大洋之间的美国，倘若东西沿海都有着大规模的海上贸易，那么它的地理位置要么会成为其海上力量极为薄弱的一个原因，要么就会让它付出高昂的代价。

由于拥有一个庞大的殖民帝国，所以英国已经失去了这种优势的许多方面，无法将兵力集中到自己的沿海地区；不过，做出这种牺牲是很英明的，因为历史最终证明，它获得的利益要比失去的东西多得多。随着殖民体系的成长，其作战舰队也发展起来，因而英国的商船运输和国家财力增长得甚至更快了。尽管如此，但在美国革命战争期间，在法兰西共和国和法兰西帝国战争期间，用一位法国作家措辞强烈的话语来说，就是：“虽说海军得到了巨大的发展，但英国身处各个富裕国家当中时，似乎永远都觉得自己穷得要命。”当时，英国的实力已经足以维持本国和各个殖民地的生存了；而西班牙这个同样广袤的殖民帝国，却因其海上力量薄弱，受到了他国的侮辱和侵害。

一个国家的地理位置，不仅会有利于其兵力集结，还可以带来进一步的战略优势，使之具有核心的阵地和优良的基地，以防可能的敌人发动敌对行动。这种优势，又是英国所拥有的；它一面朝着荷兰和北欧各个列强，另一面则朝着法兰西和大西洋。有的时候，倘若法国与北海、波罗的海各个海上强国联合起来威胁到英国，那么位于唐斯锚地和英吉利海峡的英国舰队，甚至是位于布雷斯特沿海的英国舰队，都可以回到国内严阵以待，从而能够轻而易举地将这些舰队的兵力联合起来，集中打击试图穿过英吉利海峡、去与其盟国汇合的敌人。在其两侧，大自然也将一些更加优良的港口和能更安全靠近的海岸赐予给了英国。在以前，这是通过英吉利海峡的一个重要因素；但近来，蒸汽动力的出现以及这些海港条件的改善，已经弱化了法国曾经所苦的那种劣势。在帆船时代，英国舰队进击布雷斯特时，曾将基地设在托贝港和普利茅斯。这种部署的目的很简单：在刮东风或者天气平稳的时候，负责封锁的舰队可以毫不费力地守住自己的作战位置；而在刮起猛烈的西风时，舰队便可顺风驶向英国的港口，因为英军知道，法国舰队在风向改变之前是没法出击的，而风向一旦改变，又会将英国舰队重新带回到自己的作战位置上去。

地理位置上靠近敌人或攻击目标的这一优势，在哪里也没有在最近才得名的“贸易破坏战”这一战争形式中体现得更加明显；法国人称之为“游击战”。这种作战行动，由于针对的是通常没有自卫能力的普通商船，因此只需配备了小支军队的舰船来实施。这种舰船基本上也没有什么自卫能力，所以需要就近有隐蔽之处或者补给点；这种地方，要么是本国军舰所控制的某些海域，要么就是与本国交好的外邦海港。后者对这种舰船的支援力度最大，因为港口总是在同一个地方，所以贸易破坏舰前往这种港口时，要比敌舰前往此种港口更为轻车熟路。法国与英国相距甚近，因此极大地助长了法国针对英国而进行的“游击战”。由于在北海、英吉利海峡和大西洋沿岸都有港口，所以法国巡洋舰的出发之地，离英国进行贸易的中心地带很近。这些港口之间的距离，虽说不利于进行常规的军事联合部署，但对于这种非常规的、辅助性的作战行动来说，却是一种优势；因为对于前者来说，最重要的特点就是集中兵力，而对于贸易破坏战来说，其原则却是扩散兵力。贸易破坏舰会散布于各处，从而可以发现并捕获更多的商船。那些了不起的法国私掠船的历史，就说明了这种事实；这些私掠船的据点与作战场所，主要都是在英吉利海峡和北海上，不然就是在一些遥远的殖民地区，比如瓜达鲁佩岛与马提尼克岛，它们为私掠船提供了相似的、距离不远的隐蔽点。由于需要加煤，所以如今的巡洋舰比过去的巡洋舰更加依赖于港口了。美国人都极为认同这种针对敌国贸易所进行的战争；但我们必须记住，美国并没有与大型海外贸易中心相距极近的港口。因此，美国的地理位置非常不利于成功地进行此种贸易破坏战，除非它能够在盟国的一些港口中建立自己的据点。

倘若除了赋予一国以进攻的条件，大自然还让该国位于一处既能够毫不费力地前往公海，同时还控制了世界交通要道之一的位置，那么很显然，该国地理位置所具有的战略意义就是很重大的了。英国的位置，在很大程度上又是这样。荷兰、瑞典、俄罗斯、丹麦等国的贸易，以及沿一些大河而上、直达德国内陆地区的贸易，都得经由靠近英国国门的英吉利海峡；因为帆船都是沿着英国海岸航行的。此外，这种北方贸易对制海权还存在着一种独特的影响；因为通常所称的海军军需，主要都是从波罗的海沿岸各国获取的。

如果没有失去直布罗陀，西班牙的位置跟英国的位置本来是极为相似的。由于直接濒临大西洋和地中海，并且朝大西洋一侧是加的斯，朝地中海一侧是卡塔赫纳，所以欧洲通往黎凡特的商路，就必须经过西班牙掌控的地区，即使是绕道好望角的贸易线路，也离西班牙的国门不远。不过，直布罗陀非但使西班牙失去了对直布罗陀海峡的控制权，还构成了一处障碍，使得它原本容易汇合的两支舰队，如今无法轻易会师了。

在如今，倘若只看地理位置，而不考虑影响到制海权的其他条件的话，那么，由于有着漫长的海岸线和诸多优良的港口，意大利的地理位置似乎就非常不错，可以对通往黎凡特或经由苏伊士地峡的贸易线路施加决定性的影响。在某种程度上来说，的确是这样；而要是意大利如今还拥有原属于它的所有岛屿的话，就更是如此了。不过，由于马耳他由英国控制，而科西嘉则在法国手里，所以意大利在地理位置上的优势，就大打折扣了。从种族亲疏和位置来说，这两个岛都是意大利希望拥有的合理目标，就像直布罗陀与西班牙的关系那样。倘若亚德里亚海是一条巨大的贸易通途，那么意大利的位置也会有影响力得多。地理完整性当中的这些瑕疵，加上不利于形成制海权的一些其他原因，使得意大利是不是能够在一段时间内跻身于一流海洋大国这个问题变得令人怀疑。

由于此处的目的并非是进行无休无止的讨论，而只是想通过实例说明，一国的位置会如何严重地影响到其海洋事业的发展，所以我们不妨暂时把这部分内容先放一放；后面的历史论述中，还会经常出现更多深入揭示其重要性的实例。不过，下面这两种说法还是恰如其分的。

从贸易和军事角度来看，环境已使得地中海对世界历史所起的作用，比其他任何同等面积的水域对世界历史所起的作用都要大。无数国家，一个接一个地都想控制地中海，并且这种努力如今仍在继续着。因此，对地中海这一海域的优势条件，以及沿岸相对军事意义进行研究，就会比对其他领域进行相同的研究更为有益。此外，如今的地中海，在许多方面都与加勒比海有着显著的相似之处——假如经由马拿马运河的贸易线路建成了的话，那二者就更为类似了。因此，研究已有大量例证的地中海地区战略条件，就会成为一种极佳的前奏，从而开启对历史相对较短的加勒比海地区进行相似研究的过程。

第二种说法，关系到美国相对于中美运河的地理位置。如果开凿一条运河，并且能够达成开凿者的希望，那么加勒比海就会从如今的商路终点和一个局部的交通中心，或者充其量是一条断续而不完整的交通线，变成世界的大型交通要道之一。沿着这条线路，会形成规模巨大的商业贸易，会将其他大国的利益、欧洲各国的利益，前所未有地带到我们的沿海地区。这样一来，我们就不会再像以前那样容易置身于国际纠纷之外了。美国相对于这条商路的位置，与英国相对于英吉利海峡的位置，与地中海沿岸各国相对于经由苏伊士运河的那条商路的位置，都很相似。至于影响和控制这条商路取决于地理位置这个方面，很显然的是，美国的国家权力中心这个永久性的基地（1），跟其他大国的权力中心相比，距其相应的商路要近得多。这些国家目前或日后在岛屿或者大陆上所占的位置，无论多么强大，都将只是各国势力的边远基地罢了；而在支撑军事实力的全部原生因素方面，也没有哪一个国家胜过了美国。不过，美国在尽人皆知的备战方面很不行；而其地理位置虽说靠近各国纷争之地，这一优势却因墨西哥湾沿岸的特点而少了许多价值——因为在墨西哥湾沿岸，没有足够多拥有能维修先进战舰的设备并能防御敌人进攻的港口；而没有这样的港口，任何国家的军舰都是无法伪称自己控制了哪处海洋的。倘若出现各国争夺加勒比海地区霸权的情况，那么，从密西西比河“南方通道”的水深、新奥尔良的近便以及密西西比河流域的水运优势来看，美国的主要精力似乎必须放在这一流域才行，而美国永久性的作战基地也应当建在此处。然而，防守密西西比河河口却有着重重特殊的困难；仅有的基韦斯特与彭萨科拉这两处可与对手相匹敌的港口却又太浅，并且从获取该国资源来看，它们在位置上也没有什么优势。要想获得地理位置所带来的全部好处，就必须克服这些不利之处。更何况，美国与中美地峡之间的距离虽说相对较短，但仍属遥远，所以在加勒比海上，美国必须拥有适于建立临时的或辅助性作战基地的据点才行；凭借其自然优势、易守难攻以及靠近核心战略争端之地的特点，这些据点就能够让美国的舰队跟敌人的舰队一样地靠近战场了。充分保护好密西西比河的出入口，手中又拥有这样的前沿基地，并且保障好这些基地与大本营之间的交通联系之后——一言以蔽之，就是利用该国所拥有的一切必要手段，做好充分的军事准备之后，美国在这个方面便会因为地理位置而带来优势，而它在这一地区取得霸权地位，也是确定无疑的了。

（二）自然结构——我们刚才已经提到，墨西哥湾沿岸具有独特的特征，它完全适合于归入一个国家的“自然结构”当中，是我们在影响制海权发展的条件中进行讨论的第二个问题。

海岸线是一个国家的边境之一；而由边境通往异域（在此种情形下，异域即是海洋）的途径越便捷，一个民族经由此种途径与世界其他民族进行交流的意向就会越强烈。想像一下，假如一个国家具有漫长的海岸线，却根本没有海港，那么这种国家就不可能有自己的海上贸易，不可能拥有自己的海上运输，也不可能拥有自己的海军。比利时在它还是西班牙和奥地利一个行省的时候，差不多正是这种情况。1648年，在成功地打赢了一场战争之后的和平状态下，荷兰人坚持要求不得将斯凯尔特河向海上贸易开放。这种做法使得安特卫普港关闭了，并将比利时的海上贸易转移到了荷兰。这样一来，西属尼德兰便不再是一个海上强国了。

数量众多的深水海港，是一国的国力与财富之源；而倘若它们同时还是可通航河流的入海口，那就更加如此了——这些可通航的河流，会使得该国的国内贸易都集中于这些河流上；但是，也正因为它们容易到达，所以在战争中，若是防守不当的话，这些河流就会变成其薄弱之处。1667年，荷兰人不费吹灰之力便沿泰晤士河而上，在距伦敦不远的地方焚毁了英国海军的大部；而数年之后，英、法两国的联合舰队试图在荷兰登陆时，却遭到了荷兰舰队的顽强抵抗，还被荷兰沿海的重重困难所阻，因此不得不无功而返。1778年，要不是法国的海军司令犹豫不决的话，纽约港以及它对哈德逊河无可辩驳的控制权本来是会易手，不再由处于劣势的英军所掌控的。有了这种控制权，新英格兰本可以与纽约、新泽西以及宾夕法尼亚诸地，重新恢复那种密切而安全的交通补给关系；而这次重击，又是紧随着前一年伯格因[1]的惨败而来，本来也是很有可能让英国人更早地签署和约的。密西西比河是美国一处强大有力的财富与国力之源；但其河口处防守薄弱，而此河深入美国内陆的支流数量又众多，从而使得它成了南部邦联的一处软肋和祸端。最后，到了1814年，切萨皮克湾被占、华盛顿遭毁，给了美国人一个惨痛的教训，使之明白了倘若一路上不加防卫，这些最宽阔的水道也能带来危险；虽说这个教训在时间上距今如此之近，我们很容易就能回想起来，但从目前海岸防御的表象来看，人们却似乎更容易将其忘记。我们也不应当认为，如今形势已经发生了变化；因为虽说环境与攻守的具体情况古今都在发生着变化，但大前提还是一样的。

在伟大的拿破仑战争之前和该次战争期间，法兰西在布雷斯特以东并没有适于泊驻轻型战列舰的港口。而英国却有着多么巨大的优势啊；它在这一地区的普利茅斯和朴茨茅斯有两座大型的军舰修造厂，此外还拥有诸多其他的避风港和补给点。不过，法国这种结构上的弱点，此后已由在瑟堡修筑的工事得以弥补过来了。

除了涉及到能否便捷出海的海岸线轮廓，还有其他的自然条件，使得人们或是跨洋过海，或是避开海洋。尽管法兰西在英吉利海峡上的军港数量不足，但该国在英吉利海峡、大西洋和地中海上都有良港，这些良港的位置都很有利于进行海外贸易；而在一些可以促进法国国内交通条件的大河入海口，该国也有着一些优质的海港。不过，当黎塞留结束了内战之后，法国人却并未像英国人和荷兰人那样，急于并且成功地向海上进军。其主要原因，似乎可以从法国的自然条件中找到；正是这些自然条件，使得法国成了一个宜居之地，拥有令人愉快的气候，丰富的物产，而人民的生活也很富足。另一方面，大自然赐予英国的东西却很少，直到制造业发展起来之前，英国都没有什么东西可供出口。英国人的诸多需求，连同他们那种不安于现状的活动，以及有利于航海事业的其他条件，都使得英国人能够漂洋海外；而在国外，英国人则发现了许多比本国气候更为宜人、物产更为富饶的地方。他们的需求与本领，使得他们成了商人和殖民者，然后又成了制造者和出产者；而海运，就是产品与殖民地之间不可或缺的一环。于是，他们的海上力量便发展起来了。不过，要说英国是被吸引到海上的，那么荷兰便是被逼到海上的；因为倘若没有海洋，英国只会衰落，而荷兰却会灭亡。在荷兰到达其辉煌的巅峰、尚是欧洲政治中的一个主角之时，该国一位称职的权威人士就曾预计，荷兰的国土是无法养活八分之一的荷兰人的。当时荷兰的制造企业虽说数量众多且举足轻重，但其增长一直要远远滞后于海运业的增长，土地的贫瘠以及沿岸地区光突少树的情况，先是迫使荷兰人出海捕鱼，然后，他们发现了腌制鱼类的加工方法，有了可供出口和供本国消费的商品，从而为财富的积累奠定了基础。这样一来，在发现绕道好望角的航线之后，当仍处于土耳其当局压迫之下的意大利各共和国开始没落之时，荷兰人便成了商人，接过了意大利在黎凡特地区的大规模贸易。由于荷兰地处波罗的海、法兰西和地中海之间，并且位于德国诸河的入海口，具有更多的优势，所以荷兰诸省很快就吞并了欧洲差不多所有的海运业务。在200多年前，波罗的海地区的小麦与海军军需物资、西班牙与新世界的西属殖民地之间所进行的贸易、法国的葡萄酒及其沿海贸易，都是由荷兰船舶来进行运输的，甚至于英国沿海贸易的一大部分，当时也是由荷兰货船来完成的。但我们并不能因此而妄称，这种繁荣全都只是由于荷兰自然资源匮乏所致的。因为有些东西，根本就没法无中生有。事实是，荷兰人民因贫困而被迫出海，之后由于掌控了海运业务、舰队庞大，故在发现美洲、发现绕道好望角的航线之后，他们便能够抓住突如其来的那种贸易扩张和探险大潮的机会来获利。虽说与此同时还有其他的原因，但他们的繁荣整体上依赖的是制海权，而这种制海权又是他们的贫困所造成的。他们的食品、衣物、制造企业所用的原材料、建造和装配船只所用的木材和麻绳（他们建造的船只，差不多相当于其他欧洲国家所建造船只的总数），都是进口得来的；所以，当1653年至1654年间荷兰同英国爆发了一场长达18个月的恶战，使得该国的海运业务中止之后，据说“曾经一向支撑着国家富裕阶层的税收资源，比如渔业和贸易，差不多都已枯竭。工厂关门，工人失业。须德海[2]成了一片船桅之林；国内到处都是乞丐；街上杂草丛生，而阿姆斯特丹则有1500座房子无人租住。”最终靠一份屈辱的和约，才让这些房子免于变成了一堆废墟。

这种凄惨的结局，说明了一个全靠外部资源来支撑自己在世界上发挥作用的国家，是多么的脆弱。除了大范围的方面，还有一些不同的情况，使得当时荷兰的情形同如今英国的情形有许多相似之处，但此处对这些情况我们无需加以说明；如今英国有一些真正的先知，虽说在国内似乎不太受人敬重，但他们却都提醒说，英国国内的持续繁荣，主要取决于保持英国在海外的势力。没有政治上的特权，人们或许会感到不满；但倘若没有面包，那他们就会紧张得多了。注意到下述这一点，对美国人来说则更具益处：对于被视为一个海上强国的法兰西而言，由该国国土面积、气候宜人与富饶所导致的这一结果，已经在美国重现了。起初，美国人的先辈只拥有沿海一片狭长的土地，虽说没怎么开发出来，但许多地方都很肥沃，港口良多，离一些富产的渔场也很近。这些自然条件，同美国人那种天生的爱海之情结合起来了；因为美国人的血管中仍然奔涌着英国人的血液，使得他们想要将一种健全的制海权所依赖的那些倾向与追求保持下去。在最初的那13个殖民地里，差不多所有人都沿海而居，或是居于大河的沿岸。所有的出口与进口货物，常常都指向同一个沿海地区。对海洋的兴趣、了解并认识到海洋在社会福利方面所起的作用，都很容易、很广泛地扩散开来了；而一种比关注公共利益更有势力的动机也很盛行：因为造船材料丰富，其他方面的投资相对较少，所以海运便成了一种有利可图的私人利益。我们大家都明白，如今情况已经发生了多大的变化。现在，权力中心已不再集中于沿海地区了。图书和报纸都在竞相描述内陆地区那种不可思议的发展，以及那些尚未开发的财富。资本在内陆地区找到了最佳的投资渠道，而劳动力则在内陆地区找到了最大的就业机会。边远地区被人们视而不见，而它们在政治上也毫无影响力；事实上，墨西哥湾和太平洋沿岸地区就是这样，而大西洋沿岸相对于处在中心地带的密西西比河流域来说，也是这样。当海运再一次变得有利可图的时候，当那3个沿海的边远地区发现它们不仅在军事上处于弱势，还因为没有国内航运而更加贫困的时候，它们的共同努力或许就会有利于再次为我们的制海权打下基础了。到了那时，那些密切关注法国由于没有制海权而在国家事业上受到了种种牵制的人，可能就会痛惜祖国被一种国家财富貌似过剩的情况所引领，进入一种相同的、被那种强大工具所忽视的状况了。

在不断改变的那些自然条件当中，可能有一种形式的条件值得注意，就像意大利的情形那样——意大利是一个长长的半岛，其间有一条中央山脉，将该国分成了两个狭长的区域，而连接不同港口的道路，则必然沿着这两个区域延伸。只有绝对控制住海上，才能完全保护这些交通要道，因为我们不可能知道，从远处冒出来的敌人会进攻哪个地方；但是，倘若在中心位置驻有一支合适的海军，那么在我方遭受重大损失之前，去攻击同样属于对方基地与交通补给线的敌方舰队，还是大有希望的。狭长的佛罗里达半岛一端是基韦斯特，虽说地势平坦、人烟稀少，但一眼看去，与意大利的自然条件还是很相似的。这种相似性可能只是表面上的，但十有八九，倘若一场海战的主战场就在墨西哥湾，那么，经由陆路前往半岛末端的交通补给线可能就是一个重要问题，就会很容易遭到敌人攻击了。

倘若海洋不仅濒临或包围着一个国家，还将这个国家分成了两个或者多个部分，那么控制海洋就不仅有利，而且是一种极为必要的举措了。这样一种自然条件，要么会导致并加强该国的制海权，要么就会让该国变得软弱无能。这就是如今的意大利王国、连同撒丁和西西里二岛的情形；因此，我们可以看到，在早期以及如今仍然存在的金融劣势中，意大利早已开始了这种轰轰烈烈而明智的努力，来创建一支海军。人们甚至还认为，有了一支明显优于敌人的海军之后，意大利就能以其岛屿为实力基础，效果可能会比以其本土为实力基础更好；因为我们在前面已经指出，意大利半岛上的交通补给线很不安全，会让一支入侵的敌军在被敌意重重的意大利人所包围并受到来自海上的威胁之后，陷入一种严重的不利之境。

虽说爱尔兰海把不列颠群岛分割开来了，但它更像是一个港湾，而这种分割也并不是真正的割裂；不过历史业已表明，它给联合王国带来了危险。在路易十四统治时期，当时的法国海军堪与英、荷两国的联合海军相匹敌；因为存在严重的内乱，所以爱尔兰政府差不多全部为当地人和法国人所掌控了。尽管如此，爱尔兰海仍是英国人的一大危险——即他们交通补给方面的一处薄弱环节，也并不是法国人的一大优势。法国并不敢派遣轻型战列舰进入这片狭窄的水域，而该国旨在登陆的远征军，攻击的也是爱尔兰南部或者西部的海港。在决战之时，伟大的法国舰队被派往英格兰南部沿海，并在那儿击溃了英、荷联军，同时派了25艘护卫舰前往圣乔治海峡，以阻击英军的交通补给线。在爱尔兰的英军虽然身处一个充满敌意的民族当中，处境极其危险，但因博因河之战以及詹姆士二世逃跑而脱离了险境。这种针对敌军交通补给线的作战行动，完全是战略性的；所以对于目前的英国来说，形势就跟1690年时一样危险。

在同一个世纪中，西班牙也给我们提供了一个令人印象深刻的教训，表明这种领土分割倘若未由一种强大的制海权联结起来，便会带来极大的劣势。此时，西班牙凭借昔日辉煌的余势，仍然保有尼德兰（即如今的比利时）、西西里以及其他本属意大利的领地，而且还在新世界里有着数量众多的殖民地。然而，西班牙的海上力量已经衰落到无以复加的地步，所以当时一位见多识广、头脑冷静的荷兰人都可以这样说：“西班牙所有的沿海地区，都有一些荷兰船只在航行；自1648年和约签订以来，该国的船只和水手数量都在急剧减少，所以他们开始公开招募我国船只前往印度群岛，而在以前，他们却非常谨慎，从不让外国人去那儿……”他接着说：“很显然，作为西班牙之‘胃’的西印度群岛（因为西班牙差不多所有的税收都来自于此处），必须由一支海军来将它与西班牙的‘头’联结起来才行；那不勒斯与尼德兰虽说就像两只胳膊，但它们无法为西班牙出力，并且除了海运，也无法从西班牙那里获得什么利益——在和平时期，我们的运输船只都可以做到这些；而在战时，则可用船只来进行阻挠。”半个世纪之前，亨利四世的一位大臣萨利曾经归纳了西班牙的特点，说它属于“那种双腿与两只胳膊都强大有力，可内心却软弱无比的国家之一。”自此以后，西班牙海军所遭遇的就不仅是损失惨重，还被完全摧毁了；它不仅受到了羞辱，还完全落魄了。简而言之，结果就是西班牙的海运毁于一旦，而制造业也随之衰落了。西班牙政府不是凭借一种广泛而健全、本可以使之经受起多次重大打击的贸易业和工业，而是依赖于一条小小的资金流，通过不多的宝船从美洲将银子运回；这些船只，很容易并且经常被敌人的巡逻船所截获。损失6条大帆船，就会让西班牙政府一年都无法行动，而出现这种情况，却早已不止一次了。就在尼德兰的战争持续进行之时，荷兰便控制了海上，迫使西班牙不得不经由漫长、代价巨大的陆路运送部队，而无法经由海上来运送。同一原因，也使得西班牙只剩下为数不多的海峡可以运送生活必需品了；但西、荷双方却一致商定，由荷兰船只来运送西班牙所需的补给品——在现代人看来，这种做法是非常怪异的。荷兰船只虽说以这种方式支持了本国的敌人，但作为回报，它们却获得了当时很受阿姆斯特丹交易所欢迎的银币。在美洲，西班牙人得不到本国的支援，躲在砖石结构的建筑里，尽可能地明哲保身；与此同时，地中海地区的西班牙人，则主要是利用荷兰人的毫不在乎而躲过了一劫，因为法国人和英国人那时还没有开始争夺此处的主导权。随着历史的发展，尼德兰、那不勒斯、西西里、米诺卡、哈瓦那、马尼拉和牙买加等地，或早或晚，都一一被从这个没有航运业的国家手中夺走了。总之，虽然西班牙海上力量的软弱可能是其全面衰落的一种征兆，但它也成为了让该国陷入无底深渊的一个显著因素，而迄今为止，西班牙也还没有完全跳出这个深渊。

除了阿拉斯加，美国并没有海外领土——即没有什么领土是无法从陆上到达的。它的外形轮廓，使得该国没有什么特别薄弱的特点，而其边境上的所有重要区域，也都能够轻易到达——水路很便宜，铁路又很快捷。最为薄弱的边境就是太平洋沿岸，但此处离那些最危险的敌人都很远。与该国目前所需相比，美国的国内资源可谓无穷无尽；用一位法国官员对作者所说的话来说，就是我们可以在“我们的这个小角落里”靠自己世世代代地永远生活下去。然而，倘若一条经由中美地峡的新商路侵入了这个“小角落”，那么，美国可能就会像那些已经放弃了海洋——各个民族与生俱来即对海洋拥有权力——的人一样，猛然觉醒了。

（三）领土范围——影响到一个海洋大国的发展，并且涉及到该民族区别于居住在该国之人的最后一个条件，便是领土范围。对于这一点，用较少的内容就能加以说明。

从制海权的发展来说，领土范围并不是指一个国家的总面积，而是指其海岸线的长度，以及所要考虑之海港的特征。关于这些方面，我们要说，如果地理和自然条件相同，那么海岸线的长度，根据人口多寡的比例来看，就是一国国力强大或者衰弱的根源了。在这个方面，一个国家就像是一座要塞；卫戍部队的兵力，必须与要塞城郭的长度成正比才行。最近有一个人们都很熟悉的例子，这便是美国内战。倘若南方人口数量众多且英勇无畏，还有一支与这个海上强国其他资源相称的海军，那么其漫长的海岸线以及数不胜数的小港，就会是使得南部邦联具有强大实力的基本要素了。合众国人民以及当时的合众国政府都很有理由自豪，因为他们极为有效地封锁了南方的整个沿海地区。这是一件了不起的壮举，一件极其了不起的壮举；不过，倘若南方人口很多、全民皆水兵的话，那么这就会是一种不可能实现的壮举了。此例所表明的，并不是如何才能维持这样一种封锁，就像之前已经说过的那样，而是在面对一帮非但不习惯于海战、而且数量稀少的南方人时，是有可能进行这种封锁的。那些能够回想起这种封锁是如何维持下去的人都明白，这个封锁计划虽说在当时的情况下是正确的，但在面对一支真正的海军时，却根本不可能实现。合众国的舰船散布在沿海地区，无人支援，单独或以小支舰队为单位驻守自己的阵地，而面对的却是一张有利于敌人进行秘密集结的、巨大的内河交通网。第一道内河交通线的背后，是长长的港湾和星罗棋布的坚固要塞，敌舰以前一向都是可以撤退到这两个地方，来躲避追击或者受到掩护的。倘若有一支南方海军能够利用这些优势，或者能够利用合众国舰船散布各处、不集中的情况进击，那么合众国的舰船就不可能再像以前那样分散了；而由于合众国的舰船不得不集结起来彼此支援，所以就会留下许多虽小却很有用的通路，南方就可以进行贸易了。不过，就像南方沿海地区因为面积广阔、港湾众多而本可以成为一种实力之源那样，也正是这些特点，使得它成为了让南方不断受到攻击的一大原因。打开密西西比河的伟大经历，只不过是南方各地正在不断进行的作战行动中，一个最为引人注目的例子罢了。每攻破一处海疆，都会有战舰驶入内陆。那些曾经运送财富、支撑脱联各州贸易的河流，如今开始不利于它们，让敌人能够深入各州腹地了。许多地区都开始惊慌沮丧、心神不安、政务瘫痪起来；假如保护得更恰当一点儿的话，这些地区本来是可以让一个国家保持生机，度过这场极为费神的战争的。在北美大陆，制海权还从未比在这场战争中那样，发挥过更加巨大或者更具决定性的作用；这场战争，决定了世界历史进程将由一个大国而非数个相互竞争之国家所改写。不过，虽说人们为那个年代所获得的辉煌成就而感到自豪，也承认那些赫赫战果应当归功于海军所占的优势，但了解事实的美国人决不应当忘记提醒自己的同胞不要过分自信，因为当时的南方诸州非但没有海军，南方人非但不是一个从事航海业的民族，而且南方的人口数量也与它必须防御的漫长海岸线不成正比。

（四）人口数量——探讨过一个国家的自然条件之后，接下来我们就应当来审视一下影响到一国制海权发展的人口特点了；而首先应当加以研究的，便是居于该国之中的总人口，原因就在于前面我们刚刚讨论过的、一国总人口与其领土范围的关系。我们已经说过，领土范围并非仅仅是指一国有多少平方英里，它还包括与制海权相关的、需要加以考虑的海岸线的长度与特点；因此，说到人口数量，它也并非仅仅是指一国的总人口，还应当包括该国的海员人数，或者起码来说，也应当算上那些可以上船工作、能够创造海军用品的人才行。

比如说，从前以及直到法国大革命之后历次大战结束的时候，法国人口都大大超过了英国；不过，就总体的制海权、和平的商业贸易以及军事效率而言，法国却大不如英国。在军事效率方面，这一事实则更为显著；因为有的时候，虽说法国在战争爆发之初的军事准备方面具有优势，但该国却无力保持住这种优势。因此，在1778年战争爆发的时候，法国由于海员在册人数众多，所以能够一次性装备50艘轻型战列舰。与此相反，英国却由于自己的海运船只散布于世界各地——其海军实力也因此而得到了保存——所以，在本国装备40艘战船都难以做到；但到了1782年，英国却有了120艘现役和预备役战列舰，而法国的战列舰总数却一直都没有超过71艘。此外，晚至1840年，当英法两国在黎凡特剑拔弩张、战事一触即发的时候，当时一位极为博学的法国军官，在赞扬法国舰队的高效以及法国海军司令的诸多杰出品质，并且表达出遭遇同等规模的敌军时法国能打胜仗的信心之后，接着说：“我们除了当时所能集结的、由21艘战列舰所组成的这支小型舰队之外，并无预备舰船；而在6个月内，也不可能再有另外一艘舰船来服役。”出现这种状况，并不仅仅是因为没有舰船和合适的装备，尽管这二者法军都很匮乏。“我们的海军兵源，”这名法国军官接着说，“因为我们所做的工作（即装备了21艘船只）已经消耗殆尽了，所以各地制定的永久性征兵政策，并没有让那些已经在军舰上服役了3年多的海员得以轮换。”

这样一种对比，表明了在所谓的“持久力”或者“后备力量”方面的差异，且此种差异比表面看起来的更加巨大；因为一支大型的海上舰队，除了船员，必然还会招募一大批其他人员，来从事能够促进生产和维修海军用品的体力工作，或者完成与海洋、与各种船只多少密切相关的其他工作。这种工作任务，从一开始就具有确定的海上性质。有一件趣闻，表现了属于英国最杰出水兵之一的爱德华·佩鲁爵士对这个问题具有一种古怪的见解。1793年战争爆发之时，照常出现了海员不足的问题。由于渴望出海作战，而除了没有出过海的人，他又补不满全员，于是他便命令手下的军官去找康沃尔郡的矿工；对于他们所要执行任务的环境与种种危险，他自己都非常了解，故推断出这些人会很快适应海上的生活。结果证明了爱德华的睿智与远见，因为这样一来，他就丝毫也没有耽误时间，而他的运气也很好，俘虏了此次战争中单场战斗所缴获的第一艘护卫舰；尤具启发性的是，尽管他的手下才服役数周，敌军服役却已一年多了，但双方的损失都差不多，都很惨重。

或许有人会坚持说，这样的后备力量，如今不像以前那样重要了，因为现代舰船和现代武器制造起来耗时颇久，还因为现代各国的目标都是加强武装部队的整体力量，以便一旦开战，便能在敌人发起同样的进攻之前，以迅雷不及掩耳之势，对敌人进行毁灭性的打击。用大家都很熟悉的话来说，就是不会有时间来让国家结构所组织的全面性抵抗发挥作用；这种打击针对的是已经组建起来的作战舰队，倘若作战舰队都投降了，那么国家结构中的其余部分哪怕再坚实，也会无济于事。在某种程度上，这话是对的；不过在当时，情况却一向如此，只是过去的程度比如今稍轻而已。假定有两支事实上代表了两国目前整体力量的舰队遭遇了，要是其中一支被击溃，而另一支仍能正常作战的话，那么战败的一方能够重建海军、继续这场战争的希望，如今就会比以前要小得多了；而战争结果所造成的损失，也会与该国对海军的依赖程度成正比。倘若当时的英国舰队跟法、西联合舰队一样，代表了该国的整体力量，那么，一场特拉法尔加这样的海战，就会给英国带来致命一击，并且程度要比它给法国带来的打击沉重得多。对于英国来说，特拉法尔加海战的后果，本来会像奥斯特利茨之战对奥地利、耶拿[3]战役对俄罗斯的后果一样；一个庞大的帝国，会因军事力量被摧毁或因军队瓦解而不得不向敌人俯首称臣——据说，这就是拿破仑最为钟爱的作战目标。

但是，考虑到过去这些特殊的惨败，是不是就让我们有了理由，来轻视此处所研究的、以适合于服某种兵役的人口数量为基础的那种后备力量呢？前面所提到的军事打击，都是由一些非凡的天才人物所进行的，他们指挥着经过特殊训练、有着集体荣誉感且威名远播的军队，给予那些因为知道自己不如对方、或者因为以前的失败而多少有点儿士气低落的敌人以沉重打击。奥斯特利茨战役之前不久，刚刚发生了乌尔姆之战，此战中有35000名奥地利士兵不发一枪便放下了武器；而在此前的许多年间，一直都是奥地利失败、法国取胜。特拉法尔加海战，也是紧随一次节节失利的巡航（或者完全可以称之为一场战役）之后发生的；再往前看，不过仍属于近来发生的战斗，就是西班牙人记忆中的圣文森特角战役、法国人记忆中的尼罗河河口之战，两次都是这两国的联合舰队在作战。除了耶拿之战，这些决定性的失败都并非是单次战斗的惨败，而都是最后一击；在耶拿战役中，由于双方兵力、武器装备和整体备战等方面悬殊都很大，所以不太适合据此来研究某一次获胜可能会带来什么样的结果。

英国是目前世界上最大的海洋国家；凭借铁甲汽船，它继续保持着木制帆船时代的那种优势。法、英是两大列强，拥有规模最大的海军，而对于两国之间究竟谁更强大这个问题，迄今尚无定论；或许我们可以认为，它们在进行海战时，兵力和装备等方面实际上是不分伯仲的。假如爆发战争的话，那我们能不能认为，有这样一种兵力或者准备上的差异，使得仅凭一场战斗或者一次战役，就很可能带来一种具有决定意义的力量悬殊呢？倘若没有的话，那么后备力量就是差异了；首先是有组织的后备力量，然后就是航海人口的储备、机械技术和财力的储备了。人们似乎有点儿忘记了，英国在机械工艺方面的领先地位，使得它储备了大量的技师，这些技师能够轻而易举地熟悉现代铁甲船的种种设备；而随着人们感到了战争给商贸与工业所带来的重负，这些富余的水手与技师就会投身到军舰上去。

无论后备力量发达与否，我们讨论的问题实质就是，现代战争的条件，会不会很可能导致出现这样一种情形：两个势均力敌的国家，其中的一国在某一次战役中被打得落花流水，从而一蹶不振。海上战争并未给出这一问题的答案。普鲁士对奥地利、德意志对法国的压倒性胜利，似乎都是势力悬殊的强国对弱国的胜利，无论这种弱势是因为自然原因还是政府的无能所导致的。倘若土耳其拥有能够征召的全国性后备力量，那么，像普列文[4]之战中那样的贻误战机，又怎么会影响到战争的命运呢？

假如像世界各国都公认的那样，战争中有一种至高无上的主导因素，那么，国内的人才并非军事性的、民众也像所有崇尚自由的民族一样反对为庞大的军事机构买单的那些国家，就理应确保自己至少具有赢得必要的时间、将国民的精神和力量转向战争所要求的种种新行动中去的能力。倘若现存的陆军或者海军足够强大，即便处于劣势也能坚持抵抗的话，那么，该国就可以依赖其自然资源与自然力量——即人口、财力以及其他种种生产能力，而不论这些自然资源和自然力量价值几何——来发挥作用了。另一方面，倘若该国拥有的这些资源能被敌人很快地摧毁并碾碎的话，那么就算自然之力鬼斧神工，也是不会让其免于蒙羞的；并且，假如敌人够聪明的话，还不会让它有在遥远的将来进行复仇的机会。这种情况，在那些规模较小的战场不停地重现。“倘若如此能够再坚持一会儿的话，就能挽救这个或完成那个了”；这就像是在生病的时候，人们常说的那样：“就算病人只能坚持这么久，病人的体力也可以让其恢复健康的。”

从某种程度上来说，英国如今就是这样的一个国家。荷兰也是这样；它是不会有什么好结果的，而倘若它逃过一劫的话，那也不过是虎口余生罢了。伟大的政治家德·威特曾这样写道：“在和平时期，由于害怕关系破裂，他们绝不会预先就下定会导致国家财力受损的决心。荷兰人的性格就是这样，除非危险到了眼前，否则他们是不愿意留出资金来进行防御的。我是在同一个这样的民族打交道，他们在应当节省的地方慷慨得很，而在应当花钱的时候往往却又省得抠门、贪得无厌。”

我国也容易遭到这样的指摘，全世界都知道这一点。美国并没有那种可以让它赢得时间来发展后备力量的防御和保护力量。至于能够满足它可能的发展所需的海上从业人口，又在哪儿呢？这样一种与海岸线与总人口成正比的资源，只存在于全国性的商船运输业及其相关产业里，而目前美国这样的相关产业却极少。这种船只上的船员是本国人还是外国人并不重要，只要他们忠于美国就行；而万一爆发战争，美国的海上力量只要足以让他们中的大多数人活着回来就行。倘若允许成千上万的外国人服兵役，那么他们上船之后，给予他们应有的作战空间就并不重要了。

虽说在讨论这一主题时有点儿不着边际，但毫无疑问，有大量人口从事与海洋相关的工作，是制海权的一大要素，这一点古今并无不同；美国在这一要素上无疑是有着缺陷的；只有当美国有了自己的大规模贸易之后，才能为确立其制海权奠定基础。

（五）民族性格——接下来，我们就来讨论一下民族性格与民族习性对于发展制海权的影响。

假如制海权确实是以一种和平而广泛的商业贸易为基础的，那么从事商业活动的习性，便必定是曾经在海洋上取得过伟大成就的所有民族一个显著的特征。历史几乎证明了这一点，除了罗马人，我们找不到与此相反的其他显著例子。

所有的人都图谋利益，并且或多或少都喜欢钱财；不过，谋求利益的方式，却会对居于一国之中的某个民族的商业命运以及历史产生明显的影响。

倘若历史可信的话，西班牙人以及与之同源的葡萄牙人追求财富的方式，就不仅给其民族性格带来了污点，还危及到了其商业贸易的健康成长；同样，这也给商业贸易所赖以生存的一些产业带来了危害，并最终危及到了那些通过错误方法所获得的国家财富。对于利润的渴求，在他们心中变成了一种强烈的贪婪；因此，在给欧洲各国商业贸易和海洋事业发展带来了如此巨大动力的新世界，他们寻求的不是新的产业领域，甚至也不是探索和探险带来的那种健康的兴奋之感，而是金子和银子。他们有着种种了不起的品质：大胆、有进取心、温和、任劳任怨、充满热情，并且天生具有强烈的民族感情。当这些品质加上位置优势和有诸多良港的优势，以及它率先在新世界占领了广大的富庶之地并在很长时间内没有敌手，而且在发现美洲之后的100年间它一直是欧洲首屈一指的国家等事实后，西班牙本来是有望在海洋大国中占据最为重要的位置的。可众所周知，结果却恰好相反。自1571年的勒班陀之战后，尽管参加过多次战争，但在西班牙历史上，却从未在海战中获得过什么具有重大意义的胜利；而其商业贸易的衰退，则充分说明了该国战舰表现出来的那种可悲的、有时甚至是很荒谬的不当行为的原因。毫无疑问，我们并不能将这种结果仅仅归结于一个原因。西班牙政府无疑也用尽了种种办法，来限制和破坏私有企业，使之无法自由而健康地发展；不过，一个伟大的民族是会突破政府的限制，或者塑造政府的品格的，而倘若民众嗜好贸易，则其政府也会被吸引到这种趋势当中来，这一点也是无可置疑的。并且，西班牙诸殖民地的广袤土地，都远离该国专制政治的中心；而正是这种专制政治，束缚了旧西班牙的发展。结果就是，成千上万的西班牙人，其中既有工人阶层，也有上流人士，都离开了西班牙；但他们在国外所从事的工作，却并没有给祖国带回来什么东西；他们带回的只有银币，或者只需小吨位船舶即可运送的小宗商品。西班牙国内的物产极少，只有羊毛、水果和铁器；该国完全没有制造企业；工业企业经营状况惨淡；人口数量也一直在减少。西班牙及其各个殖民地，都严重依赖于荷兰人为其提供大量的生活必需品，以至于该国仅有的那些工业企业所生产的商品，还不够用于购买这些生活必需品。“因此，”当时有人这样写道，“那些带着钱到世界各地购买商品的荷兰商人，必定会把货物卖给欧洲这一个国家，然后再把所收到的货款带回家。”这样，西班牙人热衷于寻求的这种财富象征，很快又从他们的手中流走了。前面我们已经指出，从军事角度来看，西班牙因其海运业的这种衰退，已经变得极为脆弱了。该国的财源，全都一小批一小批地集中于为数不多的船只上，而这些船只几乎一直都沿着惯常的航线航行，所以很容易被敌人截获，从而切断该国用于支撑战争的财力资源；但英国和荷兰的财富，则归功于两国在世界各地散布着成千上万条船只，所以虽说在多次旷日持久的战争中也受到过许多沉重的打击，却并未阻碍到两国财力的增长；而且，这种增长尽管费劲得很，却一直都很平稳。葡萄牙由于在历史上一个极为关键的时期与西班牙搅和在一起，所以它的国力也同样日益衰弱了：尽管在海权发展的初期，它名列各国前茅，但如今却完全落后了。“巴西的矿山是葡萄牙的没落之源，就像墨西哥和秘鲁的矿山是西班牙的没落之源那样；所有的制造企业全都陷入了受人鄙视的荒唐处境，而不久之后，非但是衣物，连所有的商品，甚至是咸鱼和粮食，葡萄牙也都要由英国来供应了。为了淘金，葡萄牙人放弃了自己的土地；而波尔图的葡萄园，最终也被英国人用源自巴西的黄金买走了——这些黄金，只是在葡萄牙人手中过了一遍，就流入到英国各地去了。”我们可以确定，在50年间，“从巴西的矿山中”榨取的财富高达5亿美元，“而最终，葡萄牙却只剩下2500万美元的金币”——这可是关于真实财富与虚假财富之间差异的一个突出的例子。

英国人与荷兰人的逐利之心，并不亚于欧洲南方的各个民族。这两个民族，每一个都曾经被世人称作“小店主民族”[5]，不过这种讥讽要是公正的话，就说明他们的聪明与公正名不虚传。他们一样大胆，一样有事业心，一样能够吃苦耐劳。事实上，他们更加任劳任怨，因为他们并不是凭借刀枪来掠夺财富，而是通过劳动来逐利的，这也是前述绰号隐含了那种指摘之意的原因；因为这样一来，他们走的就是一条最远的、而非看上去最近的致富之路。但是，这两个民族从根本上来说属于同一种族，还有着与上述特点同样重要的其他品质；这些品质与他们所处的环境结合起来，便极大地有利于其海洋事业的发展了。他们天生就是实业家、商人、生产者和航海家。因此，在本国或者国外，无论是在文明国家的港口，还是处于野蛮残暴的东方君主统治之下，或者是在自己建立的各个殖民地中，他们都见缝插针，努力地利用并开发所有的土地资源。这种天生的商人，或者“小店主”——要是您愿意这样称呼他们的话——有着机敏的本能，使得他们孜孜不倦地去寻找可用于交换的新商品；而这种求索精神，与因世代辛劳而进化出来的那种勤奋性格结合起来，就让他们必然地变成了生产者。在本国，他们与制造者一样伟大；在国外，他们所辖之地的土地日益富庶，物产也日益倍增，而要在国内与这些殖民地之间进行必要的商品交换，就得有更多的船舶。因此，他们的运输业便随着这些贸易需求节节增长了，而那些发展海洋事业的能力较弱的民族，即便是一向伟大的法兰西，也需要英国人和荷兰人的产品，也需要英、荷两国的船舶来为他们效力了。这样，他们便通过种种途径，开始取得海洋的控制权。这种自然而然的趋势和发展，实际上曾不时因别国政府的干预而被改变，并且受到了严重的制约；那些国家妒忌英、荷两国的繁荣兴旺，但那些国家的人民只有在得到人为的撑腰时才能干扰这种繁荣和兴旺——所以，这种撑腰就可以看作是政府为影响制海权而采取的行动。

对于贸易的这种爱好，必然还会导致他们生产出某种东西来进行贸易；而对于制海权的发展来说，这就是最重要的一种民族特质。有了这种特质和条件优异的沿海地区之后，来自海上的危险或者不愿意出海的心态，就不太可能会阻碍一个民族通过海上贸易去追逐财富了。在用其他方式追求财富的国度，可能也存在着这种特质；但是，它并非一定就会使某个民族获得制海权。以法国为例。法国是一个美好的国家，有着勤劳的民族，地理位置也很不错。法国海军曾经有过一段极为辉煌、威名远扬的时期；而哪怕是处于最底层的官兵，也从未让整个民族所珍视的法国军队的声誉受过损害。然而，作为一个海洋国家，虽然拥有安全而广泛的海上贸易基础，但法兰西跟历史上其他从事海洋事业的民族相比，却从未维持过一种受人敬重的地位。其主要原因，就民族性格这方面来看，即在于他们追逐财富所用的方式。正如西班牙和葡萄牙两国从地下挖掘金矿来追求财富那样，法兰西民族的性格，决定了他们是通过节约、省俭和聚积来追逐财富的。据说，守财比生财更难。可能是这样吧；不过，喜欢冒险、为了获取更多而甘愿冒险的性格，与那种为了商业贸易而征服世界的冒险精神，是有诸多共同之处的。喜欢节约、喜欢积蓄、进行谨慎而小规模投机的脾性，虽说可能会使财富以小规模进行扩散，不会有风险，但也不会让对外贸易和航运业务得以发展起来。举例来说——举此例子，只是因为它具有积极的一面——一位法国军官在跟作者谈到巴拿马运河时，是这样说的：“我在其中入了两股。在法国，我们不会像你们那样由少数人持股，每个人的股份都很多。我们是由许多人持股，每个人都只持一股或者几股。巴拿马运河的股票上市时，我的妻子这样跟我说：‘你去买两股吧，一股给你，另一股给我。'”就个人财产的稳定性而论，这种谨慎无疑是很明智的；不过，倘若过分谨慎或者让金融上的胆小变成了一种民族特征，就必然会阻碍到商业贸易和该国运输业的扩张了。而他们在另一种生活关系中，表现出来的那种对于金钱问题的小心谨慎，已经妨碍到了人们的生儿育女，使得法国的人口增长几乎一直都停滞不前了。

欧洲的贵族阶层，从中世纪起就有目空一切地轻视商业贸易的传统；这种态度，依不同国家的民族特性而定，已经对和平贸易的发展产生了根本性的影响。西班牙人的自负，与这种蔑视精神一拍即合，还与那种不愿工作、不愿等待的糟糕态度结合起来了。在法国，连法国人自己都承认是民族特性的那种虚荣心，也是朝着这个方向发展的。贵族阶层的人数和显赫地位，以及他们受到的敬重，都给他们所鄙视的贸易这一职业贴上了“低人一等”的标签。富有的商人和工厂主都渴望得到贵族封号，而一旦他们获得贵族头衔，便都不再从事那些生财有道的职业了。因此，虽说人民的勤劳和土地的多产并未让该国的商业贸易完全衰退下去，但人们都是带着一种羞耻感来从事贸易的，使得那些最有商业贸易才能的人一旦有可能，便纷纷离开了这一行业。在柯尔贝尔[6]的影响下，路易十四颁布了一项法令，“授权所有贵族都可参股商船、货物和商品并获利，只要他们不参与零售，就不会被认为有损贵族声誉”；而采取这一行动的原因则是，“它关系到我国臣民的切身利益和我们自身的满意度，会消除大众关于贵族阶层不适于从事海洋贸易的普遍观念。”但是，一种涉及有意的、公开的优越感的偏见，是不会轻易地被法令消除的，尤其是当虚荣心变成了民族性格中一种明显的特征之后；何况多年之后，孟德斯鸠又告诫人们说，贵族从事贸易，是与君主制度的精神背道而驰的。

在荷兰，也存在着一个贵族阶层；不过，该国名义上却属于共和政体，容许存在宽泛的个人自由和自主性，而国家的权力中心也都位于大城市里。国家强盛伟大的基础，便是金钱——或者说财富。作为一种使公民之间产生差异的原因，财富在国家当中同时也伴随着权力；有了权力之后，便有了社会地位和荣誉。在英国，也出现了同样的结果。贵族阶层自负得很；但在一个代议制政府里，既没法遏制有钱人的力量，也无法让财富的势力显得不重要。大家都知道这一点，大家也都尊重这一点；英国与荷兰一样，那些能够带来财富的职业，共同分享着财富本身所赋予的那种尊荣。因此，在上述两国，民族性格所导致的社会舆情，显著地影响到了整个民族对待贸易的态度。

然而，民族精神的确还以另外一种方式，影响着最为广义的制海权发展；这一点，就是迄今为止制海权能够让诸多兴旺发达的殖民地建立起来的原因。殖民事业的发展，就像其他方面的发展那样，在最自然的时候的确是最兴旺的。因此，整个民族因感受到种种需求和自然冲动而建立起来的殖民地，就会拥有最为坚实的基础；而要是该国人民还拥有独立自主的精神，那么当这些殖民地受到本国束缚最少的时候，它们随后的发展就会最有保障。过去三个世纪，人们已经深切地感受到了殖民地作为本国产品的销售市场，作为哺育商业和海运业的温床，对于母国的重要性了；但在殖民事业上所做的努力，却并非出于同一种原因，而不同的殖民制度，也并非全都一样地获得了成功。政治家们的努力，无论是多么的深谋远虑和小心谨慎，都无法替代那种强烈的自然冲动；倘若在民族性格中开始出现自我发展的萌芽，那么就算本国最缜密的法规，也不如一种巧妙的忽视，能够让它带来好的结果。在国家对那些成功兴旺的殖民地的管辖中，跟对那些不成功的殖民地进行管辖相比，并没有表现出什么更伟大的智慧来。没准儿，前者所表现出来的智慧，甚至还不如后者呢。假如精心设计的制度和监管、切实改变实现目标的手段和勤勉的呵护，能够有益于殖民地发展的话，那么英格兰民族精神中的这种系统化能力，就不如法兰西的民族精神；可是，世界上最大的殖民者却是英国，而不是法国。成功的殖民事业，连同它随后对商业贸易和制海权所产生的影响，都主要取决于民族性格；因为各个殖民地都是在自我成长、自然发展的时候，发展得最好。殖民地发展的源泉，是殖民者的性格，而不是母国政府对殖民地的监管。

这一事实，因为所有母国政府对待殖民地的态度通常都是完全自私的，而显得更为清晰。无论殖民地是怎样建立的，一旦人们看到了它的重要性，对于母国来说，该殖民地就成了一头能够挤奶的奶牛；当然，殖民地也需要照管，但母国政府主要是把它当成一种财产，重视它所能带来的回报，才去照管的。制定法律法规，目的是垄断殖民地的对外贸易；殖民地政府中的各个职位，为母国派遣的人员提供了重要的岗位；而且人们都认为，殖民地是一个安置本国难以管束或毫无用处者的合适之所，就像如今人们仍然经常那样看待海洋一样。然而，只要殖民地存在一天，军事管治就是母国政府正当而且必要的统治手段。

英国作为一个伟大的殖民国家，其独一无二且精彩非凡的成功也极其明显，故无需我们再来详述；而该国成功的原因，似乎主要在于其民族性格中的两种特质。英国的殖民者很自然、也很乐意生活在自己新开辟的国土之上，把新国家的利益当成自己的利益；并且，他们尽管保持着对祖国充满深情的回忆，但并没有急于返回祖国的这种不安分想法。其次，英国人会马不停蹄地去开发新国家中最为广义的种种资源。在前一种特质上，英国人与法国人完全不同，因为法国人始终都热切地回想着生活在美丽祖国时的种种乐事；而在后一种特质上，英国人则有别于西班牙人，因为对于一个有着种种可能、会全面发展起来的新国家而言，西班牙人的兴趣范围太过狭窄了。

荷兰人的性格和需求，使得他们自然而然地开始建立殖民地；到了1650年，他们已经在东印度群岛、非洲和美洲拥有了数不胜数的殖民地了。当时，在建立殖民地这个方面，荷兰要领先于英国许多。不过，在性质上纯属商业逐利的这些殖民地似乎一直缺乏一种令它们发展繁荣起来的源泉。“在建立这些殖民地的过程中，他们从未想过帝国扩张的问题，只是想着通过商业贸易来获利。他们只是在为环境压力所迫时，才会想要去进行征服。通常来说，能够在本国君主的保护之下进行贸易，他们就心满意足了。”这种没有政治野心、只想获利的温和的满足感，常常就像法国和西班牙的独裁统治一样，使得诸殖民地只是一种依赖于母国的商业属地，从而切断了其自然发展与繁荣的源泉。

在不再进行这方面的探究之前，我们不妨还问上一问，假如其他条件有利的话，美国人的民族性格，在多大程度上适合于建立起一种伟大的制海权。

不过，我们无需费神，只需看一看不久之前的历史就能证明，要是没有法律上的障碍，要是在开拓进取中有更多划算的领域得到了充实，那么，确立制海权就要不了多久。喜欢从事商业贸易的天性，在逐利过程中的大胆精神，以及对于通往财富之路的敏锐嗅觉，美国人全都具备；所以，将来倘若有什么值得进行殖民的领域，那么毫无疑问，美国人就会带着传承下来的那种民主自治和独立发展的天资，进入这些领域。

（六）政府的特征——在讨论一个国家的政府和制度对于其制海权所产生的影响时，必须避免那种过度哲学化的倾向，不能将注意力只限于那些明显而直接的原因，以及它们清晰的结果上，而不去深入探究表面之下那些深远而终极的影响。

尽管如此，我们还是必须认识到，不同的政府形式、与之相应的政治制度以及统治者的性格，都曾对制海权的发展产生过极其重大的影响。我们已经详细探讨过，一个国家与该国国民的不同特点，构成了一个民族的自然特征，就像一个人在开始其事业时所带有的那些自然特征一样；而政府的行为，反过来又与明智地发挥其自制力相对应：倘若发挥得明智、有力而坚忍不拔，就会让一个人在人生中、一个国家在历史上获得成功；倘若与此相反，自然就会导致失败。

一个完全顺应民众嗜好的政府，似乎在各个方面都很可能极为成功地促进其自身的发展；并且，在制海权这个问题上，史上最为辉煌的成就，都是在一个完全充满了民众的精神、很清楚民众真正普遍爱好的政府英明领导之下取得的。倘若人民的意愿，或者说自然拥戴政府的精英们的意愿，在创建政府的过程中发挥了重要的参与作用，那么，这样的政府才是最为稳固的。不过，这种自由民主的政府并不多，一方面，明智而不懈地运用专制权力，有的时候也会很直接地建立起规模庞大的海洋贸易和一支杰出的海军，而自由民族则由于进展比较缓慢，所以这一点是难以企及的。另一方面的难处在于，在某位专制君主去世之后，如何才能确保继续坚定不移地将其政策执行下去。

英国无疑是现代所有国家中达到了海权巅峰的一个国家，所以英国政府的作为，值得我们首先来加以注意。这种作为，虽说常常不值得称颂，但在总体方针上却是连贯一致的。它的目标，一直都是控制海洋。英国人最自负地表达这一点的一个例子，可以远溯到詹姆士一世统治时期；当时，英国除了本国的各个岛屿，几乎还没有占领过别的地方，而弗吉尼亚或马萨诸塞等地也还没有开始拓殖。下面就是黎塞留对这种情况的报告：

“身为亨利四世（历史上最具骑士风度的亲王之一）重臣的苏利公爵[7]，在加来港乘坐一艘主桅悬挂法国国旗的法国船只出发，一抵达英吉利海峡，便碰上了一艘守候在那里多时了的英国通信船；英国通信船上的舰长命令这艘法国船只落旗投降。苏利公爵认为自己有能力免受此种屈辱，便鲁莽地拒绝投降；但他拒绝之后，便挨了三炮，炮弹击穿了他的座舰，击中了船体中心，也击穿了所有优秀法国人的心。武力使他不得不在道义所禁止的东西面前屈服了，而他提出的所有控诉，都只换来了英王这样的回答：‘正如职责令他必须尊重您这位大使的官衔一样，他的职责，也让他为了行使他的主人作为海洋领袖的权力。’就算英王詹姆士这话说得更有礼貌一点儿，其效果无非也是使苏利公爵在假装满意的同时，不得不去深思自己应该谨慎这个问题；而他所受的创伤，却是痛苦而永久的了。亨利大帝这一次不得不采取温和稳健的措施了；不过，由于他决心下次一定要通过武力来维护自己的王权，因此在时间的帮助之下，他应当是有能力威胁到海洋的。”

从现代的观点来看，此种不可饶恕的傲慢行径，是最为明显、也是最早表明了英国不惜一切代价都要维持其海上霸权的标志；而这次事件，竟然是英国最为胆小谨慎的一位国王所为。这种空洞的国家荣誉，除了向外界表明了一国政府的目标之外，其实是一种无足轻重的权利；但在克伦威尔治下，跟在历任英王治下那样，英国却一直生硬地坚持着这种权利。这是荷兰人在经历了1645年那场损失惨重的战争之后，所放弃的和平条件之一。除了名义上，克伦威尔其实是一个彻头彻尾的暴君，他对于英国荣誉和力量相关的所有事情都很积极，并不会因为别国表现出了空泛的敬意，就停止提升英国威望和势力的脚步。虽说此时还并不强大，但英国海军却在他的严酷统治之下，迅速地获得了新生和活力。散布于世界各地的英国舰队——在波罗的海和地中海地区对抗巴巴里诸国[8]，以及在西印度群岛——都需要拥有英国的种种权利，或者说都需要弥补它们曾经犯下的失误；在他的统治之下，征服牙买加就是开始了通过武力扩张大英帝国的步伐，而这种扩张，一直持续到了如今我们所处的这个时代。人们也并没有忘记，使得英国商业贸易和海上运输发展壮大起来的那些同样强大有力的和平措施。克伦威尔那部赫赫有名的《航海法案》，规定英国及其各殖民地进口的所有货物，都必须由英国本国的船只来运输，或是由商品出产国的船只来运输。这一法令虽是专门针对号称“欧洲公共承运者”的荷兰人的，却招来了整个商贸世界的不满；不过，在那个充斥着民族冲突和民族仇恨的时代，这样做对英国人的好处却是非常明显的，所以这一法令在英国的君主统治之下持续实行了很久的时间。125年之后，我们还能看到，纳尔逊曾在西印度群岛实行此法案来对抗美国商船，表现出了他维护英国航运利益的拳拳之心；而此时的纳尔逊，还没开始从事他那份声名远扬的职业呢。克伦威尔去世之后，查理二世坐上了父亲的王位；这位国王，虽说对英国人民毫无诚信可言，但也还是一心维护和信守着英国政府对于海洋的传统政策。在他阴险地与路易十四暗中勾结，企图就此不受议会和人民约束的时候，他给路易十四写信说：“要形成一种完美无缺的联盟，还有两大障碍。第一，是目前法国正不遗余力地想要开辟商业贸易，想要成为一个真正的海上强国。对于我们来说，这一目标能否实现，却极为值得怀疑；我们只有通过自己的商业贸易和海军，才拥有了如今的重要地位，所以法国在这个方面采取的每一项措施，都会让两国之间的相互猜忌长久地无法得以消除。”在这两位国王联手对荷兰共和国发动可恶进攻之前的谈判过程中，对于该由哪国来指挥英、法联合舰队的问题，双方发生了激烈的争执。在这个问题上，查理二世毫不退让。他称：“在海上发号施令，英国人已经习惯了；”他还明明白白地告诉法国大使，假如屈从于法国的话，他的臣民是不会服从其命令的。在分割“联合省”[9]的计划中，他为英国保留了在控制斯凯尔特河与默兹河两个河口的一些位置上进行海上劫掠的权利。查理二世治下的海军，将打上了克伦威尔苛政烙印的那种精神和风纪保持了一段时间；但后来，海军也有了那种标志着查理二世罪恶统治的士气普遍衰落之象了。1666年，蒙克[10]犯了一个极大的战略错误，派出了所率舰队的四分之一，却发现自己要面对兵力大大超过了英军的荷兰军队。他没去考虑有多大胜算，便毫不迟疑地发动了进攻，并且尽管伤亡惨重，却与荷兰人英勇奋战了3天。这种做法还算不上是战争；但从渴望英国海军树立威望并支配其行动的专一目标来看，这种做法却说明了数个世纪中英国屡败屡战并最终获得胜利的奥秘——这正是英国人民与政府的共同看法。查理二世的继任者詹姆士二世，本身就曾是一名水兵，并指挥进行过两次大规模的海战。威廉三世登基后，英、荷两国政府便为一人所掌控，并且为了对抗路易十四这个相同的目标而联合起来，直到1713年签订《乌特勒支和约》；也就是说，两国结盟长达25年。有着清晰目标的英国政府，便日益平稳地推进其海洋霸权，从而促进了该国制海权的发展。尽管它是法国公开的敌人，在海上打击法国，但许多人认为，它至少也是个狡诈的友邦，也削弱了荷兰的海洋实力。两国签订的条约规定，荷兰应当装备联合海军的八分之三，英国装备八分之五，几乎是荷兰的两倍。这一条款，加上让荷兰维持102000陆军、而英国只维持40000陆军的另一条款，实际上就是规定了一国负责陆上战争，而另一国负责海上战争。不管是不是有意为之，这种倾向性都是很明显的；而根据和约，虽说荷兰获得了土地补偿，但英国除了在法国、西班牙和西属西印度群岛拥有了商贸特权，还攫取了地中海地区的直布罗陀和马翁港这两处要地，以及北美的纽芬兰、新斯科舍和哈德逊湾。法国和西班牙的海洋实力，此时已经荡然无存；而荷兰的海洋实力，此后也日益衰落下去了。在美洲、西印度群岛和地中海地区这样扎稳脚跟之后，英国政府便开始坚定地走上了一条让英王国变成大不列颠帝国的道路。《乌特勒支和约》签订之后的25年间，各国制定对英、对法政策的大臣们，首要的目标都是与这两个沿海大国和平相处；但在社会极为动荡不安、欧洲大陆政治形势风云变幻、小规模战争不断和各种狡猾的条约层出不穷的那个时期，英国的注意力却一直牢牢地放在保持其制海权上。在波罗的海，英国舰队挫败了彼得大帝对瑞典的袭击，从而维持了波罗的海地区海上势力的均衡；从这一地区，英国不仅获取了大规模的贸易利润，而且其主要的海军军需品也都来自这里，可沙皇却想把这里变成俄国的一个内湖。丹麦努力想要借助外国资金，建立起一个东印度公司；可英国和荷兰非但禁止两国臣民加入，还威胁丹麦，从而阻止了该公司的成立，因为英、荷都认为这个公司不利于两国的海洋利益。在尼德兰——《乌特勒支和约》已规定将这一地区割让给了奥地利——奥地利皇帝批准成立了一个类似于东印度公司、以奥斯坦德为口岸的公司。这一做法，旨在通过斯凯尔特河的天然入海口，恢复低地国家[11]已经输给英、荷两国的贸易业，却遭到了这两个海上强国的反对；两国都贪得无厌，想垄断贸易，在这件事情中又得到了法国相助，所以该公司在步履维艰地坚持了数年之后，也被两国扼杀了。在地中海地区，奥地利皇帝破坏了《乌特勒支和约》；但在当时的欧洲政治格局中，奥地利皇帝却是英国的天然盟友。在英国的支持下，已经攫取了那不勒斯的奥地利皇帝，又要求用西西里交换撒丁岛。西班牙拒绝了这一要求；于是，由阿尔韦罗尼[12]这位精力充沛的大臣统领、刚刚开始复兴的西班牙海军，1718年便在帕萨罗角海岸被英国舰队击溃和消灭了。而在第二年，一支法国陆军在英国的要求下越过比利牛斯山脉，又摧毁了西班牙的造船厂，从而结束了这次战争。如此一来，英国除了将直布罗陀和马翁港掌控在自己手中之外，还让那不勒斯和西西里掌控在盟友手中，从而打垮了自己的一大敌人。在西属美洲，英国虽说从西班牙生活必需品中榨取到了有限的贸易特权，却深受一种覆盖面广且差不多属于明目张胆的走私制度之害；而当恼羞成怒的西班牙政府开始大肆进行压制之后，那位建议和谈的大臣与力挺开战的反对派，便都用和谈或开战对英国制海权和声誉的影响，来捍卫自己的观点。虽说英国的政策一向如此，旨在扩大和加强它统治海洋的各种基础，但欧洲其他各国政府似乎都看不到这一危险，都毫不担心英国在海洋上的发展壮大。西班牙这个大国因为过去那种盲目自大的势力而导致的可悲境遇，似乎都被人们忘记了；而最近因路易十四的野心和言过其实的实力所激起的那一场场血腥、代价巨大的战争所带来的教训，也都被人们遗忘了。在欧洲的政治家们看来，欧洲正在平稳而明显地崛起第三种不可抗拒的力量；这种力量注定要被人们自私地加以利用，虽说并不像以前那样残酷，却会强有力地加以利用，并且会比以前的所有力量利用得更加成功。这便是海洋的力量；由于不像短兵相接那样喧嚣，所以它的影响尽管非常明显地摆在人们面前，人们往往却很少注意到它。不可否认，在我们为这一主题所选择的、差不多整个这一段时间内，英国那种势不可挡的海洋霸权，无疑都是决定最终结果的军事因素中最主要的一个。（2）然而，在《乌特勒支和约》签订之后，一直都无人预见到这种影响，以至于在长达12年的时间里，法国都在其君主个人经历的驱使之下，站在英国一边对抗西班牙；1726年弗勒里[13]掌权之后，虽说这一政策已经取消，但法国海军仍然无人重视，而该国对英国的唯一打击，便是在1736年扶持英国的天敌、波旁王朝的一位亲王登上了两西西里王国[14]的王位。1739年与西班牙开战的时候，英国海军在兵力上比法、西两国海军加起来还要多；而在随后几乎战火不断的25年间，这种兵力差距变得越来越巨大了。在这些战争中，英国迅速建立起了一个强大的殖民帝国——起初是凭直觉，后来则是因为英国政府看到了机会，看到了英国拥有强大制海权的可能性，从而具有了明确的目的；而英国殖民者的性格和英国舰队的力量，则为这一殖民帝国打下了坚实的基础。在纯粹的欧洲事务中，因为拥有制海权而攫取的财富，使得英国在同一时期发挥了极为显著的作用。始于半个世纪之前的马尔伯勒[15]征战中，并在半个世纪后的拿破仑战争中得到最充分发展的拨款津贴制度，使得英国的盟国一直能够为其出力；倘若没有这些友邦，英国就算不是完全任人宰割，其势力也会大大削弱的。谁也无法否认，一个政府倘若左手握着金钱命脉，巩固欧洲大陆上那些虚弱不堪的盟国，右手又将自己的敌人赶下海去并将它们逐出加拿大、马提尼克、瓜达鲁佩、哈瓦那、马尼拉等主要的殖民地，就会让本国在欧洲政治中扮演最重要的角色；又有谁看不到，因为国土面积狭窄、资源匮乏，所以该国政府的力量都是直接来自于海洋呢？皮特[16]的一次演说，表明了英国政府在战争中所坚持的政策；他是英国在战争过程中涌现出来的一位杰出人物，尽管不待战争结束他便丢了官。在谴责政敌所订的《1763年和约》时，他说：“法国就算不是只针对我国，也是我国海上力量和贸易力量的主要威胁。我们在这方面所取得的成就，尤其是通过损害法国利益而让我国获益这一点，弥足珍贵。可你们却给了法国复兴该国海军的机会。”不过，英国的收获是巨大的；它对印度的统治得到了巩固，而北美密西西比河以东的所有地区，也都为它一手所掌控了。到了此时，英国政府已经明确地规划出了自己的前进道路，并且已经采取了一种传统的力量，一直遵循着这条道路前进。的确，从制海权的角度来看，美国革命战争是它犯下的一个巨大失误；不过，英国政府是被一系列的非人为错误所误导，不知不觉地参与进去的。倘若不考虑政治和宪法这两个方面，而将这个问题看作是纯粹的军事问题或海军问题的话，那么，情况就是这样的：美洲的殖民地数量众多，并且当时正在距英国极为遥远的地方发展成为一个一个的社会。只要它们继续隶属于祖国——当时，诸殖民地对于这一点极为狂热——那么，它们就会成为英国在这一地区确立制海权的牢固基地；不过，它们面积太大、人口太多，加之与英国相距遥远，所以，倘若其他强国愿意为它们撑腰，那就不要指望能够用武力去控制它们。然而，这个“倘若”也包括了一种众所周知的可能性：法国和西班牙所受的屈辱是如此的刻骨铭心，其受辱的时间又如此之近，所以它们一定会寻找报仇雪恨的机会；特别是法国，它一直都在认真而快速地建立自己的海军，这一点世人皆知。倘若这些殖民地是13个岛屿，那么英国凭借制海权，就会迅速解决掉这一问题；可它们并没有这样的自然屏障，只能通过内讧才能把它们分开来，而某种共同的危险即足以消除这种内讧。刻意地介入这场战争、试图用武力控制面积如此广袤、民众如此敌视、距本国如此遥远的一片地区，就是与法、西两国重新开始一场“七年战争”，而此次，美洲人民并非支持英国，而是反抗英国了。“七年战争”曾经给英国带来极为沉重的负担，所以一个明智的政府本该明白，哪怕再重一点点，自己都是承受不起的，因而也会明白，对殖民者必须加以安抚才行。当时的政府并不明智，所以英国就失去了大部分制海权。不过，这是失误而非存心；这是因为骄傲自大，而非由于软弱才失去的。

对于英国后来的历任政府来说，通过种种明确迹象，来平稳地执行一条总的政策路线，无疑都是极其容易的。而目标专一，从某种程度上来说是被迫的。坚定不移地维护制海权、傲慢自大地要别国感受到这种制海权、明智地筹划制海权在军事中所占的分量，都更多地应当归因于英国政治制度的特点；这种政治制度，使得英国政府在我们所讨论的这一时期内，落入了土地贵族阶层的手中。这样一个阶层，无论它在别的方面有什么样的缺陷，都很容易采取并且坚持一种良好的政治传统，也自然会以祖国的荣誉为傲，而对保持此种荣誉的社会疾苦相对却比较麻木。这个阶层常常会将备战和打持久战所必需的经济负担，轻描淡写地强加于人民身上。作为一个富有阶层，他们并不觉得那些负担很沉重。由于不从事商业贸易，这一阶层本身的财富并不会直接受到威胁；所以在政治上，他们不像那些财产毫无保障、生意受到威胁的人一样胆小谨慎——这就是人所共知的“资本的胆小”。不过在英国，这一阶层对于触及到英国贸易的事情，无论是有利还是不利，也并非一概都是麻木不仁的。国会上下两院都竞相小心地照管着英国贸易的发展并对其加以保护，所以一位海军历史学家曾把控制海军过程中行政权力效率的增加，归因于上下两院对海军情况的经常质询。这个阶层，还自然而然地接受并保持了一种军事荣誉精神；在军事制度尚未提供某种足以取代所谓“集体荣誉感”的时代，这种荣誉精神是极为重要的。不过，虽说充满了阶级感情和阶级成见，使得别人在海军和其他领域都能感受到他们的存在，但他们的实用主义，却让他们允许地位较卑贱的人获得晋升并得到最高的荣誉；因为每个时代，都有出身于最底层的海军司令。在这一点上，英国上流阶层的脾性与法国有着天壤之别。近至1789年法国革命爆发的时候，法国海军名册上仍保留着这样一位军官的名字：这位军官的职责，就是核实那些有意加入海军的人所提供的贵族血统证明。

自1815年以来，尤其是在如今的这个时代，英国政府已经将很多权利移交给了普通民众。英国的制海权是否会因此而受到损害，仍有待观察。英国制海权的广泛基础，仍然存在于该国规模巨大的贸易、大型的机械工业以及全面的殖民体系当中。英国政府是否具有远见，对国家地位和信誉是否具有锐利的敏感性，是否愿意在和平时期出钱来确保国家的繁荣——这些方面都是做好军事准备所必需的——也仍是一个存有争议的问题。平民政府通常都并不赞成军费支出的，无论这些军费支出有多么必要，故有迹象表明，英国已经有了落后的趋势。

人们已经看到，荷兰共和国的繁荣与荷兰人民的生活，甚至比英格兰这个民族还要更得益于海洋。荷兰政府的特点和政策，根本谈不上有利于始终如一地支持该国拥有制海权。荷兰共和国由7个省份所组成，政治上号称“联合省”；在美国人看来，该国实际的权力分配情况，大体上可以说成是一种夸大了的“州权”的例子。每一个沿海省份都有自己的舰队和海军本部，因此互有猜忌。这种混乱不堪的瓦解趋势，因为荷兰省具有极大的优势而部分地得到了遏制；这一个省就占了全国舰队的六分之五，税收则占全国的85%，因此在制定国家政策时，相应的权力也很大。尽管有着强烈的爱国之情，也能够为了自由而做出最后的牺牲，但民众从事商业贸易的精神还是渗入到了该国政府——它实际上可以称为一个商业贵族政府——当中，并使得它反对战争，反对把钱花在备战所必需的军费上。正如前面已经说过的那样，只有到了危险迫在眉睫的时候，各地长官才愿意花钱来进行防御。然而，在荷兰共和国政府存续期间，这种节省的做法却一点儿也没用在舰队上；直到1672年约翰·德·威特去世、1674年与英国签订和约时，荷兰海军的数量和装备都足以在英、法两国的联合海军面前趾高气扬。此时荷兰海军的实力无疑挽救了该国，使之没有被英、法两国国王密谋消灭掉。随着德·威特去世，共和政体也一去不返，继之而来的，实际上是奥兰治的威廉君主政府了。这位亲王彼时年方18岁，其终生的政策便是对抗路易十四、对抗法国势力的扩张。此种对抗，体现在陆地上而不是在海洋上——这种变化趋势，是由英国退出战争所促成的。早在1676年，舰队司令德·鲁伊特[17]就发现，他的兵力根本应付不了法国海军这一方。由于政府的注意力一直都集中于陆上边疆，所以荷兰海军迅速衰落下去了。1688年，当奥兰治亲王威廉需要一支舰队护送他前往英国的时候，阿姆斯特丹的官员们都极力反对，说海军的力量已经不可估量地削弱了，又缺少有才干的指挥官。当上了英国国王之后，威廉仍然兼任荷兰执政，并且在荷兰继续执行其全面的欧洲政策；此时他发现，英国正好拥有自己所需要的那种制海权，所以便开始利用荷兰的资源来进行陆上战争。这位荷兰亲王同意，在联合舰队中、在军事会议上，荷兰各舰队司令都应当坐在那些资历较低的英军舰长的下首；而荷兰的海洋利益，就像荷兰人的自负那样，轻而易举地为了满足英国的需要而牺牲掉了。威廉死后，下一届政府仍然继续执行着他的政策。这届政府的目标，全都集中在陆地上；而在结束了一系列长达40多年战争的《乌特勒支和约》中，由于没有任何海洋权利诉求，因此在海洋资源、殖民扩张或商业贸易等方面，荷兰都一无所获。

对于其中的最后一次战争，有位英国历史学家曾经如此说道：“荷兰人的节俭，极大地损害了他们的名声和贸易。他们在地中海的作战人员总是军粮短缺，而他们的护航队兵力既弱，装备又差，所以我们每损失1艘船，他们就会损失5艘，使得大家都认为，我们才是更安全的承运人，这当然产生了很好的效果。在这场战争中，我国的贸易是增长而不是削弱了，原因即在于此。”

自那时起，荷兰就不再拥有一种强大的制海权了，因而在确立了制海权的国家中，它很快就丧失了领先地位。公平地来说，是没有什么政策，可以在路易十四那种固执持久的敌意面前，挽救这个虽说意志坚定却很小的国家，使它不致衰落下去的。与法国的友好关系，确保了该国陆地边疆的和平，本来也是可以让它坚持得更久一点，来与英国争夺海洋统治权的；而作为盟友，这两个大陆国家的海军本来也是可以遏制前述这种庞大的制海权，使其无法发展扩大起来的。英、荷两国之间在海洋上的和平，只有在一国事实上臣服于另一国的前提下，才有可能实现；这是因为，两国所致力的都是同一个目标。而法、荷之间则不一样；荷兰的衰落，并不一定是因为其国土面积和人口数量不如别国，而是因为两国政府的错误政策。至于评判哪国政府应负更大的责任，则无需我们去关心了。

法国非但位置十分有利于拥有制海权，还从亨利四世和黎塞留这两位伟大的统治者那里，获得了一种引导其政府行政的明确政策。除了在陆地上向东扩张的某些明确计划，它还一直在对抗奥地利的哈布斯堡王朝——当时，哈布斯堡王朝统治着奥地利和西班牙两国——并出于相同的目的，而在海洋上与英国抗衡。为了推动后一个目标，以及出于其他诸多原因，使得法国必须设法让荷兰成为其盟国。它必须鼓励民众从事商业贸易和渔业，因为二者是获得制海权的基础；还必须建立一支能够打仗的海军。黎塞留留下了一份他自己所称的“政治遗嘱”，指出了法国在其位置和资源的基础上成就制海权的诸多机会；法国史学家们都认为他是法国海军真正的创始人，并不仅仅是因为他装备了许多舰船，而是因为他的眼界之宽广，以及他为确保制度合理和平稳发展而采取的诸多措施。他去世之后，马萨林继承了他的观点和所有的政策，却没有继承他那种崇高而尚武的精神，所以在马萨林统治法国期间，刚刚建立起来的海军又逐渐没落了。1661年路易十四掌控政府之时，法国只有30艘战舰，其中仅有3艘战舰上拥有60门火炮。接下来，就开始出现了一种极为惊人的文治武功；这种文治武功，只有一个巧妙而系统地加以控制的专制政府，才能得以实现。对贸易、制造业、运输业和殖民地事务进行管理的政府部门，交给了柯尔贝尔这个具有极大实干天赋的人；他曾经与黎塞留共过事，并且充分汲取了黎塞留的观点和政策。他以一种彻底的法国精神，追求着自己的目标。一切都必须有条有理，一切政令均出自这位首相的内阁。“要将生产者和商人组织起来，变成一支强大的军队，使之受到积极而睿智的指导，从而通过有秩序的、一致的努力，确保法国在实业上的胜利，并且要通过强制所有工人接受有识之士所公认的加工流程，来获得品质最佳的产品……要像制造业和国内贸易那样，将水手和远洋贸易组织成大型实体企业，并且让一支建立在牢固基础之上、规模之大前所未有的海军，成为支撑法国贸易实力的后盾，”——我们得知，这些就是柯尔贝尔的目标，它们都与制海权链条上三大环节中的两环相关。至于第三环，即位于最远端的殖民地，柯尔贝尔显然也打算采取相同的施政方针和组织方式；因为法国政府首先就从当时的所有者手中，将加拿大、纽芬兰、新斯科舍和法属西印度群岛重新赎了回来。因此，我们从中便可看出，这种纯粹、绝对而不加约束的权力，将指引一国发展之路的支配权集于一身，其目的就是通过这样做，使得国家除了在其他方面发展起来之外，还能确立起一种伟大的制海权。

详细了解柯尔贝尔的施政行为，并不是我们的目的。我们注意到下述两点就足够了：一是法国政府在确立该国制海权的过程中发挥了主导作用；二是这位伟人所关注的，并非仅仅是为确立制海权打下某个方面的基础，而是在其睿智而颇具远见卓识的行政任期之内，为确立该国制海权打下所有的基础。农业生产能增加土地的产品，各类制造业能够让人类的工业产品倍增；国内设立的贸易线路和制定的法律法规，使得产品销往国外更加容易；海运业和海关方面的法律法规，往往会让法国不费吹灰之力便可揽得海外运输业务，从而促进了法国的造船业，使得国内与诸殖民地之间的商品可以畅通地往来；通过殖民制度以及殖民地的发展，一个遥远的市场可以持续成长起来，并为国内贸易所垄断；与外国签订的各个条约都有利于法国贸易业的发展，而对外国船只的商品课税，往往则会削弱竞争国的贸易——所有这些手段，还包括无数的具体措施，都被用于加强法国的：（1）生产能力；（2）运输业；（3）殖民地和市场；一言以蔽之，就是加强法国的制海权。倘若这一切都是由一个人物实施的，并且大致上是一种合乎逻辑的过程，那么我们对这一成就的研究，就要比这一切由一个较复杂的政府中有着利益冲突的各方缓慢地完成的情形更简单，也更轻松。柯尔贝尔在任的那数年中，法国人以自己那种有条有理的、集中的方式，实施着整套制海权理论；而同一理论的阐述，在英国和荷兰历史上，却经历了数代才得以完成。不过，法国的这种发展却是被动的，并且取决于监管此种发展的绝对权力能够持续多久；由于柯尔贝尔并非国王，所以一旦在国王那里失宠，他就失去了掌控权。不过，注意到他的辛劳在政府行为特有的一个领域——即海军领域——里所取得的成绩，是很有意思的。前面已经说过，1661年他走马上任时，法国只有30艘军舰，其中又只有3艘军舰上的火炮达到了60门。1666年，法国有了70艘军舰，其中50艘是战列舰，20艘是火攻船；1671年，该国的军舰数量已从70艘激增到了196艘。到了1683年，除了许多较小的舰船之外，法国已有107艘所载火炮从24门到120门的军舰，其中还有12艘携带的火炮数量超过了76门。海军的造船厂都井然有序、制度分明，使得其生产效率远远高于英国人。在柯尔贝尔的政策影响继续在他儿子手中得以发挥的那个时期，一位被俘的英军上校，曾经如此写道：

“我被那边俘虏之后，首先便在布雷斯特的医院里躺了4个月疗伤。在那里，他们配置和装备军舰的速度让我感到极为震惊；当时，我还以为没有别的国家能够快过英国呢，因为我国的舰船数量10倍于法国，所以水兵数量也10倍于法国。但我在那里却看到，20艘军舰，每艘约有60门火炮，20天之后便装备好了；这些舰船先是被拖进港来，解散了船员；然后巴黎一声令下，这些船只便开始倾侧检修、龙骨朝上、装上船帆、配备食品和人员，然后便在规定的时间重新出海了——一切都进行得极为轻松，简直令人无法想像。同样，我还看到过一艘军舰，它配有的100门火炮，在四五个小时内就全部卸下来了；在英国，我还从未见过哪儿能在24个小时内卸下这么多的火炮呢。可在这里，法国人却干得如此轻而易举，危险情况出现得也比我国要少得多。”

有位法国的海军历史学家，还引述了一些简直是不可思议的做法，比如在4点钟给桨帆船装上龙骨，而9点钟这艘船就全副武装，离港而去了。用那位英国军官更具严肃性的话语来说，我们可以承认，这些传说表明了法国人有着极为卓越的制度与秩序，以及丰富的设备和设施。

不过，这种了不起的发展全都是政府的行为强制促成的，所以一旦政府失道，它就像约拿的葫芦藤[18]一样，渐渐消亡了。它并没有充足的时间来深深扎根于法兰西民族的生活中。柯尔贝尔的做法，与黎塞留的政策是一脉相承的，所以柯尔贝尔政府一度似乎会继续保持这种施政方针，会让法国既在海洋上变得强大起来，也会在陆地上逐渐掌握主导权。由于此处无需列举的种种原因，路易十四开始变得极其憎恨荷兰；因为查理二世也憎恨荷兰，所以两国国王便决定，要联手消灭这个“联合省”。此次战争爆发于1672年；尽管它与英国人民的自然感情更加背道而驰，但对英国而言，此战却不像它对法国而言那样，不是一个政治上的错误，尤其是从制海权方面来看。在此次战争中，法国是在协助消灭一个可能的、当然也是不可或缺的盟国；而英国则是在协助摧毁本国在海洋上最大的、此时事实上在贸易上也胜过英国的竞争对手。路易十四登基时的法国正债务缠身、金融紊乱，原本是到了1672年才在柯尔贝尔的改革措施及其所带来的成就之下，看清了自己的道路。可这场持续了6年的战争，却让柯尔贝尔的努力大多付之东流了。农业生产、制造业、商业和殖民地，全都深受其害；柯尔贝尔所确立的制度、法规，全都荒废了，而他在金融领域所确立下来的秩序，也被颠覆了。这样一来，路易十四的统治——此时，他独揽法国政府大权——就损害了法国海上力量的根基，并且疏远了法国在海上的最佳盟友。虽说法国的领土扩张了，军事力量也增强了，但在此过程中，进行商业贸易的种种源泉业已枯竭，一种和平的海洋运输已经不复存在了；并且，尽管在此后数年间，法国海军仍称得上是势力显赫和富有效率，但它很快就衰落下去，而到了最后，法国海军的主导优势实际上完全丧失殆尽了。对于海洋的这种相同的错误政策，就成了法国占据了长达54年的主导地位之后那个时期的标志。除了建造军舰，路易十四一直都对法国的海洋利益无动于衷；他要么是看不到，要么就是不愿意看到这一点：倘若支撑海军的商船运输业和工业被毁，军舰就会毫无用处、命运难料了。他所制定的政策，目的本在于通过军事实力和领土扩张，让法国获得欧洲霸权，可结果却迫使英国和荷兰结成了同盟；这种结果，正如前面已经说过的那样，不但直接从海上击败了法国，自此以后还间接削弱了荷兰的势力。由于柯尔贝尔建立的海军就此消失了，故在路易十四执政的最后10年间，尽管战火不断，法国在海上却并没有什么大规模的舰队。因此，君主专制政体形式的单一性，就清楚地表明了一国政府对于制海权的发展与衰落会产生多么巨大的影响。

这样，路易十四的后半生，也就见证了法国的制海权因其基础、商贸以及商贸所带来的财富被削弱而导致的衰落。他死后的那一届政府同样专制、有着自己既定的目标，并在英国的要求之下，完全不再坚持维持一支强大的海军了。个中原因，便在于新任国王年纪尚幼；而摄政王因为极其痛恨西班牙国王，为了不利于西班牙国王且保住自己的权力，便同英国结成了联盟。在那不勒斯和西西里，他协助英国扶植了奥地利的势力，以此来打击西班牙，还联手摧毁了西班牙的海军和造船厂，可奥地利本来却是法国的宿敌。在这儿，我们又看到了这样一个例子：一个统治者置法国的海洋利益于不顾，既毁掉了一个天生的盟友，又直接帮助了英国这个海洋霸主[19]发展壮大起来，就像路易十四间接和无意地帮助了英国那样。这一政策实施的时间并不长，随着1726年那位摄政王的辞世而结束了；但从那时起，直到1760年，法国政府却仍然无视自己的海洋利益。实际上，据说由于财政法规做了一些很明智的修正，主要是自由贸易方面的（这应当归功于那位出生于苏格兰的大臣洛），所以法国同东、西印度群岛的商业贸易有了大幅增长，而瓜达鲁佩和马提尼克诸岛也开始富裕、兴旺起来了；不过，一旦开战，法国的贸易业和各个殖民地便都只能任由英国宰割，因为法国海军已经完全没落不堪了。1756年，形势有所好转之后，法国仍然只有45艘战列舰，英国却有近130艘；而要装备这45艘舰船的时候，法国却发现既无材料、帆索，又无补给，甚至连火炮也不足。反正是什么都没有。

“政府的行政无方，”一位法国史学家说，“会让官员们麻木不仁，并为不法行为与纪律涣散大开方便之门。以前从未有过如此之多不公正的擢升现象；因此，以前也从未有过如此普遍的不满情绪。金钱和阴谋取代了其他的一切，并且带来了与金钱和诡计伴生的种种权力。那些能够影响到各个海港的资金和自给自足的贵族和暴发户，认为他们无需荣誉。国家税收和海军造船厂的浪费，就像无底洞一样。荣誉感和谦虚变成了笑柄。而政府却仿佛觉得这些弊端不够厉害似的，还不遗余力地想要将过去那些幸免于破坏殆尽的英雄主义传统消灭干净。至于继任的这位伟大国王的强大斗志，宫廷曾经下令，‘须事事小心’才行。倘若将浪费的材料留下来用于武装舰船，那就是给敌人增加了获胜的机会。由于这种不恰当的政策，我们就必然处于一种守势，而敌人则占有优势；这种情形，正是我国人民的传统精神所不愿见到的。我们按照命令行事，在敌人面前畏首畏尾，从长远来看，是有悖于我们的民族性格的；而对制度的不当运用，则导致了毫无纪律和在战斗中变节的行为，可在前一个世纪中，我们根本就不曾看到过这种行为。”

在欧洲大陆上扩张领土的错误政策，耗尽了法国的各种资源，并且还带来了双重害处；因为它让各个殖民地和商业贸易处于一种毫无防备的状态，使得最大的一种财富来源很容易被敌人切断，而实际上也的确发生过这种事情。在海上航行的小型舰队，被占有巨大兵力优势的敌军一支支地摧毁了；商船被掳掠一空，而加拿大、马提尼克、瓜达鲁佩和印度等殖民地，也统统落入了英国之手。要不是所占篇幅太大，我们本来可以摘选出一些有趣的材料，来说明法国这个放弃了海洋的国度所遭受的可悲苦难，以及在法国做出了所有牺牲和努力的过程中，英国的财力却日益强大起来的情况。有位当代的作家，曾经如此表达了他对法国在这一时期所采取政策的看法：

“由于法国像以前一样全身心地投入了普法战争，将大部分精力和财力都不再放在海军上了，所以我们才可以对其海上力量进行如此沉重的打击，使得它可能永远都无法恢复元气。参与普法战争，同样也使得法国无暇防守各个殖民地，所以我们便趁机征服了其中一些最重要的法属殖民地。战争也让法国无法保护本国的贸易，使得法国的贸易完全被摧毁了；而英国的贸易，却在一种最彻底的和平状态下，前所未有地兴旺起来了。所以，发动此次普法战争，使得法国在与英国发生具体而直接的对抗时，便只能承受落败的结局了。”

在“七年战争”中，法国损失了37艘战列舰和56艘护卫舰——这支兵力，数量上相当于美国在帆船时代任何一个时期内整个海军的3倍。有位法国历史学家在谈及此次战争时，曾经说道：“自中世纪以来，英国第一次在几乎没有盟国支持、而法国却有着强大外援的情况下，独自打败了法国。英国完全是通过政府所具有的优势，才战胜了法国的。”的确是这样；不过，英国是通过该国政府利用制海权这种巨型武器的优势，才战胜了法国的——这就是坚定不移地执行针对一个目标的政策所带来的回报。

法国所受的深切耻辱，在1760年至1763年间达到了极致，于是它便在1763年同英国媾和了；在我们这个商业贸易衰退、海军没落的时代，这种耻辱对于美国来说，是很有教育意义的。我们并未遭受过法国那样的耻辱；所以，就让我们寄望，美国可以从法国后来的这个例子中获益吧。在这几年间（1760年到1763年），法国人民揭竿而起，就像后来的1793年起义一样，并且宣称他们会建立一支海军。“政府巧妙地引导着民意，将下述呼声传遍了法国南北：‘必须重建海军。’各个城市、公司纷纷制作舰船礼品，而个人也纷纷展开了募捐。不久前还默默无闻的一些港口，开始大张旗鼓地干起来；到处都在建造或者修理舰船。”这种做法一直持续着；军械库里补充了武器，各种材料都各归其位，放置得井井有条，而炮兵也得到了重组，经常操练并保持了10000名经过训练的炮手。

当时，海军官兵们马上就感受到了民意的沸腾；事实上，他们心中的一些高尚情操不仅在等待释放，而且也在起着作用。法国海军官兵们那种心理上和职业上的活动，没有什么时候要比当时更强烈；因为当时的法国海军，已经因为政府的碌碌无为而日益衰弱下去了。因此，法国一位杰出的当代军官曾这样写道：

“路易十五统治时期，海军的可悲状况使得官兵们无法在勇敢进取、战争获胜中体现出职业的辉煌，迫使他们只能靠自己的努力来争取。他们从学习中汲取了知识，并在数年之后对这些知识进行了检验，比如践行孟德斯鸠的那句名言：‘逆境者，吾人得生；成功者，吾人得养。'……而到了1769年，海军便变得光彩夺目了，无数优秀官兵的足迹遍及世界各地，他们的著作与调查研究涵盖了人类知识的方方面面。1752年成立的海军学院，又重新整顿起来了。”

海军学院的首任院长是一位退役舰长，名叫比戈·德·莫罗古斯，他写了一部关于海军战术的专著，内容详尽；这是自保罗·何斯德[20]以来，首部关于海军战术、并且旨在代替何斯德专著的原创著作。莫罗古斯一定是在法国还没有舰队、并且在敌人的打击之下根本无法在海洋上抬头的那个时期，研究并系统地阐述其战术思想的。在同一时期，英国并未出现类似的著作；1762年，一名英国中尉也只是翻译了何斯德著作的一部分，而略去了其中的大部分内容。直到差不多20年后，克拉克这位苏格兰的低调绅士，才将他对海军战术所进行的独创性研究发表出来；在他的著作中，他为英国的舰队司令们指出了法国是如何挫败他们那种轻率而联合不善的攻击的。（3）“海军学院的研究，以及海军学院为官兵们注入的那种强大的精神动力，正如我们过后打算说明的那样，对法国海军在美洲战争之初那种相对发达的状况而言，并不是没有产生影响。”

我们已经指出，美国独立战争背离了英国传统的、正确的政策，让该国在一处遥远的大陆上参战，而强大的敌人则伺机在海上攻击它。与距当时不久的普法战争中的法国，以及后来在西班牙战争中的拿破仑一样，英国因为过分自信而让一个盟友变成了敌人，从而使得其实力的真正基础遭受到了严峻的考验。另一方面，法国政府却没有陷入到那种它经常陷入的麻烦中去。由于法国将注意力不再放在欧洲大陆上，在那儿它可以采取中立，并且确定无疑地与西班牙结了盟，让西班牙站在自己这一边，所以凭借一支精良的海军，以及一群虽说经验相对较少却很杰出的海军官兵，法国开始到海上与他国一较雌雄了。在大西洋另一侧的西印度群岛和美洲大陆上，法国得到了一个友好民族的支持，也获得了法属港口或盟国港口的支援。这一政策的明智，以及此种政府行为对法国制海权所产生的良好影响，都是很明显的；不过，此次战争的详情，并不属于本书主题这一部分的内容。对于美国人来说，陆上才是此次战争最主要的利益所在；但在海军官兵看来，最主要的利益却是在海上，因为此次战争本质上就是一场海上战争。法国20年来明智而系统的努力，终于结出了预期的硕果；虽说海上战争以损失惨重而告结束，但法、西两国舰队通力合作，无疑压制住了英国的势力，并且从英国手中夺得了许多殖民地。在海军各种各样的任务与战斗中，法国的荣誉整体上得到了维护；但从一般主题这方面来看，我们很难不得出这样的结论：跟英国海军相比，法国水兵缺少经验，而贵族军官对出身不同的其他官兵也表现出了一种狭隘的猜忌之心；并且首要的是，前面已经提及的那种长达75年的可悲传统，以及政府教导他们首先是保住船只以节省材料的可悲政策，都阻碍着法国的海军将领们，使他们非但无法获得荣耀，还无法发挥出他们数次胜券在握的大好优势。蒙克说过，一个国家想要统治海洋，就必须不停出击，这就为英国的海军政策奠定了基调；而倘若法国政府的命令也始终如一地表现出一种同样的精神的话，那么1778年战争可能就会更早结束，结果也会比实际情况更好。对一种我们国家在神的庇佑之下应当感激的奉献行为加以批评，说这种行为的出现就是一种灾难，似乎有点儿失敬；不过，法国作家们却充分地反省了此话所表达的那种思想。一位曾经在此次战争中出海服役的法国军官，在一部作品中用冷静而公正的语气，如此说道：

“看到德斯坦[21]在桑迪岬之战中的手下，德·格拉斯[22]在圣克里斯托弗所率的军队，甚至是随德·泰尔奈[23]抵达罗德岛的官兵，回来之后并没有受到审判，那些年轻的官兵们又会怎么想呢？”

而很久之后的另一位法国军官，在谈到美国独立战争时，也用下面的话语也证明了上述观点的正确性：

“必须消除摄政时期与路易十五统治时期种种不恰当的成见；不过，这两个时期所充斥的这些悲剧距今都太近，我国的大臣们都没法忘记。由于一种不幸的犹豫态度，我国业已充分激起英国之警惕的舰队数量，才降低到了正常的比例。政府为了固守一种虚假的节约，宣称由于维护舰队需要庞大的军费支出，所以必须命令海军将领们保持‘最大限度的慎重’，好像这种措施在战争中向来都没有导致过惨败似的。因此，下达给我们各分舰队指挥官的命令，就是尽可能久地在海上航行，而不要参与任何可能导致难以补替之舰船损失的作战行动；于是，本来可以为我国海军将领的军事才能和舰长们的勇气带来莫大荣誉的多次大捷，都变成了无关紧要的小胜。一种制度，倘若规定一位将领不应当运用手中的力量，即让将领怀着被动挨打而非主动出击的预定目标去迎敌，倘若为了节省物质资源而消耗道德力量，就必定会导致不幸的结果……这种可叹的政策，当然就是路易十六统治时期、（第一）共和国时期以及（第一）帝国时期海军纪律涣散、官兵变节情况惊人的原因之一。”

1783年和约签订10年后，爆发了法国革命；不过，这次伟大的剧变尽管动摇了各国的基础，松散了社会各阶层之间的联系，并且将君主制度下那些训练有素而食古不化的将领差不多全都赶出了海军，却并未将法国海军从一种错误的制度下解放出来。推翻一种政府形式，要比彻底消除一种根深蒂固的传统更容易。对于这一点，又有一名职位极高、文学成就也很大的法国将领，谈到了维尔纳夫[24]的不作为——在尼罗河河口之战中，维尔纳夫指挥着法国的后卫舰队，但在其纵列舰队前锋受到重创时，他却按兵不动，没有前去支援：

“终有一天（即特拉法尔加海战），会轮到维尔纳夫抱怨说他被自己的舰队抛弃了，就像他之前的德·格拉斯和杜歇拉一样。我们已经慢慢开始怀疑，这种致命的巧合可能会存在着某种隐秘的原因。在这么多可敬之人当中，经常有海军将领和官兵遭受这样的耻辱，是很不正常的。倘若如今我们还遗憾地将他们当中某个人的名字，与我国的各种灾难联系起来的话，那么我们就可以确定，这并不全是他们的错。我们必须将责任归咎于他们所进行的那种作战行动的性质，以及法国政府规定他们只能进行防御作战的制度——皮特曾在英国国会宣称，这种制度，就是灭亡的前兆。到了我们不愿承认的时候，那种制度早已渗入到了我们的习惯当中；可以这么说，它已经让我们的双臂变得衰弱，并且让我们丧失了自立精神。我国的小型舰队离港去完成某项特定任务时，常常首先就抱有避开敌人的想法；要是遭遇了敌人，那就是运气不好。我们的舰队就是这样卷入战斗的；它们都是被动地接受战斗，而不是主动地迫使敌人进行战斗……其实，双方舰队的运气本来可能差不多，倘若途中遭遇纳尔逊的布律埃斯[25]能够勇敢出击的话，结局并非一定就会对我们如此不利了。维拉雷[26]和马丁曾经参与了的那场缩手缩脚、胆小谨慎的战争，只是由于一些英国将领的谨慎小心，以及原有战术上的种种传统，才持续了很久。正是因为这些传统，尼罗河河口之战中法军才失败了；所以，采取关键行动的时刻已经到来。”

数年之后，便爆发了特拉法尔加海战，法国政府再一次对海军采取了一种新的政策。上面这位作者又说：

“法国皇帝虽然有着鹰隼般犀利的眼光，制定了法国舰队和陆军的作战计划，但这些意想不到的失利，却让他倍感厌烦了。于是，他的目光不再盯着这个运气并不眷顾他的战场，决定在别的地方而不是在海上与英国继续纠缠下去；他开始重组法国海军，却不让海军在这场变得愈加激烈的战争中发挥作用……尽管如此，我国各个海军造船厂的生产却并未松懈下来，而是再次增加了。年年都建造新的战列舰，或者年年都有新的战列舰加入舰队。法国控制下的威尼斯和热那亚，又看到了过去种种辉煌的再次崛起，而自易北河河岸直到亚得里亚海顶端，欧洲大陆上的所有港口也都在热切地支持法国皇帝这种颇具创造性的想法。斯凯尔特河、布雷斯特、都灵……到处都集结着众多的小型舰队。可最终，皇帝却不愿给予这支热情满怀、自信非凡的海军一个与敌人一较高下的机会……不断的失败已让他极感沮丧，所以他坚持只让我们的军舰起到这样的作用：迫使敌人进行封锁，因为封锁要付出巨大的代价，最终必然会耗尽敌人的财力。”

法兰西帝国倒台的时候，法国仍有103艘战列舰和55艘护卫舰。

现在，让我们把目光从过去具体的历史教训，转到政府对一国人民的海洋事业所产生的影响这个一般性问题上来；看得出来，此种影响可以从两个相互独立却又紧密相关的方面产生作用。

首先是在和平时期：政府通过它所制定的政策，可以促进一个民族的工业发展，可以促进该民族通过海洋来寻求冒险和收获的癖好；或者，在它们并非自然存在的情况下，政府也可以尽量开发这样的产业，并且培养人民的航海爱好。而从另一方面来说，政府也可能通过错误的行为，遏制和束缚人民在没有政府管理的情况下自发获得的进步。在这些方面，政府要么会成就、要么会毁掉该国赖以进行和平贸易的制海权；以此种制海权为基础，是可以建立起一支十分强大的海军的，这一点我们怎么坚持也不过分。

其次是在战争时期：政府的影响体现在用最合理的方式维持一支海军，海军的规模应与该国海洋运输业的发展及其相关利益的重要性相适应。比海军规模更为重要的，就是海军制度的问题；它们应当有利于形成一种健康的精神与活力，并且考虑到本民族的性格与爱好，通过储备适当的人员和舰船，通过各种措施来发挥出前面已经指出的那种全面性备用力量的作用，来为战时的迅速发展做好准备。毫无疑问，在上述第二种军事准备中，还得包括在偏远的、须有军舰保护商船的地方，拥有一些合适的军港。保护这些军港，要么必须依赖于直接的武装力量，就像保护直布罗陀和马耳他那样；要么必须依赖于军港周边的友好民族，比如曾经属于英国的美洲各殖民地那样，并且可想而知，如今的英属澳洲各殖民地也是这样。此种友好的环境与支持，加上合理的军事准备，就是最佳的防御之法；倘若再加上一种明显的海上优势，就足以确保一个像英国这样分散而广袤的帝国无虞了，因为虽说出其不意的攻击的确可能给某个地区带来灭顶之灾，但制海权方面实实在在的优势，自然会阻止这种败局蔓延，从而不致造成不可收拾的局面。历史已经充分证明了这一点。英国的海军基地遍布世界各地；英国舰队也曾一度保护过这些基地，使它们之间的交通补给畅通无阻，并且倚赖这些基地，把它们当成避难所。

因此，附属于母国的殖民地，便为一个国家提供了支撑其制海权的最安全的途径。在和平时期，政府的作用应当是千方百计地促进这些殖民地与母国之间保持一种温暖人心的附属关系，在利益上保持团结，使得一地的福祉即是整个帝国的福祉，一处之纠纷即是整个帝国之纠纷；而在战时，或者更准确一点说，在备战时，则应采取恰当的组织与防御措施，根据各地所获得的利益，公平地分配每个地方应当承担的义务。

美国没有这样的殖民地，日后也不太可能拥有。对于纯粹的海军军港，100年前一位英国海军史学家在谈到当时的直布罗陀和马翁港时，很可能就已经准确地表达出了美国人民的感受。“军事政府，”他说，“一般极少认可一个贸易民族的勤勉，而这种政府的内部，也对英国人民的才干充满厌恶之情；因此，我并不怀疑，那些明智人士以及属于各个党派的人一直都倾向于放弃这些军港，就像抛弃丹吉尔军港一样。”美国并没有海外机构，既无殖民地，又无军港，故战争时期的美国军舰就会像陆地上的鸟儿一样，无法远离本国海岸。因此，为军舰提供泊锚之处，使之能够在这些地方添煤、维修，对于一个打算发展制海权的政府来说，就是它的首要职责了。

我们这种探究的实际目标，是从历史教训中得出适用于我国行政事业的结论；所以，现在我们不妨来问一问，美国的现状在多大程度上会使它陷入严重的危险当中，在多大程度上会为了重新确立美国的制海权而要求政府采取行动。很难说自美国内战以来至今，美国政府的行动都有效地把精力集中在所谓制海权因素链中的第一环这个唯一的目标上。国内的发展、大规模生产以及相应的自给自足之目的，连同自给自足所带来的自豪感，这些一直都是美国政府的目标；从某种程度上来说，这些也是美国政府行动的结果。在这个方面，政府如实地反映了该国统治阶层的喜好；尽管我们很难说，即便是在一个民主自由的国度里，这些统治阶层也具有真正的代表性。但无论情形怎样，可以确定的是，除了没有殖民地之外，商船运输这个中间环节以及它所带来的利益，如今的美国也同样没有。总之，在制海权这一链条上，美国只拥有其中的一环。

在过去的100年间，海洋战争的环境已经发生了巨大的变化，使得人们可能会怀疑，一边是海洋战争这种灾难性的后果、另一边则是如此了不起的繁荣——就像我们在英法战争中所看到的那样——这种情形如今是不是还有可能发生。英国凭借其稳妥而神气的海洋霸主地位，让各中立国唯命是从的情形，今后这些中立国再也不会容忍了；而国旗涵盖了该国财产的原则，也已永久地确立下来了。因此，交战国的物资，除了战时禁运品和运往被封锁港口的那些物资，如今都可以安全地由中立国船只进行运输了；至于封锁港口，我们也可以确定，今后不会再有什么纸上封锁[27]了。所以，撇开为了不让本国海港被敌人攻陷或者被迫向敌人纳贡而进行防御这个问题不谈——因为对于这个问题，各国在理论上完全一致，可实际运用起来却截然不同——美国在制海权方面又有什么样的需求呢？即便是现在，美国的贸易也是由别国来进行的；那么，美国人民又怎么会渴望那种在获得之后需要付出巨大代价才能守住的制海权呢？这个问题属于经济问题，由此来看，它超出了本书论述的范围；不过，一些可能导致交战国蒙受损失和伤亡的情况，却与这个问题有着直接的联系。因此，假定美国的对外贸易往来都是由外国船只进行的，除了驶往被封锁港口的情形之外，敌方都无法对付这些船只，那么，什么才是一种有效的封锁呢？目前对于“有效封锁”的定义，是指对试图进出港口的船只构成明显的威胁。显然，这一定义非常灵活。许多人都还记得，美国内战中，在对查尔斯顿沿海的合众国舰队进行了一次夜袭之后，第二天早上，南部邦联便派一艘汽船，载着一些外国领事出海了；这些外国领事没有看到封锁船只，都很高兴，便发表了一份大意是没有封锁船只的声明。南方当局又以这份声明为依据，宣称已经依规打破了北方的封锁，而北方则必须重新发表一份通告，才能依照规则再次实行封锁。是不是非得看见执行封锁任务的舰队，才能说是对突破封锁的船只构成了真正的威胁呢？在新泽西和长岛之间离岸20英里之处进行巡逻的6艘快艇，对于试图通过主要入口进出纽约的船只来说，就会构成一种真正巨大的威胁；而在相似的地点进行巡逻，也可以有效地封锁波士顿、特拉华河和切萨皮克湾。执行封锁任务的舰队主力，非但有着俘获商船的准备，也作好了抵御军事突破封锁的准备，并不需要别人看得见，也不需要待在岸上人所熟知的某个地方。特拉法尔加海战爆发的前两天，纳尔逊舰队的主力位于距加的斯港50英里的地方，并有一个小分队严密监视着该港。法、西联合舰队在早上7点开始出港，而即便是在那时的条件下，纳尔逊也在9点就得知了这一消息。英国舰队虽说相距如此遥远，但对敌人来说，却是一种真正巨大的威胁。从已有越洋电报的如今看来，在近海与远海、从此港到彼港执行封锁任务的舰队，可以沿着整个美国海岸线用电报相互联络，从而轻松地支援彼此，这一点是有可能做到的；并且，倘若有着某种有利的军事联合机制，一支小分队遭受猛烈进攻时，就可以警告其他分队，并且向其他分队方向撤退。假设对一个港口的这种远海封锁有一天被突破，那些执行封锁的舰船被彻底赶跑了，那么，第二天就可以把重新进行封锁的通告，用电报发往世界各地。要想避免这样的封锁，就必须有一支海上部队，始终威胁到敌方执行封锁任务的舰队，使之根本无法待在自己的战位上。这样，除了那些装有战时禁运物品的，中立船只便可来去自如，维持该国与外界之间的通商贸易了。

有人或许会说，美国的沿海地区广袤得很，是不可能有效地封锁整个海岸线的。那些还记得在内战中是如何维持对南部沿海进行封锁的军官，最容易承认这一观点。不过，从美国海军目前的情况来看，倘若再加上美国政府提出的增补力量，（4）封锁波士顿、纽约、特拉华河、切萨皮克湾和密西西比河——换句话说，就是封锁那些大型的贸易进出口中心——并不会让一个海洋大国要费比过去更大的劲儿。英国曾经同时封锁过布雷斯特、比斯开湾沿岸、土伦和加的斯，当时这些海港中都驻扎有一些兵力强大的小型舰队。那时，中立国的商船确实能够进入美国的其他港口，而无法进入上述地区；但是，进口贸易所倚赖的港口被迫发生此种改变，会给该国的贸易运输业带来多大的混乱，会使得补给时不时发生多么严重的中断，又会导致铁路和水路交通的方式、船坞使用方式、驳船运输的方式以及仓储方式变得多么的不足啊！该国难道不会因此而蒙受金钱上的损失，不会因此而承受苦难么？而当费尽力气和巨大代价，部分地改善了这些弊端之后，敌人可能又会像对付原来那些港口一样，去封锁新的港口了。美国人民当然不会挨饿，但他们可能会极为难受。至于属于战时禁运品的那些补给物资，我们难道没有理由担心，一旦出现紧急情况，美国如今已无法独自承受了吗？

这是一个突出的问题，政府在这个问题上的作用，应当是为美国建立起一支海军；就算这支海军无法前往那些遥远的国家，起码也应当能够保持通往本国的交通要道畅通无阻才行。我国不再关注海洋已达25年之久；这样一种政策的结果，以及与之相对的政策的结果，从法、英两国的例子中就可以看得出来。我们不用在美国的情形与这两国中任何一国的情形之间进行狭隘的类比，而是可以肯定地说，通过外部战争尽量让商业贸易环境不受影响，这一点对于整个国家的福祉来说是至关重要的。为了做到这一点，我们不但必须将敌人拒之于我国诸港之外，还得使敌人远离我们的沿海地区才行。（5）

这样的一支海军，是否不用恢复商船运输业就能建立起来呢？值得怀疑。历史已经证明，一位专制君主也能建立起这样一种纯粹的军事制海权，比如路易十四；但尽管看上去如此公平，经验却已表明，他的海军就像是无根之木，很快就凋落了。不过，在一个代议制政府里，任何军费支出都必须有力地代表着某种利益，并且确定有必要支出才行。在制海权中，这样的一种利益并不存在，没有政府参与的话，海上行动也不可能存在。此种商船运输业如何才能建立起来，无论是通过补贴还是通过自由贸易，也无论是通过持续刺激其发展还是让其自由发展，都属于经济问题，而非军事问题。即便是拥有了一种大规模的国家航运业，美国能否因此而建立起一支强大的海军，这一点也仍是值得怀疑的；美国与其他列强格格不入，从某种意义上来看就是一种保护主义，也是一种陷阱。促使美国建立海军的动因——倘若存在这种动因的话——如今很可能正在中美地峡有如胎动般地蓬勃兴起。让我们翘首期待这个“胎儿”不要降生得太迟吧。

对于影响到各国制海权发展——无论有利还是不利——的主要因素的一般性讨论，我们就到此为止。进行讨论的目的，首先是考虑这些因素的自然属性是有利于制海权的发展，还是不利于制海权的发展，然后再用具体事例或者过去的经验教训，对此加以说明。这样的讨论，虽说无疑涉及到了更为广泛的范围，但主要还是属于不同于“战术”的“战略”范畴。讨论中所涉及到的问题与原则，都是不可改变的、或者说永恒不变的自然法则，其因果关系世世代代都是始终如一的。可以说，这些问题与原则都属于自然规律，并且我们如今也已熟知，自然规律都是极其稳固的；而战术呢，因为它以人类所造之武器为工具，所以与人类一样，会一代又一代地变化和进步的。战术的上层建筑，时常必须加以改变，或者彻底推倒重构才行；但迄今为止，战略原有的那些基础却仍然存在，并且坚若磐石。后文中，我们会具体地根据最广义的制海权对这段历史以及对两洲人民福祉所产生的影响，来研究欧美两洲的一般性历史。如有机会，我们还会时不时地通过具体的例证，回忆并强化我们已经得出的一般性结论。因此，这种研究的总体思路就是战略性的，依据的是前面已经引述过、业已得到公认的那种最广义的海军战略之定义：“海军战略之目标，旨在和平时期与战争时期建立、支撑并扩大一国之制海权。”至于具体的战事，虽然可以坦承因为具体情况不同，所以根据这些战事总结出来的许多理论业已过时，但我们仍会尽量指出，哪些战事因为应用或者忽视了真正的普遍原则而产生了决定性的结果；并且，在其他条件相同的情况下，我们还会介绍一些特定的战事——因为它们都与一些极为杰出的将领紧密相关，所以我们相信，这些战事可以说明，在某一特定年代或者某一特定的军事职责当中，能够获得多么正确的战术思想。在古、今武器装备表面上很相似的一些战事中，我们也值得去推断其中所提供的、那些有充分根据的教训，而不必过分强调这些战事在武器装备上的相似之处。最后，我们必须记住，尽管世间事物千变万化，人的本性却一如往昔；虽说在具体事例上表现的程度不一，但仁者见仁、智者见智这一点，我们却会时时见到。

原注：

（1）通过永久性的作战基地，“可以了解一个国家的所有资源来自何处，水陆交通干线在何处交汇，以及该国的军械库与武装要塞位于何处。”

（2）从约米尼的《法国革命战争史》一书的第一章，我们可以看到一位伟大的军事权威极其重视英国制海权的一个很有意思的证据。他为欧洲政策制定了一项基本原则，即不允许任何无法经由陆路到达的国家不加限制地扩张海军——这种办法，其实只适用于英国。

（3）对于克拉克的说法，不管人们认为它在建立一个海军战术体系方面具有什么样的新颖性，也无论它受到了人们何种严厉的抨击，他对于过去的批判无疑都是正确的。正如作者所认为的那样，作为一个既未接受过海员训练、又未接受过军事训练的人，他已经很值得大家称颂了。

（4）写下上述文字之后，海军部长在其1889年的报告中，已经提议建立一支能够完成这种封锁任务、但此处却已表明相当危险的舰队。

（5）在战争时期，“防御”一词有两种意思；为严谨起见，我们在心中必须将它们区分开来才行。纯粹的防御是指加强自身的力量，以待敌人攻击。这种防御可称之为“被动防御”。而另一方面，有一种防御观念却认为，主动进攻敌人可以最好的保护好自身的安全，并且达到进行防御准备的真正目标。对于沿海防御而言，沿岸固定的防御工事、鱼雷，以及所有无法移动、只是为了阻止敌军进入沿海地区而建立起来的普通工事，都是前一种方式的例证。第二种方式则包括了并非守株待兔、而是出海迎击敌方舰队的所有手段，不论出击距离只有数英里远，还是直达敌国沿海。这样一种防御，虽说看上去可能是一种真正的进攻战，但实际上却不是；只有当攻击目标从敌方舰队变成了敌方国土，才会变成攻击战。英国曾将自己的舰队部署在法国沿海诸港外，如果法国舰队出海的话，就进行攻击，以此来保卫英国的海岸线和殖民地。合众国在内战中也曾将舰队部署在南方诸港沿海，并非是因为合众国担心自身的安全，而是为了通过隔绝南部邦联与外界的联系，并最终进攻这些南方港口，从而打垮南部邦联。两国所采用的，都是相同的方式；但英国的目的是为了防御，而美国的目的则是为了进攻。

混淆这两种概念，会使我们对于陆军和海军在沿海防卫方面的恰当作用产生许多不必要的争论。被动防御属于陆军；凡是在水上运动的装备与方式，则都属于海军，它们都有执行进攻性防御的特点。倘若水兵经常驻守要塞，那他们就变成了陆军的一分子，这跟陆军部队登上舰船补充海军兵力之后，无疑就变成了海军的一部分是一样的。

译者注：

[1] 伯格因（John Burgoyne,1722～1792）。美国独立战争时期的英军将领之一，也是一位剧作家。1777年秋，他在萨拉托加第二战役中惨败，并向北美殖民地军队投降。

[2] Zuyder Zee：须德海。欧洲北海的一个海湾，在荷兰西北部。它是13世纪时海水冲进内陆，同原有的湖沼汇合而成，英国称之为“南海”（Southern Sea）。亦拼作Zuider Zee。

[3] Jena：耶拿。德国西南部的一个城市。1806年发生的耶拿战役，是拿破仑指挥的法军与第四次反法同盟进行的一场著名战役，以法军获胜而告结束，并集中体现了拿破仑杰出的军事指挥才能。

[4] Plevna：普列文。欧洲地名，现属保加利亚。1877～1878年俄土战争期间，俄国与罗马尼亚联军凭借兵力优势，在此击败土耳其。

[5] a nation of shopkeepers：小店主民族，小店主之国。这是拿破仑对英国人的蔑称，源于英国的贸易业发达，指英国人会做生意。

[6] 柯尔贝尔（Jean-Baptiste Colbert,1619～1683）。法国政治家和国务活动家，曾长期担任财政大臣和海军国务大臣，是路易十四时期最著名的政治人物之一。

[7] Duke of Sully：苏利公爵（Maximilien de Béthune, 1560～1641）。法国政治家，法国国王亨利四世的重臣。1603年，任驻英王詹姆斯一世宫廷的特命大使（后面引文中所称的“大使”即是指他），后获封苏利公爵一世。

[8] Barbary States：巴巴里诸国。指16世纪至19世纪间埃及以西信奉伊斯兰教的北非各国，如摩洛哥、阿尔及利亚、突尼斯和利比亚等，故亦称“北非诸国”。

[9] United Provinces：联合省。即荷兰共和国。荷兰资产阶级革命时期，北方7省和南方部分城市于1579年1月23日缔结乌特勒支同盟，为共和国的成立奠定了基础。1581年，由北方各省组成的三级会议宣布废黜西班牙国王腓力二世，并正式成立“联合省共和国”。由于荷兰省在“联合省”中的经济和政治地位最重要，因此亦称荷兰共和国。

[10] 蒙克（George Monk,1608～1670）。英国内战时期在爱尔兰和苏格兰作战的国会派将领、苏格兰总督，亦为第一次英荷战争和第二次英荷战争时英军的舰队司令。他是促成查理二世王政复辟的关键人物。亦拼成George Monck。

[11] Low Countries：低地国家。指欧洲大陆西北沿海地区，广义上包括如今的荷兰、比利时、卢森堡，以及法国北部和德国西部，狭义上则仅指荷、比、卢三国。

[12] 阿尔韦罗尼（Giulio Alberoni,1664～1752）。意大利教士、政治家和军事家，1715年至1719年间任西班牙首相和主教，在西班牙王位继承战中起到了重要作用。他曾试图废除《乌特勒支和约》，进而掌控奥地利在意大利的财产，但此举遭到英、法、德、荷四国的反对，导致爆发了四国同盟战争。

[13] 弗勒里（Cardinal André-Hercule de Fleury, Bishop of Fréjus,1653～1743）。法国的枢机主教，路易十五时代的首席大臣。

[14] The Two Sicilies：两西西里王国。1282年，西西里王国分裂，从而出现了“两西西里”这一名称，其范围包括意大利南部和西西里岛。在拿破仑入侵以前，南意大利和西西里岛虽均由波旁王朝统治，但两地统治者不同。1734年，西班牙国王查理七世（当时还未继位）夺取了西西里和那不勒斯王位，使得两西西里回到了西班牙手中。1816年，斐迪南一世将西西里和那不勒斯统一成两西西里王国，首都在那不勒斯。

[15] Marlborough：马尔伯勒（John Churchill,1650～1722）。英国历史上最伟大的军事统帅之一，1672至1673年间随英国远征军参加英荷战争，立有战功，获封马尔伯勒公爵（Duke of Marlborough）。

[16] 皮特（William Pitt,1708～1778）。英国政治家，第9任首相，“七年战争”中英国的实际领导人，获封查塔姆伯爵一世（1st Earl of Chatham）。其儿子与他同名，为英国历史上最年轻的首相（小皮特任首相时，才24岁）。两人都擅长演说，皆被认为是英国历史上最伟大的首相之一。

[17] 德·鲁伊特（Michiel de Ruyter,1607～1676）。荷兰历史上最著名的海军司令之一，以其在英荷战争中的表现而闻名。他率军多次同英、法两国海军交战并获胜，还在1667年突袭麦德威一役中重挫英国，从而结束了第二次英荷战争。后在1676年死于海战。

[18] Jonah's gourd：约拿的葫芦藤。源于《圣经》故事。约拿是《旧约》中的一个先知，因认为神不公正而坐在城外生气。神让一根葫芦藤生长起来，为约拿遮阴，约拿很高兴；但第二天，神又让虫子啃食葫芦藤根部，使得葫芦藤迅速枯萎了。约拿很难过，神便借此开导他。后人多用“约拿的葫芦藤”比喻“来得快去得也快的东西”，或者“朝生暮死”等意思。

[19] Mistress of the seas：海洋霸主。英国昔日因海洋力量强大而获得的绰号。

[20] 保罗·何斯德（Paul Hoste,1652～1700）。法国耶稣会教士、海军战术家，出版了世界首部关于海军战术的重要著作。

[21] 德斯坦（Charles Hector, Comte D'Estaing,1729～1794）。法国军事家和海军上将，在美国独立战争期间曾率第一支法国舰队支援美国。

[22] 德·格拉斯（Francois-Joseph Paul, marquis De Grasse Tilly, Comte De Grasse, 1722～1788）。法国海军将领。在美国独立战争中，他指挥法国海军参与了切萨皮克湾海战，并直接导致英军在约克镇投降。但他在次年的桑迪海峡战役中，被罗德尼击败并被俘。他也因在这次战役中的表现而广受批判。回国后他希望受到军事法庭审判，但最终被判无罪。

[23] 德·泰尔奈（Charles-Henri-Louis D'Arsac, Chevalier De Ternay,1723～1780）。法国海军将领。他在“七年战争”和美国独立战争中最为活跃，曾于1762年率远征军攻取了纽芬兰，又于1780年被任命为皇家海军司令，率军开赴美洲。

[24] 维尔纳夫（Silvestre De Villeneuve,1763～1806）。法国贵族、海军将领。1798年拿破仑埃及远征军的舰队在尼罗河河口之战中，被英国的纳尔逊舰队歼灭，但维尔纳夫侥幸逃脱，后在特拉法尔加海战中投降英国。

[25] 布律埃斯（Francois-Paul Brueys D'Aigalliers, Comte De Brueys,1753～1798）。法国海军副司令，1798年在尼罗河河口之战中的阿布基尔被纳尔逊打败并阵亡。

[26] 维拉雷（Louis-Thomas Villaret De Joyeuse,1747～1812）。法国海军将领，曾任法属马提尼克和圣卢西亚岛总督。

[27] paper blockade：纸上封锁。军事封锁的一种，亦称“拟制封锁”、“宽松封锁”等，指虽然宣告某地已成为本国封锁的禁地，但并不真正派遣海军前去实行的封锁，实际上属于一种外交宣示。17～19世纪的封锁多属此类，但此种封锁对交战国和中立国均会造成困扰，1805年的特拉法尔加海战便是其中著名例子之一。